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PREFACE 
"Truth is rarely pure, and never simple. " 
Oscar Wilde. 
0.1 Three difficulties 
The germ from which this study grew was three difficulties I had with the way in 
which the truth about HIV/AIDS was represented. Contrary to what might well be 
expected however, these problems were not functions of the much vaunted ignorance 
and irresponsibility often supposed to surround the syndrome (and to be exemplified 
by the greater part of media reportage), but were instead found in aspects of those 
texts which might be considered 'progressive', in that they were those which often had 
the specific aim of clearing up the mess that media mischief makers had left in their 
wake; texts, that is, which set themselves up as authorities which could provide the 
reader with the 'real truth' about HIV/AIDS. 
Chronologically the first of these difficulties was how it was that the discourse of 
HIV/AIDS came to be sexualised. This may seem a bizarre question, given what is 
commonly understood and accepted about the nature of HIV, and indeed it is, in as 
much as it was resultant from my rather unusual subject relation to the discourse of 
HIV/AIDS; my first encounter with this discourse was in the early eighties (two or 
three years before HIV/AIDS became hot news, and a time when there was no 
widespread awareness of even the existence of the syndrome) when the propensity I 
have for bruising more easily than most people was translated by means of two or 
three blood tests into a diagnosis of moderate haemophilia. I was thereafter presented 
with a good deal of information about this then new condition (HIV/AIDS, that is, 
not hemophilia), and this early discourse, as I remember it, centred very much 
around blood - on how it was more important than ever to avoid accidents which 
would require treatment with blood products, and on non-blood-derived therapeutic 
alternatives which might be used, with relatively little emphasis on the dangers of 
sexual transmission of whatever agent was causing the sickness. It was something of 
a surprise to me, then, that when the explosion of discussion of HIV/AIDS began a 
couple of years later, it was orientated so completely around sexuality. From my 
admittedly peculiar perspective, there seemed to have been an intriguing 
reorganisation of HIV/AIDS knowledge. 
My second problem was more straightforward; in the mid-nineteen-eighties there 
began a burgeoning of truth-claiming literatures about HIV/AIDS, sporting titles such 
as AIDS: The Facts (Langone 1991), The Truth About the AIDS Panic (Fitzpatrick & 
Milligan 1987) and The Real Truth About Women and AIDS (Singer Kaplan 1987). 
These various texts were, however, often markedly contradictory -a fact which could 
leave the interested lay reader and the professional enquirer alike somewhat 
bewildered, and with no way other than hunch or arbitrary preference to decide the 
issues raised. This was certainly my experience, so my second problem was how to 
make some sense out of this confusion without resorting to either of those less than 
satisfactory options. 
My third difficulty was with safer sex, which, it seemed to me (after having made a 
certain amount of initial but relatively casual enquiry into the area), had over the 
years from 1985 onwards become ensconced in certain increasingly conspicuous and 
influential quarters as the preferred approach to dealing with the spread of HIV, 
sometimes at the expense of alternative and possibly complementary approaches, 
such as trying through education to encourage people to take fewer sexual partners in 
order to reduce the overall number of connexions by which the virus might be 
transmitted. My problem with the privileging of safer sex in this manner was that 
such thinking seemed to me to imply that the avowedly compelling assertion that 
expressions of human sexuality need not necessarily be concerned with reproduction 
(and, moreover that non-reproduction orientated sexual expressions are not morally 
deviant by dint of being so) could be extended to the less immediately convincing 
suggestion that human sexuality has nothing at all to do with reproduction. How, I 
wondered, was one to practice safer sex when trying for a baby? Or alternatively, at 
what point should one give up safer sex in order to reproduce - when one is married? 
when one has a 'steady partner' (whatever that might be)? if both partners have taken 
an HIV test and shown up as negative? I began to wonder how it was that such a 
discourse had come to dominate and how this dominance could be sustained, given 
such obvious - to me at any rate - aporia. 
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0.2 A tentative problematic - the problem with progressive discourse 
These difficulties provided me with what Silverman calls 'puzzling data' (1985: 6-8); 
that is they served as examples of the sort of perplexing findings one may on 
occasion come across when looking at a given area of interest, and from which one 
may then derive a more specific research problematic. The true starting point of the 
thesis, then, was the moment when I made the decision to attempt to make some 
sense of the melange of representations and recommendations which are articulated 
on HIV/AIDS, and to do so using certain of the theories of societal regulation and 
personal subjectivity proffered by Michel Foucault. Having made this decision it 
became possible to hammer out some sort of terms of reference for myself, and in 
doing so the scope of what was to be targeted within the work became a little wider 
than this original statement of intent might seem to suggest, in that my gaze moved 
away from the specific problems inherent in 'progressive' HIV/AIDS discourse, and 
towards the difficulties of 'progressive' discourse in general, as they are manifested in 
HIV/AIDS discourse. 
Engaging with such problems, it must be said, is not the standard fare of sociological 
enquiry. To do so, however, is very much in keeping with Foucault's analyses (1961; 
1973; 1977; 1979) which sought to question whether one can ever be 
unproblematically on the side of 'progress', and to determine the costs of 'progress'. 
These analyses provided a useful starting point for my work. Foucault, however, was 
not a sociologist, and provided no ready account of exactly how to go about doing 
work akin to his own. It became necessary, therefore, for me to try to extract a 
sociology from this non-sociological perspective, a fact which informs my research 
overall, and which has interesting ramifications at many levels - in the way the 
objects of enquiry are conceived, in the methodologies employed, in the relation I as 
the researcher was required to take to the process of research, in the status of the 
conclusions drawn. These will all be discussed in full in the body of the thesis. 
Given the above, though, the work should be viewed as being as much about carving 
out a particular kind of sociology as it is about saying something on the subject of 
HIV/AIDS. 
Nevertheless, HIV/AIDS is the subject of this thesis, and some further discussion of 
the particular problems it raises is necessary here. As J. S. Mill commented in On 
Libero,, "those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling" have 
tended to occupy themselves 
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"rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike than in questioning whether its 
likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the 
feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical rather 
than make common cause in defence of freedom with heretics generally. " 
(1985(1859): 66) 
And so it is with much of what may be termed the 'progressive' discourses which 
orbit AIDS - that various campaigns with objectives which are undeniably laudable in 
their humanity, have, possibly through a desire to ensure their political potency and to 
effect concrete change, focused on a multitude of specific problems and grievances, 
often at the expense of philosophical clarity and consistency. This, it may well be 
argued, is a fair trade off; the amelioration of real suffering should take unqualified 
precedence over the dissatisfactions of those who, secure in their ivory towers, are 
divorced from the untold numbers of individual catastrophes which comprise this 
thing called AIDS. However, such pragmatic approaches to problems sometimes 
create difficulties which are no less practical, but a lot less visible. 
For example, the particular gambits and manoeuvres which inform these forward 
looking HIV/AIDS discourses have (probably accidentally) achieved two problematic 
ends. Firstly, various technologies of exclusion have come to be, which regulate who 
can and cannot legitimately be considered to be in/affected by HIV/AIDS, or more 
accurately who one has to be in order to be admitted to the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected 
community' which is central to 'progressive' HIV/AIDS thinking, especially around 
the issues of how best to go about reformulating the self in the wake of an HIV 
antibody positive diagnosis, and of the prevention of HIV transmission (cf Roth & 
Nelson 1997; Kalichman, Sikkema & Somlai 1996; Kippax et al 1992). Secondly, 
whilst calling for the acceptance of a particular brand of 'heresy' (to use Mill's term), 
there are forces in the discourse which hinder the expression of ideas which are in 
turn heretical to the preferred heresy, forces which seek to make this privileged 
account immune to attack, not only by shoring up the arguments for particular modes 
of action in response to the epidemic, but also by suggesting that it is immoral or 
inhumane to question tasks undertaken with such good intentions. 
By now, midway through the second decade of AIDS, the preferred 'heresy' has had 
some considerable success against its initial bugbear - right-wing reactionary 
moralism - in that a particular regularity in the discourse, a particular way of thinking 
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HIV/AIDS, has become established as an authority, which I have called the 
'alternative orthodoxy' (an ideal-typical construct, discussed in full in chapter 3). 
This is a (moral and ontological) truth of AIDS which 'those in the know' understand, 
believe in and evangelise, with the end of the emancipation and empowerment of 
those who are HIV/AIDS in/affected in mind. This thesis will argue, however, that in 
common with many such putatively emancipatory discourses this new hegemony is 
no less a prescriptive and restrictive morality than that which it seeks to displace - 
that both liberals and reactionaries have found in HIV/AIDS a packhorse upon which 
they can load their moral baggages - and that the strategies employed ostensibly to 
open up spaces of freedom for particular privileged targets, at the same time close off 
alternative freedoms, both for those who are HIV/AIDS in/affected and those who are 
not. It is the problematic nature of these new spaces of freedom which is the 
motivation behind this analysis. 
Further to this, the problems posed by 'progressive' HIV/AIDS discourse present a 
particular interest in that they demand engagement on what may be called an 'ethical' 
plane (the term ethical here being used in a peculiarly Foucauldian sense, covered in 
detail section 1.4.2 below), that is on a level which is concerned with the practices by 
which those who engage with these texts construct and maintain their sense of self; 
because the discourses from which the 'progressive' HIV/AIDS related freedom 
concepts arise aim to give both practical help with living to those in/affected by 
HIV/AIDS, and advice about the practices one should employ if one is not HIV 
infected in order to stay that way, the question 'what is the nature of the freedom 
advocated? ' implies the questions 'how must one act upon oneself in order to gain this 
freedom? ' and 'what moral, political and ontological commitments must one make in 
order to gain the help on offer? ' This thesis, then, is in part seeking to reformulate 
Foucault's question "How can the subject tell the truth about itself as a subject of 
sexual gratification, and at what cost? " (1989: 245-246) as 'how can the subject tell 
the truth about itself as a subject (potentially or actually) in/affected by HIV/AIDS, 
and at what cost? ' and to reveal and to map the 'forms of rationality' which determine 
the limits of one's possibilities - and of one's freedoms - as an HIV/AIDS in/affected 
subject (Rajchman 1991: 11). 
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0.3 Two disclaimers - what this thesis is not 
Given the potentially highly controversial nature of the problem space which is 
beginning to be opened up, and the accompanying danger that I will misrepresent my 
intentions to my readers, I think will be useful at this point to introduce a couple of 
caveats in order to establish what this work is not; as was commented earlier, since 
the 1980s, there has been an explosion of discourse on the subject of HIV/AIDS, such 
that there are now articulated a plethora of often deeply conflicting versions of the 
truth of the syndrome, upon which many debates informing an equally wide array of 
late-modern problematics are played out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised, 
however, that this work is not at all intended to add its author's pennyworth of 
preferred ontology to this field of debate; indeed, the piece should be read as making 
no truth claims about the syndrome beyond the contention that it is possible to read 
and to construct HIV/AIDS in ways other than those which are currently in the 
ascendant, and that the truth which presently obtains can be viewed as having been 
afforded its position due to the accidental workings of what Foucault called the 
micro-physics of power. (Cf chapter 1 for a full discussion of the ontological 
assumptions necessary to the work. ) 
Nor is this work meant to be a polemic; rather it is an experimental exploration of 
problematic areas of the discourse undertaken for the sake of clarification, its 
principal aim being to map the form of the emergent dominant account of HIV/AIDS, 
to reflect upon both the limits and the possibilities of being which are established by 
it (cf Rajchman 1991), and through this process to provide a device by which the 
reader (and possibly more so the writer) can begin to consider him/herself as a 
subject in relation to the syndrome. In particular, I wish to stress that I do not put 
myself forward as any kind of representative or champion of some or other 
'haemophiliac community', nor is it by virtue of my legitimately being able to take the 
subject position 'hemophiliac' that I claim the right to speak on the issue at hand; 
although it was by the accident of my peculiar haemophilia related angle on 
HIV/AIDS that my curiosity was roused, such concepts as 'haemophiliac' or 'person 
with haemophilia' provide possible identities which, for personal reasons (in 
particular the lateness my diagnosis -I was seventeen at the time, with a fairly well 
developed sense of self and considerable experience in coping with my bruising 
without help from medicine or anyone else) I tend either to regard with curious 
detachment, or, more often, to resist. It is not as a haemophiliac, but as a sociologist - 
of discourse, of knowledge, of the self - that I study the syndrome. 
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0.4 The empirical focus of the thesis 
For the most part this thesis focuses neither on popular representations of HIV/AIDS 
found in televisual and newspaper reporting, nor on the sorts of technical/medical 
and/or therapeutic texts aimed at a specific professional readership (with one slightly 
anomalous exception - the National AIDS Manual). The former was left untouched 
partly because this area has been covered so frequently before (cf Berridge 1992; 
Karpf 1988; Kitzinger & Miller 1992; Sontag 1989; Watney 1987,1994), and partly 
because the kinds of truth-claiming texts which spawned my problematic very often 
define themselves in terms of their being in an oppositional relation to such media 
representation (more will be said of this in later chapters); the latter was ignored 
because, on the one hand a cursory pilot examination of examples of such suggested 
that due to the specific nature of their intended readership they articulated a rather 
different set of ethical relations from those found in the sorts of texts within which I 
found my original problems, and on the other because my time, energy and expertise 
were insufficient to what would likely be a truly fascinating area of study. A similar 
analysis of such texts would serve very well to complement both this analysis, and 
existing analyses of media-borne HIV/AIDS representations. Thus this thesis instead 
focuses precisely on the kinds of texts from which my 'puzzling data' arose in the first 
place - texts which deal with HIV/AIDS as a social or cultural phenomenon, those 
which seek to bring the truth of HIV/AIDS to the interested lay person - and, because 
the category 'interested lay person' would of course include anyone who found 
themselves with an HIV antibody positive diagnosis, upon user discourses which 
couch themselves as emanating from some sort of 'grass-roots HIV/AIDS in/affected 
community'. 
So, to re-cap and tie up this account of my problematic, what I am looking for are 
what may be termed 'regularities of thought' in the discourse, which delimit the 
possibilities of being for (potentially or actually) HIV/AIDS in/affected persons, as 
revealed in various of the texts of the sort outlined above - principally widely read 
authority books and user discourses - texts which will likely have an immediate 
impact upon such people (and especially upon actually rather than potentially 
HIV/AIDS in/affected persons) and then to explore various issues: how those 
regularities of thought are informed by political and moral concerns; how this body of 
discourse may comprise what may be called an ethical authority - that is an authority 
to which one can refer in order to make one's ethical judgements, and which provides 
both guidance and incentives to behave ethically, and thereby to constitute oneself in 
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the terms of the discourse; precisely what action one has to take upon oneself in order 
to constitute oneself as an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected person', and by what techniques this 
can be achieved; how these various truth discourses and political and ethical practices 
may together comprise a single regulatory mechanism; what is the relationship 
between this mechanism and other technologies of governance found in the late- 
modern West. 
0.5 An outline of what follows 
Having made all the above introductory comments, it behoves me to outline the areas 
actually covered within the work. What follows breaks down into three sections: 
The first section (chapters 1 and 2) deals with the theoretical backdrop to the work, 
further considering the philosophical, ontological, and epistemological commitments 
which have been made in the writing of this thesis, which enable its problematic, and 
which inform the empirical work described in subsequent chapters. It also explains 
something of the methodology; what is meant by an 'ethical' approach and how it fits 
within the mode of study which has come to be known as 'the history of the present' 
are discussed, as are some of the methodological problems implied by such an 
approach. In this section it is postulated that devices of textual management such as 
'the implied reader' (Iser 1978) and the 'performance of community' (Woolgar 1993) 
can establish an ethical relation which can in turn inform self-formation without the 
need to establish an actual face-to-face relation between two parties. This section 
also discusses the theoretical basis behind using an analytical construct such as the 
'alternative orthodoxy'. 
The second section comprises the empirical analyses, and deals with the distribution 
of truth around HIV/AIDS, seeking first (in chapter 3) to review and to provide a map 
of the broader popular discourse of HIV/AIDS in order to show what this so-called 
'alternative orthodoxy' is, how it has come to emerge thus, and how it is located 
amongst other ways of thinking HIV/AIDS. A tentative model is made to embrace 
various conflicting truth discourses, comprising three vectors; along with the 
'alternative orthodox' mode of thought there are the competing 'orthodox' and 
'dissident' versions, all of which are viewed as being emergent from a complex of 
micro-political relations. Details are given of the truth of HIV/AIDS which emerges 
out of the conflict which exists between these discourses. 
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Having done this, a deconstructive critical analysis is made of the works of Simon 
Watney (chapter 4), one of the commentators whose work is highly visible within and 
(albeit with certain reservations) exemplary of the 'alternative' vector. In his work 
there is articulated an idea of an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', for which he 
considers himself an advocate, and from which he claims his authority to speak. 
Present in his work there is also an alternative moral vision for ways of being which, 
it is argued, serves as an aspect of the politico-moral backdrop giving shape to the 
concrete ethical practices by which someone may make themselves into an 
HIV/AIDS in/affected subject. 
The two chapters which follow examine texts which, although like Watney's 
explicitly make the claim to emanate from 'grass roots' contact with the epidemic and 
afford themselves advocate status, are rather different kinds of publications. For 
unlike Watney's, they are not avowedly polemical pieces, but so called 'user- 
discourses', works designed specifically to make the lives of HIV/AIDS in/affected 
persons easier and more fruitful, through the provision of largely practical advice on 
how to go about achieving such ends, rather than through broader statements on how 
the world ideally should be. Readings of what are arguably the principal such 
discourses available to HIV/AIDS in/affected people in this country are made - firstly 
of the Body Positive Newsletter (chapter 5) and secondly of the National AIDS 
Manual (chapter 6). It is contended that these canons of work also construct and 
articulate their own notions of an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', in part similar 
to Watney's, in that admittance to them is policed along political and moral lines 
which reflect the concerns which were held prior to the appearance of HIV/AIDS by 
those who subsequently have become the prime movers in providing these texts. 
Within all the texts considered in chapters 4-6, membership of this community is the 
criterion by which it is judged whether or not someone can legitimately speak about 
HIV/AIDS. 
Finally, in the third section, an attempt is made to draw together the various ethical, 
moral, political and ontological aspects of HIV/AIDS discourse identified within the 
empirical section. It is argued (in chapter 7) that the conflicting relations between the 
various truth-claiming discourses has caused to emerge and sustains a truth of AIDS, 
which has, premised on certain common ontological features, three significant 
characteristics; its nature is eschatological, it opens a new terrain for the division of 
normal from pathological, and it has direct relevance to every (sexual) subject. 
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Following on from the work of Armstrong (1983) the possibility of understanding 
this dominant HIV/AIDS discourse as an extended panoptic disciplinary mechanism 
is explored. It is argued, though, that the panopticism which is found in HIV/AIDS 
discourse is based upon a lateral rather than a vertical surveillance, which functions 
through the creation of 'sexual and threatened by AIDS' subjects. It is here that the 
importance of the ethical vision of the 'alternative orthodoxy' becomes clear, for it is 
ideally placed to regulate the spaces of subject construction opened by and necessary 
to the HIV/AIDS panoptic mechanism as a whole. It is further argued (in chapter 8) 
that this whole process has an elective affinity with a general societal shift away from 
disciplinary modes of regulation and towards ethical modes of regulation, and indeed 
with the shape of the late modern world in general. As such, 'progressive' HIV/AIDS 
discourse can be seen to be intimately related to late modern forms of 
governmentality. The implications of this relationship for the practice of resistance 
and of freedom as an HIV/AIDS in/affected individual are explored. 
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PART 1- THEORIES AND METHODS 
Chapter 1 
THEORETICAL APPROACH & COMMITMENTS 
Both the problem space of this thesis (as outlined in the previous section), and its 
subsequent central project of exploring that problem space, rest upon certain 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, which in turn inform the general 
approach and the specific methodological stratagems employed. What follows in 
this section, then, is a discussion of all such various factors which shaped the manner 
in which engagement is made with the discourses analysed in the later empirical 
sections. 
1.1 The ontology of HIV/AIDS 
The ontological position held within this thesis is derived from Foucault's, in that it 
assumes the world as we perceive to be a world of representations, of meanings, of 
concepts - the reality we apprehend is the reality of 'discourse'. This is not to say that 
there is no noumenal world, nor that there is no reality in the realm of meaning, but it 
does imply a radical rethinking of how the nature of truth is to be conceived. 
Truth, for Foucault, is contingent, and in a sense arbitrary, but that does not mean 
that there is no truth, only that truth is not the constant unchanging thing that 
common-sense might tell us it should be; rather it is dependent upon strategic 
regimes of power, in combination with which it comprises an expression of what 
Foucault called knowledge/power - the central idea here being that knowledge and 
power are aspects of the same entity, that they imply and sustain each other. It is 
important, though, to clarify what is meant by power in this context; power for 
Foucault is not something that can be held nor wielded, but it is something which 
'operates', so to speak, it has movements and effects, and it extends in all directions 
in an unending and immensely complicated nexus. He refers to this as the micro- 
physics of power (Foucault 1977: 27; 1979: 92-97; 1980: 98). 
Something emerges as knowledge - and therefore truth - then, because relations of 
power exist such that that particular way of thinking things is able to be dominant. 
This emergent truth is resultant from the accidental coalition of various aspects of 
discourse, and should not be thought of as some sort of conspiracy. (Indeed, it is 
12 
more likely from this perspective that powerful groups are enabled to emerge in 
society because of favourable chance relations of power than that such groups could 
influence to any great degree dominant relations of knowledge/power to their own 
advantage. ) This emergent power informed truth is still truth however, in that it is 
still constraining - the realisation that a particular truth is contingent does not mean 
that it therefore simply vanishes; truth may not be absolute nor essential, but it is still 
truth (Foucault 1980: 131-133; also cf Rajchman 1991). 
Within this research, then, the truth of HIV/AIDS is to be regarded in such terms, as 
an object of discourse; all knowledge of HIV/AIDS is subject to the same limits as 
knowledge in general - that is, it is contingent, based upon relations of power, and 
could be otherwise than it is. It is a way of making sense of a particular set of human 
experiences, and that way of making sense is underdetermined. (In this much at 
least, the ontological assumptions of this thesis are not without precedent in work 
which may be considered more strictly sociological than Foucault's - this assumption 
that disease cannot be separated from the discourses and practices that constitute its 
nature is quite in line with the constructionist approach to medical sociology, for a 
clear exposition of which see Sedgwick 1982). It is herein assumed, then, that the 
fact that HIV/AIDS discourse has emerged as it has is not because it relates 
unproblematically to a pair of noumenal, 'out there' real things called 'HIV and 
'AIDS', but instead is a reflection of the formations of micro-power which currently 
hold sway, and which themselves are informed by dominant regularities of thought. 
1.2 Ideal-types - the ontological status of analytical constructs. 
It is also important to recognise the ontological status afforded to the various 
analytical constructs used in the thesis, and in particular that of the 'alternative 
orthodoxy' (although this discussion is equally applicable to various other notions 
which will appear as the thesis goes on - for instance the 'orthodox' and 'dissident' 
discourses which are also discussed in chapter 3); such constructs are to be regarded 
as ideal-types, that is they are merely analytical tools designed to fit with and provide 
a way of accessing and engaging with the specific sociological problem under 
consideration. As Giddens suggests when summarising Weber's position, although 
such constructs are rooted in the empirical world, it is unlikely that they will be 
found there in the exact same form 
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"An ideal type is constructed by the abstraction and combination of an indefinite number 
of elements which, although found in reality, are rarely or never discovered in this 
specific form. Thus the characteristics of the 'Calvinist ethic'... are taken from the writings 
of various historical figures, and involve those components of Calvinist doctrines which 
Weber identifies as of particular importance in relation to the formation of the capitalist 
spirit. " 
(Giddens 1971: 141-142) 
'Alternative orthodox' discourse then, similarly to the Calvinist ethic, does not 
exactly correspond to any particular bodies of work - any one author may in the same 
piece express ideas which are both in and out of accord with this hegemony. The 
term is intended as a short-hand for a particular way of thinking the syndrome, a 
regularity of thought - involving a certain rationality and various moral, political, 
ethical, ontological and epistemological commitments - and as such it too is a digest 
of those aspects of the discourse which are considered to be 'of particular importance' 
to the formation of that way of thinking, in relation to the concrete problems 
herewith being considered. Such an approach of course opens both this thesis and 
Weber up to the charge of being too subjective - of picking and choosing one's 
evidence to suit one's case. 
Analysis which employs ideal-types is, however, not geared so much towards the 
abstracted consideration of 'how the world is' as it is to pragmatic analysis of a given 
difficulty, and as Weber so persuasively argues (Weber 1948,1949: 1-112; Giddens 
1971: 135-144), the process by which any given object becomes a difficulty requiring 
analysis is never value-free, but always involves the value-laden decision that that 
event is worth studying. Given this, the seemingly totally free range afforded the 
researcher by so vague a selection principle as deciding what appears to be important 
is checked to some degree by whichever practical problem it is which spawned the 
analysis in the first place, the aspects of the discourse which are to go into the ideal- 
type construct being those which pertain to the problem originally delineated. 
What is produced, then, is not a comprehensive explanatory description of the whole 
of the field in question (and given the vastness of the literature which exists on 
HIV/AIDS, to undertake such a task would be madly courageous, and likely 
impossible) but an avowedly partial tool by which to apprehend the factors relevant 
to deciding a given issue, a device which exists only to facilitate the analysis of 
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empirical questions, and whose worth is to be decided not so much by its veracity as 
by its utility. (Although displacing veracity as the arbiter of worth is not quite so 
dangerous as it might seem, for any ideal-type which strayed too far from empirical 
reality would be practically useless. ) As such, any propositions made by and in the 
form of ideal-types are not new and better truths of the object of study, writ in stone 
and unalterable, but are tentative, provisional and thoroughly mutable statements - an 
ideal-type, born of the need to analyse a concrete problem, may be - indeed should be 
- modified in the light of further empirical evidence, or readily abandoned 
completely if its analytical power should for some or other reason become 
compromised. 
1.3 Analytical relativism 
In keeping with the above ontological pre-commitments, an overall analytical 
relativism is adopted towards HIV/AIDS. It must be re-emphasised, however, that 
this does not reflect some naive notion that HIV and AIDS are not real problems, nor 
that the problems of HIV and AIDS will wither away if the 'social construction' or 
the 'power informed discursive construction' of the syndrome can be exposed. 
Rather, it is simply that given the natures of the problem space and the object of 
study under consideration, coupled with the necessary limitations of the analytical 
tools available, the adoption of such an analytical relativism can be beneficial; when 
viewed as it is in this thesis, as a discursive object, HIV/AIDS offers a highly 
confusing and contradictory 'truth' - and if one's object is to unravel such a particular 
truth, then regarding truth itself as problematic is desirable for at least two reasons: 
First, doing so can serve as a useful guard against being open only to those findings 
which are in keeping with one's own moral and political preferences. This approach 
is especially pertinent given that so much of the commentary on HIV/AIDS produced 
to date can be seen to be based on the kind of ontological boundary work identified 
by Woolgar et al (Woolgar & Pawluch 1985). There has been a tendency, 
particularly but not exclusively by writers with strongly held politico-moral stances, 
to establish an analytically convenient reality of the syndrome, and to proceed to 
consider how that reality has been (mis)used by one or other polemical target. 
Having served such ends, HIV/AIDS is now a key surface of emergence for manifold 
problematizations concerning the self, the body, sexuality and civilisation, rendering 
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any proclaimed truth of the syndrome troublesome, and therefore ripe for 
deconstruction. 
This leads us, albeit somewhat obliquely, to the second advantage to be had from 
analytical scepticism; the first risk that Foucault says he took when writing The 
Order of Things (1970) was to assume that empirical knowledges - amongst which 
HIV/AIDS discourse might be counted - and the practices by which they are 
comprised and articulated are enabled by and subject to historically and culturally 
specific regularities of thinking, an assumption shared by this thesis. But in his 
speculation about the possibility that 
"... errors (and truths), the practice of old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, 
but also the most naive notions, obeyed, at a given moment, the laws of a certain code of 
knowledge... " 
(Foucault 1970: ix) 
lurks a problem for any inquirer whose interest is to gain clarity through 
understanding the regularity of thought pertinent to his/her desired object of study; 
how to distinguish between 'genuine discoveries' and 'naive notions', when the only 
tools available for him/her by which to do so are those the workings of which s/he is 
hoping to expose and delineate. Faced with this difficulty, arguably the most 
appropriate course (for the purposes and duration of the analysis only) is to dispense 
with the division altogether (even despite the fact that this can have infuriating 
ramifications, especially for those impatient which such intellectual indulgences at a 
time when so many are suffering so grievously); that is, to acknowledge and describe 
how such a difference would be decided within the terms of the mode of thinking 
being considered, but to take an ethical decision to refuse to commit one's support to 
any party opinion, in order not to be blinded by a particular truth to the workings of 
the more general mechanisms which enable that truth. 
It is for these reasons that the various positions considered within this thesis have 
been approached with a deliberate naivety, affording epistemological privilege to 
none. Such an approach is quite in keeping with - indeed essential to - the central 
ethical concerns of the thesis, and also allows one more easily to consider the other 
question with which this thesis will attempt to deal - that is whether in the 
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articulation of this combination of disparate representations may be found a unitary 
and coherent mechanism through which power can operate. 
1.4 An ethical approach to an ethical problematic - the 'care of the self & the 
'history of the present' 
It was commented earlier that the problems posed by HIV/AIDS discourse need to be 
engaged with on what may be called an 'ethical' plane, a claim which needs 
clarification. There are, in fact, two senses in which this study is to do with ethics, 
but before they can be elaborated upon, the manner in which the term 'ethics' is here 
being used must be defined; the usage of 'ethics' in this thesis is derived from that 
work of Foucault's in which he examined various ancient practices which he couched 
under the general rubric of 'the care of the self. A small digression into the relevant 
aspects of this work will helpful here. 
1.4.1 'The care of the self 
Towards the end of his life, Foucault began work exploring what he described as 
'techniques or technologies of the self, that is practices which; 
".. permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, 
so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection or immortality. " 
(Foucault 1988: 18) 
The initial analyses he made were of the development of the hermeneutics of the self 
within the Greco-Roman philosophy of the early Roman Empire (in the first and 
second centuries A. D. ), and within Christian spirituality and the monastic principles 
of the late Roman Empire (fourth and fifth centuries A. D. ). These two locations he 
regarded as historically contiguous, and in them he saw the roots of the modem 
conception of the self (ibid). 
He related this work to certain practices of late antiquity, based on the precept "to be 
concerned with oneself' or "to take care of oneself', which was, for the Greeks, a 
central principle of personal conduct, a rule for the art of life. He saw a contrast 
between this principle, 'take care of yourself, and the Delphic maxim, 'know 
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yourself suggesting that originally the latter was a piece of technical advice 
concerning consultation with the oracle, and that it was a subordinate principle to 
that of caring for oneself. However, he further suggests that in time the latter 
principle came to be more visible than the former, such that the imperative to know 
oneself became a central preoccupation of Christian asceticism, and, bolstered by a 
vestigial religious morality of self-renunciation, a secular morality based in respect 
for the law (in something outside the self, that is) and theoretical philosophy from 
Descartes to Husserl, it remains central to this day; 
"There has been an inversion between the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, 
"Take care of yourself' and "Know thyself. " In Greco-Roman culture knowledge of 
oneself appeared as the consequence of taking care of yourself. In the modern world, 
knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle. " 
(Foucault 1988: 22) 
Foucault considered that the point at which the ancient imperative to know oneself 
transformed into the Christian monastic obligation to confess one's thoughts to one's 
spiritual guide marked the starting place of what he termed the hermeneutics of the 
self, and has therefore considerable significance to modem conceptions of 
subjectivity (Foucault 1993: 205). Indeed; 
".. the modern hermeneutics of the self is rooted much more in those Christian techniques 
[of the self] than in the Classical ones. " 
(Foucault 1993: 211) 
Foucault noted a difference between practices of the care of the self in the Hellenistic 
and Roman imperial periods and the later period of Christian monasticism; that in 
the former the emphasis is on what is done not what is thought, and in the latter this 
priority is reversed. He pointed to Seneca's use of administrative language in his 
self-examination, which is to be seen as a stock taking exercise rather than a 
precursor to self-punishment, and in which errors are to be seen as being of strategy, 
not a reflection of character. This he contrasted with the later Christian project to 
excavate the sinful truth of the soul. The distinction between these two perspectives 
is crystallised in their different aims; the Greco-Roman project can be seen as being 
directed at achieving the fullest realisation of life in this world (howsoever that 
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should be calculated), whereas the Christian project is a preparation for a better life 
to come (Foucault 1988: 32-35; 1993: 206-207). 
The kinds of duty imposed by Greco-Roman techniques of the self, then, were of a 
markedly different character from those of Christian practice. The former demanded 
that the ethical subject should inspect his behaviour for administrative, for technical 
purposes, that is ends which were the concern of the techne tou biou, the rechne of 
life - the practical question of how to achieve practical ends, of what techniques to 
employ in order to live as well as one should (Foucault 1991: 348). Christianity, on 
the other hand, brought with it what Foucault called 'obligations to truth'; 
"The duty to accept a set of obligations, to hold certain books as permanent truth, to 
accept authoritarian decisions in matters of truth, not only to believe certain things but to 
show that one believes, are all characteristic of Christianity. " 
(Foucault 1988: 40) 
Along with these obligations to believe certain things comes a duty to discover and 
to disclose, to God or to the church community, the (faulty, guilty, fallen) truth of 
oneself (Foucault 1993: 211). These two aspects are linked together in such a way 
that purification of the soul is not possible without self knowledge, and access to 
truth, gaining understanding of sacred texts, cannot be achieved with an impure soul. 
So to be redeemed one must be pure and to be pure one must know how the truth of 
one's heart lies in relation to those dogma which one is obliged to regard as true, a 
formula unchallenged until the time of Descartes, only in the wake of whom did it 
become possible to have a non-ascetic subject of knowledge (Foucault 1991: 372). 
However, Foucault contended, the incitement to know as precisely as possible who 
one is and thence to tell that truth in minute detail to someone else in order to 
'achieve salvation' is still characteristic of Western societies (1993: 201). 
The relevance of all this to a late modem sociological analysis (such as this one) may 
not be immediately clear. It is as follows; accepting Foucault's contention that the 
concepts of self and the technologies by which they are achieved (which he describes 
in his analysis) inform their modem equivalents, it is possible to view these two 
contrasting technologies as models, pertinent to currently existing technologies of 
self, and if not as ends of a continuum, then at least as alternative, and perhaps 
competing, mechanisms by which people are made and make themselves subjects. 
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And one of the central questions of this thesis is whether or to what extent or both 
the progressive HIV/AIDS related discourses under consideration comprise a 
'technology of self which may be understood by using such models. 
1.4.2 'Ethics' and 'morals' 
'Ethics', then, in the terms of the above approach, are the codes of conduct which 
inform such 'technologies of the self, and when used to apply to this understanding 
the term should not be regarded as interchangeable with 'morals'. The differentiation 
between the two ideas as articulated within this way of thinking things must be made 
clear: although both ethics and morals can be seen to involve prescriptive codes of 
conduct, the direction of action which such codes imply differs between the two 
notions; morals are concerned with how an individual acts in relation to others, 
reflecting some or other hegemonic value system, whereas ethics are to do with how 
an individual acts in relation to him/herself, and accordingly, then, with the subject's 
formation of itself. Whereas morality articulates normative codes which are external 
to the subject, and to which the subject must submit itself, ethical norms, on the 
other hand, are devices which the subject can employ to make itself internally 
consistent. Used in this sense, 'ethical' issues do not deal with the rightness or 
wrongness of a given action, but their appropriateness to the ethically constituted 
subject (Osborne 1994: 517,1998). 
In order for a subject to be able to act upon itself in such fashion, it requires what 
Osborne has called an 'ethical stylisation' - this is not an anthology of particular 
virtues and vices, so much as a way of thinking ethics which enables the subject to 
make ethical judgements and to act accordingly -a means by which to "construct the 
self as a subject of ethical value" (1998: 2). However, one can see here a point of 
contact between ethics and morals; Durkheim contended that a collectivity's 
characteristic ideals, beliefs and values are invested with a moral authority by virtue 
of their being collective, and that it is thus a moral necessity which imposes upon 
one the categorisations and forms of logic by which one organises the world 
(1960: 335; 1968(1915): 17-18). The rationalities which inform any given ethical 
stylisation will therefore reflect the prevalent morality, which will in turn be 
sustained by those whose conduct is regulated by the ethical stylisations it articulates. 
Vehicles for the propagation of politico-moral prescriptions, then, can serve an 
important function in extended ethical technologies, because it is through them that a 
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given ethical stylisation acquires its moral flavour, the thing that in the first place 
confers upon an ethical stylisation its authority (cf 1.5 below). 
Here it is, then, that the first of the senses in which HIV/AIDS is ethically 
problematic is revealed. Much of the work which has been done and which has 
contributed to the emergent 'alternative orthodoxy' has had a moral character (at 
some times more overt than at others), which has then translated into a way of 
thinking HIV/AIDS, both in relation to the issue at large, and ethically, that is in 
terms of one's own relation to the syndrome. That this is the case is unsurprising, 
given the morally overdetermined nature of various discourses to which HIV/AIDS 
has been attached since first it was described. Initial HIV/AIDS borne attacks on 
gays, drug users, black people, prostitutes and 'the promiscuous' were moralistic and 
demanded to be repulsed in kind, a task which was undertaken by forces whose 
underdetermined 'enthusiasm for revolution' was reminiscent of (and likely directly 
descended from) that of the 'free Left' which emerged in May 1968. Gordon argues 
that the 'revolution' of that time was unprecedented in that it comprised an attempt to 
release a revolutionary energy unfettered by any definite intent or plan (such as those 
proffered by Leninism or Maoism), an attitude which also characterised the various 
struggles in the years which followed, and which is certainly reflected in early 
defences of HIV/AIDS in/affected people (1993 (1986): 21-24). 
Given the above, it is problematic to regard the currently ascendant way of thinking 
HIV/AIDS which is here termed the 'alternative orthodoxy' as a dispassionately 
amoral Weltanschauung, in which the prescriptions on how to live in the face of the 
syndrome self-evidently follow from its ontology (a position congruent with certain 
of the arguments considered below - see in particular the chapter 4). Central to this 
thesis is the proposition that the emergent truth of any phenomenon comprises an 
ontological and politico-moral complex - that is, any given truth discourse will 
articulate a politico-moral component which necessarily informs the ontological 
component, and, in turn, the various techniques and practices by which someone can 
constitute him/herself as a subject in relation to that discourse. Such is the case with 
'alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse. To give an example, the route through 
which one can become an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected' subject is often to aspire to 
membership of the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', an object which is politico- 
morally constructed and maintained in a variety of ways and forms (details of these 
ways and forms are to be found in chapters 4-6). 
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Indeed, the relationship between HIV/AIDS and the various moral and political 
flavours with which it is infused can be regarded as a symbiosis. HIV/AIDS is not 
alone in this, however; Hacking has observed how historically multiple personality 
disorder has been carried to prominence as a 'parasite' on various contingent societal 
concerns (1992). A similar picture would seem to be emerging with respect to 
HIV/AIDS, except that it is not always clear which aspect is taking a piggy-back 
from which; as Hacking has acknowledged, in cases such as this "the line between 
parasitism and symbiosis can be a fine one" (ibid: 13). That HIV/AIDS falls more 
comfortably into the latter category reflects the fact that the concerns which now 
articulate themselves upon HIV/AIDS have from the start shaped how the syndrome 
is to be understood, collapsing the distinction between what is putatively fact and 
what opinion, between Sontag's 'disease' and its 'metaphors' (1989; cf also Alcorn 
1988: 65-70); the two are inseparable. HIV/AIDS is a politico-moral disease, and 
any ethical practices formed in its wake will reflect this. 
1.4.3 An appropriate analytical approach - the 'history of the present' 
In the light of this the appropriate analytical response cannot be to attempt any such 
impossible separation. Instead of searching for a kernel of truth hidden within a 
mass of husk, one must instead take the object as it is found, accepting its 
contradictions and tensions, and attempt to map its nature, with a view to 
understanding what the costs and benefits of the revealed particular style of thinking 
the problem might be. And this is the second sense in which HIV/AIDS is an ethical 
issue, for this mode of enquiry demands an ethical rather than an intellectual 
engagement with the problem on the part of the researcher. The question is not 'what 
is the truth of HIV/AIDS? ', but 'how has the truth of HIV/AIDS come to be, and with 
what ethical difficulties with being and thought does it confront one? ' (cf Rajchman 
1991: 26-27). 
This approach to analysis follows from the later work of Foucault, in which he was 
concerned to determine what the costs of our self constitution are. Rajchman 
summarises Foucault's position thus 
"In his last writings, he often declares that we know ourselves, we govern ourselves, and 
we make ourselves only at a cost, which we often pay without recognizing, or without 
realizing that it is not necessary to do so. One task for "critical thought" is thus to expose 
these costs, to analyze what we did not realize we had to say and to do to ourselves in 
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order to be who we are. " 
(ibid: 11) 
and suggests that 
"Foucault thus defined a particular difficulty in thought: the difficulty of those moments... 
when our self-identifications seem contingent and violent in ways we hadn't realized... " 
(ibid: 13) 
And it is at such moments that the costs of, and the possibility of refusing, such 
identities are revealed. This study, then, aims to expose to scrutiny the 'contingency 
and violence' of the ways in which HIV/AIDS related identities are made thinkable, 
and therefore be-able, and to explore Foucault's contention that latterly freedom is to 
be had not in the attempt to discover what we are, but in the ongoing refusal of what 
we are (that is; the constant and rigorous questioning of that which is taken as given 
in our thinking, principally because it is taken as given). It is a question of 
attempting to discern what is contingent and singular within what is presented as 
necessary and universal; it is an inversion of the Kantian approach of finding the 
limits beyond which knowledge must not venture, in which the doing of the critique 
becomes in itself a form of possible transgression of exactly such limits (Gordon 
1993(1986): 23-24). This certainly should not be taken to be an advocation of 
reckless norm violating actes gratuits; the exercise should be a sober and scholarly 
one, done with a view to allowing the reckoning of the costs implied by one's usually 
unacknowledged axia - and it may be, of course, that the limits to being which they 
impose are deemed acceptable. One may choose not to refuse. 
In following this line the work should be seen as being located within the broader 
project which has been termed the 'history of the present' (Foucault 1977: 31). 
Graham Burchell suggests that this type of intellectual work is in itself a practice of 
the self, an ethical exercise. He argued that the 'history of the present' involves 
"the experience of not being a citizen of the community or republic of thought and action 
in which one is, nevertheless, unavoidably implicated or involved. It is an experience of 
being in a goldfish bowl in which one is obliged to live but in which it seems impossible 
to live, to think and act... The experience is not at all just a matter of holding a different 
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opinion from everyone else, but of finding oneself not knowing what or how to think. " 
(Burchell 1993: 276-277) 
The task of the historian of the present then, is to re-problematize current truth - to 
reveal the possibility of alternative experiences of one's subjectivity in relation to 
oneself. This being the case, any work undertaken within this perspective comprises 
an ethical mystery tour, an enterprise central to which is the putting at risk of how 
one thinks and thereby also the possible ways that one can be. The historian of the 
present is concerned to show that what now is, both in terms of definitions of truths 
and the limits of experience, is not necessary, is not as fixed and pre-given as it may 
appear; that limits to thought and action are historically contingent, and incur certain 
costs. This type of analysis, through mapping such boundaries and revealing their 
lineage, allows the possibility of an assessment of these costs - to ascertain what 
other ways of being are precluded by the form in which truth happens presently to be 
articulated (ibid: 276-280). The impetus to undertake such a work, then, is in finding 
oneself confronted with the impossibility of thinking oneself other than in some or 
other particular relation to any given discourse, a factor which has characterised the 
choice of targets in various of Foucault's analyses (Osborne 1994a: 496). 
And what is particularly interesting about Foucault's works, is that his targets were 
very often discourses which might not unreasonably be called 'progressive' - the hope 
of reforming the minds rather than violating the bodies of criminals, the throwing off 
of lunatics' chains, the desire to unburden human sexuality of moralistic repression - 
and this perhaps reflects the fact that new truths which present themselves as the 
antidote to the malaise of old and (putatively) dominant truths, new accounts which 
aim to displace the moral strictures resultant from the current order, are by virtue of 
this way of self-presentation more difficult to unsettle, and more successful at 
concealing the limitations to existence they themselves impose, than are those old 
truths. But old and new truths alike can act as mechanisms of normalisation, and it is 
this, the significance to modern society of normalising discourses of whatever 
political persuasion, which is one of Foucault's central concerns (Pasquino 1993: 37). 
Given such a state of affairs, it is quite conceivable that a historian of the present, as 
an ethical subject working within a politico-moral context, may find him/herself in 
the position of being in general moral or political agreement or both with the avowed 
progressive aspirations of a given new truth, but may nevertheless be confronted with 
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an unavoidable ethical difficulty with that discourse. It is out of a tension of this type 
that this thesis is born; the work is not intended as a means to bury those positions 
which are analysed, but as a recognition that it is they which now define the truth and 
falsity of HIV/AIDS - they have, within certain limits (cf section 3.2), become the 
authoritative standpoint, and accordingly are a legitimate, even necessary target of 
critical analysis, if only in order that one can know the ethical price one has to pay in 
order to maintain liberal pluralistic values. (It is for this reason that any moral 
difficulty which a researcher may have in undertaking deconstructive and critical 
analysis of a progressive political position with which s/he is in accord should not be 
allowed to prohibit such study. As has already been commented, this form of 
analysis to some extent comprises an experimental violation of limits, and such a 
methodology demands the temporary suspension of moral judgement in order to 
achieve intellectual clarity. ) 
The spirit of the work, then, is akin to that observed by Gordon within the 
genealogical analyses of Weber, which address "the endogenous hazards and 
necessities of a system, not the unrecognised incursions of an alien pathological 
mutation. " (Gordon 1993(1986): 26). If the guiding principle of much of the 
commentary which comprises the 'alternative orthodoxy' is 'know thine enemy', be 
that enemy a virus, or prejudicial media reporting, or inadequate governmental 
responses, then the guiding principle here is the Delphic maxim, 'know thyself, in 
the sense of aiming to acknowledge and understand the ethical implications of 
adopting the preferred moral vision in relation to HIV/AIDS. 
1.5 'Alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse as an 'ethical authority' 
Above it was stated that the process by which a subject may construct itself ethically 
functions through a given mode of thinking ethics, which in turn enables ethical 
judgements to be made, and which was termed an 'ethical stylisation' (Osborne 
1998). Such ethical stylisations do not operate in a vacuum, however, but do so in 
relation to some form of 'ethical authority'. Such an authority is an account of 'life 
and how to live it', the prescriptions of which do not carry an imperative force, but 
are more compelling than mere suggestions or advice. It is the contention of this 
thesis that the 'alternative orthodoxy' comprises just such an ethical authority. Some 
further discussion of the nature of ethical authorities in general, of how these 
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properties are relevant to the field of HIV/AIDS, and of how to approach such an 
object of study is necessary here. 
The exercise of ethical authority presupposes that those who put themselves under it 
putatively do so freely, on the basis of trust. A reciprocal relationship exists between 
the construction and maintenance of such an authority and the ethical resources of its 
proteges; whilst it is the ethical authority which informs the ethical stylisations which 
comprise the framework for consistent conduct of the selves under it, yet it is 
through the free ethical expression of those persons that the authority is legitimated 
(Osborne 1994a: 492; 1998: 3). A dynamic such as this will be highly effective in 
disguising the arbitrary nature of the order of the world as viewed from the given 
ethical standpoint, as it will establish a cycle wherein there is an instituted discourse 
about the world (the ethical authority), the self-evident truth of which is continually 
re-established because all the group, all those whose opinions are deemed to count, 
acknowledge that self-evidence and do so freely. And that they will do so is assured 
by the fact that it is that which they are reduplicating which has given them their 
framework for conduct in the first place (Bourdieu 1977: 166-167). 
Analysis, then, should be geared on the one hand towards plotting a genealogy of the 
authority - to describe how it comes to be here in its current form - in an attempt to 
reveal a complex historical dynamic; what were the precursors of the ethical 
authority as it is now? what other authorities are its direct ancestors? what forms of 
acceptance were fitting to these more ancient authorities, and how do they inform the 
types of acceptance demanded now? On the other hand, analysis must aim to gain an 
understanding of how it is that members of the group come to accept the authority; 
for example, in the field of HIV/AIDS there are, as has already been intimated and 
will be discussed fully below, various technologies of exclusion, by which group 
membership is ethically regulated but on politico-moral terms. Would be dissenters 
are faced with Hobson's choice; for as Bourdieu has observed 
"social categories disadvantaged by the symbolic order.. . cannot 
but recognize the 
legitimacy of the dominant classification in the very fact that their only chance of 
neutralizing those of its effects most contrary to their own interests lies in submitting to 
them in order to make use of them... " 
(1977: 165) 
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In this light, analysis should be looking to see what technical means an authority 
discourse employs in seeking to actualise its preferences through the propagation of 
particular ethical stylisations; for the power of the logic of 'if you can't beat them, 
join them' is multiplied when that logic is coupled with ethical techniques, by virtue 
of there being provided in them a ready-made machine by which can readily be 
achieved the re-constitution of self in approved terms which is required in order to 
join. 
It may be considered that such techniques of foreclosure run counter to the principle 
that the decision to engage with an ethical authority must be made freely. However, 
this element of compulsion only becomes apparent if one steps outside what 
Bourdieu has described as the 'field of opinion' as it applies to HIV/AIDS; that is if 
one tries to force acknowledgement of the question of the legitimacy of that which is 
taken as given, of doxa (Bourdieu 1977: 168-169). Regarding HIV/AIDS, however, 
the boundary between the 'field of opinion' and doxa is somewhat unstable, reflecting 
the problematic identification of who is dominant and who is dominated. Bourdieu 
contends that it is in the interests of the dominated to penetrate doxa in order to show 
how that which constrains them is arbitrary, whilst it is in the interests of the 
dominant to preserve doxa if at all possible, or as a second best to substitute an 
orthodoxy (ibid). But with HIV/AIDS this situation is complicated by the fact that 
various interest groups can be considered to be both dominant and dominated, one's 
view dependant upon along which axis it is that one considers the question. For 
instance, the 'alternative orthodox' account of the syndrome is dominant in certain 
specific and relevant spheres of thought and conduct, but could not be considered as 
dominant in British culture as a whole. Thus a proponent of this account will seek to 
push back doxa in relation to a widespread understanding of HIV/AIDS which is 
ignorant and misinformed on that account's terms, yet will seek to defend doxa 
against those who are themselves oppressed by this account, and whose interests 
therefore demand the undermining of this doxa. Hence we have a picture of a variety 
of competing orthodoxies, each of which implies its own 'field of opinion', and 
therefore also its own area outside that field, which will be doxa for some but not for 
others. In accordance with this, whether or not a given ethical operation appears to 
involve coercion will depend upon what the subject of that operation perceives to be 
doxic. 
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It is in the light of this that Osborne's account of the work which ethical authorities 
must perform upon themselves in order to stabilise their status as such must be 
considered. He distinguishes two types of relation; first there is the 'expressionistic' 
relation between an ethical stylisation and the work which an ethical authority 
actually does. By this he means the cultivation on the part of an authority of a type 
of persona which constitutes an expression of that authority's claim to such title. 
Secondly there is the 'instrumental' relation between an authority's preferred ethical 
stylisation and the ethical stylisation with which it aims to imbue others, in which the 
ethical qualities of an authority are held as exemplars which others should 
straightforwardly imitate (1998: 7). Within the 'field of opinion', neither of these 
relations is coercive, either to those who comprise the authority (for example, with 
respect to medical authority, doctors; with respect to HIV/AIDS user discourses, 
contributors and editors, perhaps particularly the latter) or to those who are invited to 
submit to it. There is, however, some kind of if not coercion then constraint in that 
available alternatives to submission to the given authority are only those possible 
within the 'field of opinion' - which the authority will seek to maintain - and are often 
markedly less attractive than wholesale capitulation, or even conversion. If the 
alternative to believing in a given god is damnation, then only a fool will refuse to 
believe. The only successful counter to such an argument is to make the opposition 
of 'god or damnation' illegitimate by penetrating doxa, by showing its contingency. It 
can thus be seen that it is in every authority's interests to resist manoeuvres which 
would undermine its defining oppositions, which would reveal its truths as mere 
orthodoxies. The freedom in the relation between the ethical authority and those 
whose conduct of conduct it would shape, then, is dependent upon the maintenance 
of a certain way of thinking the field in which the authority has its authority. It is 
therefore somewhat similar to the theoretical freedom the proletarian has to refuse to 
sell his/her labour and therefore to starve; such is only freedom within the classical- 
and neo-liberal Weltanschauung which allows the matter to be thought in that way. 
1.6 The 'implied reader' and the 'textual performance of community' 
Having discussed the nature of ethical technologies of the self, how these rely upon 
particular 'ethical stylisations', how these in turn are shaped by 'ethical authority 
discourses', and how the ideal-typical object of this study - 'alternative orthodox' 
HIV/AIDS discourse - can be interpreted as an example of such, the exact relevance 
of this overall theory to the texts which follow in chapters 4-6 still requires 
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clarification. In short, the object of this thesis is to explore the possibility that these 
texts are themselves ethical mechanisms by which one can come to understand one's 
subjectivity as an HIV/AIDS affected subject. 
This is of course a problematic claim. While it will hopefully be quite readily 
acknowledged that any discourse which makes prescriptive remarks on how best to 
live (as does the 'alternative orthodoxy') could function as an element of a technology 
of the self, it is quite another thing to claim that it could comprise one in and of 
itself, lacking as it does a concrete didactic relation between an actual master and an 
actual student. The texts which comprise this hegemony, it could well be objected, 
constitute only one half of the relation necessary to establish a regime of the care of 
the self; one would need to know how its prescriptions were put into practice before 
an analysis on such terms were possible. However, if one abandons the narrow 
Anglo-Saxon definition of 'discourse' in favour of the broader continental usage of 
the term, in which the division between discourse and praxis is collapsed (cf 
Woolgar 1986), then a didactic relation can be observed in the manner in which the 
text is managed, in the way it constructs the relative required positions of voice and 
reader. 
Iser has written of 'the implied reader', a function of any given text, which; 
".. embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise its effect - 
predispositions laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by the text itself... The 
concept of the implied reader is therefore a textual structure anticipating the presence of a 
recipient without actually defining him: this concept prestructures the role to be assumed 
by each recipient ... 
[and thus]... designates a network of response-inviting structures, 
which impel the reader to grasp the text. " 
(Iser 1978: 34) 
Such response-inviting structures are the devices by which (actual, not implied) 
readers can be placed such that they see the world constructed within the text from 
the required perspective. This vantage point which the text brings about is such that 
it enables the reader to focus on things which s/he otherwise would have overlooked, 
and it should be able to perform this role for any number of different readers. Iser 
notes that literary texts tend to have a number of different perspectives in them - 
those he identifies are the narrator, the characters, the plot and the implied reader - 
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which form converging guidelines, each starting from a different position. but 
heading and leading the (actual) reader towards a point of intersection, which Iser 
calls "the meaning of the text" (ibid: 35). This 'meeting place' can only be viewed 
properly from the vantage point described above. These two elements, then, are 
closely related (although neither of them is actually set out in so many words in the 
text, emerging instead via the reading process), and it is through this drawing 
together of the meeting place of textual themes, and the (actual) reader's vantage 
point, that the (actual) reader is brought into the world of the text (ibid: 34-38). 
It is in the relation between the textual voice and the implied reader that the didactic 
relation of a technology of the self is to be found within the texts studied. These 
texts are managed in such a way that the implied reader, with whom the actual reader 
is invited to identify, is predisposed to react in a particular way to the suggestions, 
imperatives and information given by the master-discourse, which is in turn informed 
by and an expression of the particular regularity of thought pertaining to HIV/AIDS 
which is here called the 'alternative orthodox' account. Thus it is possible to examine 
the mechanisms by which this abstract way of thinking HIV/AIDS comes to be and 
sustains itself, and those by which it is manifested concretely, without, for example, 
having to interview actual readers of the texts under discussion to see how they react 
to them (although this would by no means be an unworthy area of study; it would, 
however, be fraught with methodological difficulties - cf 2.2). To give a metaphoric 
parallel which might make the idea behind this kind of analysis clearer, one may gain 
a good understanding of the possibilities and limits for driving established by a 
particular car through examining its technical specifications - its top speed, its 
turning circle, its fuel capacity and so forth - without ever asking any actual drivers 
how they happen to drive it; for however they happen to drive it, it must be within 
the limits of the car's mechanisms. 
Given the above, it is important to note that the 'actual reader' constructed within this 
research (who may or may not be named as such, but can be assumed to be present 
whenever a relation is drawn between a text under consideration and someone who 
engages with it), is an ideal-typical one, who is peculiarly committed to driving this 
particular car, to the exclusion of all others. It is acknowledged from the outset that 
real people use a great variety of discourses in their processes of self-construction, 
and that the relations described as existing between 'textual reader-subject positions' 
and 'actual readers' are simplified, and do not - indeed, given the methodological 
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limitations of the enquiry could not - take full account of possible resistances on the 
part of readers, nor the influences of competing subjectivity-informing discourses. 
Accordingly, the unit of analysis in this work is not the empirical subject, but is a 
textually established ideal subject, to be understood in relation to textually 
constituted possibilities of being. 
One potential problem with using Iser's work to devise a methodology such as that 
elaborated herein is that his observations relate to the realities brought into play 
within novels, and the objection could be raised that this disqualifies texts of the sort 
examined herein from such an analysis. Woolgar's work on how 'scientific' texts 
encourage particular readings of themselves counters this suggestion, however. 
Starting from the premise that all facts and objects are inescapably textual in nature, 
he goes on to identify various devices by which a text can privilege a particular 
reading of itself (and thereby construct its facts and objects) one of which is that 
which he describes as the 'performance of community' (Woolgar 1993: 73) . 
On the 
one hand, this technique externalises and gives a set reality to the objects being 
discussed by removing from the author any privileged epistemological viewpoint 
compared with the audience. On the other, by use of the royal 'we', it 
".. has the interesting effect of inviting the reader to become part of the existing state of 
knowledge-the reader is encouraged to orient to an existing state of affairs, a state of 
existing knowledge which is shared by an unmentioned number of others. " 
(Woolgar 1993: 76) 
It is also through the invocation of community that 'tellers of the tale', the various 
voices within the text, are legitimated, are shown to be trustworthy. It is below 
argued that such a strategy, in combination with the articulation of an implied reader, 
is articulated within the studied texts, and through this is constituted an ethical 
framework by which it is established what it is necessary to accept as true and to be 
in order to assume the identity of a person with HIV/AIDS. 
1.7 Summary 
In this chapter it is argued that the 'truth' of HIV/AIDS may for analytical purposes 
be regarded as an object of discourse, emergent from contingent relations of what 
Foucault termed 'micro-power', and accordingly, it is deemed appropriate to the 
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analysis that an ontologically relativistic position should be taken. Various ideal- 
typical constructs are made by which to apprehend this truth of HIV/AIDS, the most 
important of which is the 'alternative orthodox' account, the ascendant 'progressive' 
regularity of thought pertaining to HIV/AIDS. This regularity of thought not only 
articulates a certain ontology, but is also heavily politico-morally overdetermined. 
It is held that the problems posed by this way of thinking the syndrome are 'ethical' in 
character, in that it is this mode of thinking HIV/AIDS which determines the 
possibilities and limits to being for an HIV/AIDS in/affected subject. Usage of the 
term 'ethical' is explained as having derived from Foucault's analysis of the 
development of what he called the 'hermeneutics of the self. It is contended that 
ethical practices by which one constructs oneself are shaped by particular 'ethical 
stylisations', which are related to 'ethical authority discourses', which in turn reflect 
dominant moral and political concerns. It is argued that the 'alternative orthodoxy' 
comprises just such a politico-morally informed ethical authority discourse. It is 
suggested that the most appropriate modes of engagement with the research material 
are also 'ethical'; hence it is correct to locate this thesis within the wider project 
called the 'history of the present'. 
Finally, it is contended that examination of the forms of textual management 
employed by texts to be analysed will make discernible a concrete ethical didactic 
relation, obtaining between authority voices concomitant with certain textually 




The fact that the problematic central to this thesis is so firmly embedded in the sorts 
of theoretical premises outlined in the previous chapter, which are in large part 
derived from the work of Foucault, presents certain difficulties when trying to write a 
formal sociological methodology. Given that this work is conceptually 
'Foucauldian', it makes sense that it should follow a 'Foucauldian' model in practice. 
Foucault, however, never really described a 'methodology' as such, so much as a 
Weltanschauung of the sort discussed in the previous chapter - something which 
should certainly inform one's methodological choices (by virtue of the implications 
of the various philosophical commitments which necessarily go with such an 
approach), but which never provides any practical step-by-step guide. In the light of 
this, what follows is to some extent more a detailing of various methodological 
issues which were found to be relevant, and of what approach was taken to them, 
than it is a completely neat-and-tidy, fully systematic methodology. 
2.1 Discourse analysis 
Having said this, there are certain theoretical and methodological parallels between 
this style of research and some of the variety of approaches to sociology and social 
psychology which are grouped together under the heading 'discourse analysis', on 
which subject there exist a considerable number of works which might provide 
exactly the sort of detailed methodology lacking from Foucault's own writings. 
Indeed, some commentators regard Foucault's work itself as coming within this 
grouping, although opinion on how centrally his approach is integrated into it is not 
unified - for example, whereas Burman and Parker suggest that the sorts of "post- 
structuralist" research of which Foucault's is exemplary comprise one of three key 
reference points in the field of discourse analysis (1993: 6-7), others regard his work 
as being at a rather more extreme position on the continuum of discourse analytic 
approaches, due to the broad way in which he defines discourse (Potter & Wetherell 
1987: 6-7). 
Certainly there are themes within Foucault's thought which have congruence with 
two of the assumptions often said to characterise discourse analysis: (a) that 
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discourse in the form of language comprises a set of practices through which social 
reality is constituted, hence analytic focus should be on the discourse itself, in its 
own right, rather than on that which it supposedly mirrors, or to which it putatively 
may lead (things such as attitudes or cognitive processes) -a discourse, then, is a way 
of apprehending the world which constructs its own objects, but discourse analysis is 
about regarding discourses themselves as objects (Burman & Parker 1993: 3; Parker 
1992: 8-9; Potter & Wetherell 1987: 6,34-35,160); (b) the assumption that selfhood 
and cultural identity have multiple possible forms which are enabled and shaped 
through discursive practices - discourses articulate particular subject positions into 
which those who engage with them are invited (Burman & Parker 1993: 1,3; Parker 
1992: 9; Potter & Wetherell 1987: 95,102). With such similarities then, and given the 
lack of any clear instructions from Foucault himself, the methodological treatises of 
discourse analysis proper are probably the best resource available for some helpful 
hints about the nuts-and-bolts of doing a history of the present. 
The degree of affinity between discourse analysis and the history of the present 
should not be over-stated, however; there are important differences, in particular in 
the relation the researcher takes to his/her work (in the former it is an intellectual 
relation, in the latter an ethical one - cf section 2.5). So it is, then, that this research 
has borrowed from the former's methodologies that which has a good enough fit with 
the latter's theoretical stance, although none of the various available point by point 
guides of 'how to do discourse analysis' has been followed exactly (cf Parker 1992: 6- 
20; Potter & Wetherell 1987: 160-175). 
2.2 Why not interviews? 
It was decided that data would not be gathered by means of interviews, but instead 
documentary sources would be used. There were two principal reasons for this, one 
to do with achieving coherence between theory and method, the other to do with 
professional ethics. 
2.2.1 The relationship between theory and method 
The problem of the effect that researchers have on their respondents has been widely 
acknowledged as a significant practical difficulty in accessing 'genuine' texts upon 
which to perform analysis; hence, use of documents of various kinds is now well 
established as one methodological option for more conventional discourse analysis 
34 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987: 162). Within this work, though, the problem with 
interviews is more profound than merely a pragmatic difficulty; as has been stated, 
this research comprises an attempt to gain an understanding of the research topic by 
applying a Foucauldian framework to it. Given this, it is necessary to take account of 
how highly disparaging Foucault was about sociology, and indeed about what he 
always referred to as the 'so-called human sciences' in general, and in so doing to 
acknowledge that any attempt to graft 'Foucauldian thinking' straight onto existing 
sociological techniques like interviews is liable either to produce an irresolvable 
tension between theory and practice, or require that the theoretical side of things 
should be absurdly bastardised. 
For Foucault, ways of thinking which constructed humans as legitimate objects of 
study - ways of thinking which would include here sociology, psychology and indeed 
anatomo-clinical medicine - were central to the extension of panoptic disciplinary 
power and the constitution of what he called the 'carceral society'. To ask someone 
what they think about being an HIV/AIDS in/affected person, then, would not only 
make one a conduit of disciplinary power, but also establish one in an ethical relation 
with one's respondent, both of these effects happening by virtue of asking the 
respondent to confess the truth of themselves to you, the researcher. In other words, 
if one is looking to map ethical relations and one attempts this by means of 
interviewing respondents, then it is quite possible that one's findings will be 
artefactual, that one will have constructed as a function of the process of research the 
very relations one subsequently observes. This problem is considerably reduced, 
however, if the work is based solely on documents, as within such work one's 
relation with those whom one studies is less direct, is a less immediate and efficient 
conduit of power, at least until the moment of publication. 
2.2.2 A professional-ethical difficulty 
The second issue relating to the question of whether or not to do interviews was one 
of professional-ethics. In a nutshell, the problem with making this research into an 
ethnography of people with HIV or AIDS was the likelihood that human scientists 
from all disciplines have bothered such people quite enough. Given the amount of 
literature on the subject of HIV/AIDS to be found in periodicals pertaining to all the 
human sciences it would not be unreasonable to posit that one of the primary 
experiences which someone has to endure after receiving an HIV antibody positive 
diagnosis is that of being made a target of social scientific research. Indeed, even 
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more cynically, there has been talk of a new syndrome being identified, ARCO - 
Aids Related Career Opportunities. Ian Parker (1989a) has discussed this problem in 
relation to social psychology, and argues that the rapidly expanding research 
discourse on HIV/AIDS bears a large component of works which fail to recognise 
the limits and the reflexive implications of the theories and knowledges which are 
employed to enable them. Such work he regards as reprehensible, and even goes so 
far as to suggest that there should be a moratorium on certain types of HIV/AIDS 
related research, in particular "undergraduate projects, in which the only motivation 
is that AIDS is an interesting issue", which he is certain will "do more harm than 
good. " (ibid: 30). Neither are such cautions limited to undergraduate work; the view 
that discourse analytic work must justify itself through having progressive aims and 
applications is frequently expressed in the literature, and a certain disdain is directed 
towards engaging in work intended 'merely' to add to the existing stock of 
sociological knowledge or to advance careers (Burman & Parker 1993: 11; Parker 
1992: 18-20; Potter & Wetherell 1987: 174-175). 
In the light of such comments, whilst acknowledging that from a Foucauldian 
position all 'progressive' aspirations are problematic (as discussed in the last chapter) 
and despite some reservations about such criticism of the practice of gathering 
knowledge for its own sake, recognition had to be made of the fact that, given the 
nature of this thesis and its problematic (a fairly commonplace piece of post-graduate 
research, dealing with an abstracted academic question) any practical benefit that its 
findings might provide for those who are currently suffering would only be felt long 
term, and somewhat tangentially (although to say this is not to abandon all hope that 
some non-academic application for this piece of commentary may be found). And 
with the acknowledgement that the foremost function of this research was to secure 
its author a PhD came a different set of moral obligations from those which would 
have obtained if the work had been of more immediately practical use to the 
alleviation of suffering. It was considered that relying exclusively on already 
published documentary sources would not violate such obligations, as it would 
involve no direct interference into the lives of people with HIV. 
2.3 Sources and samples 
As has been observed frequently, there has been a veritable explosion of all manner 
of writings on HIV/AIDS since the syndrome was first identified, such that it would 
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be impossible to examine anything like all of it, especially not in the kind of fine- 
tooth comb detail which has here been applied to those texts which have been 
examined. One is forced, then, to devise some criteria by which to select which texts 
to analyse. 
The criteria for choosing texts to be analysed were less rigorously systematic and 
more opportunistically pragmatic than would have been preferred; initially a broad 
sweep was made of texts which were considered to be attempts to convey to an 
interested lay public information about HIV/AIDS which was 'better' or 'more 
accurate' than that commonly found in media reports. (The 'lay public' was here 
considered to comprise people who did not have a 'professional' relationship to 
HIV/AIDS - that is were not doctors, nurses, counsellors, care workers &c -a 
grouping which would of course include people who have an HIV antibody positive 
diagnosis. It should be noted, though, that some of the texts included - in particular 
the National AIDS Manual - are aimed at both a professional and a lay readership. ) 
From this overview was derived a particular sub-section of texts which shared (albeit 
with some limitations) certain ontological commitments and progressive politico- 
moral persuasions, and which had achieved a local hegemony. This sub-section was 
made the central focus of the thesis, and three principal texts were chosen for 
examination - the writings of Simon Watney, the Body Positive Newsletter and the 
National AIDS Manual. This selection was made on the basis of the frequency with 
which they were cited as being authoritative both by each other and in other arguably 
less significant texts (cf chapter 3), of their apparently inhabiting an influential or 
interesting position, and simply because access to them existed. (This last criterion, 
flawed as it may be, is quite commonly employed by discourse analysts - Potter & 
Wetherell 1987: 162. ) It was not, for example, readily possible to obtain any 
literatures from the organisation Positively Women, something which may be 
considered a rueful omission. Access was gained to two other support literatures 
(Continuum, a newsletter for HIV/AIDS in/affected people which seeks to challenge 
many received ideas about AIDS, and in particular is sceptical about the HIV 
hypothesis, and the Birchgrove Group Newsletter, which is produced for and by 
HIV/AIDS in/affected haemophiliacs), but these were omitted as upon examination 
they were considered not to inhabit the same space of authority as those which were 
selected. 
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The danger inherent in this approach is, of course, that some vital text containing 
novel insights will be overlooked. Not only that, but none of the canons of discourse 
which were selected for scrutiny were entirely fixed entities; all were in ongoing 
publication, a state of affairs which carries the uncomfortable possibility that the 
analyses made of those discourses might be rendered out of date before they had 
even been submitted. This was a particular problem with respect to the commentary 
on the Body Positive Newsletter in chapter 5, which was written quite early on in the 
research period, and consequently was based on rather a limited selection of issues of 
this magazine, in comparison to what would be available for analysis now (a new 
issue is produced about once every three weeks). Given that resources do not permit 
a thorough examination of these later issues, and that it might be considered 
methodologically suspect to make a cursory reading of them in order to check that 
they match with the conclusions of the original reading (see the section on value 
freedom below for an explanation of why such a practice would be dubious), these 
later issues have been omitted from the analysis. A similar problem obtained with 
respect to the National AIDS Manual - this work is updated every year, and until 
recently was published in a ring-binder format, such that pages which had become 
obsolete could readily be replaced by new ones. The copy of the manual which was 
studied herewith was of this format, and was an amalgamation of the November 
1992, Autumn 1993 and May 1994 editions, which, at the time the analysis was 
undertaken (early 1996) was available for current use in a West London hospital 
library. However, in the intervening time, the mode of publication of this document 
changed, such that it is now produced annually as a soft back book, with a radically 
revised contents, and utterly altered internal indexing and referencing. To try to 
incorporate these sweeping changes into the analysis would have proven practicably 
impossible. 
2.4 A central assumption 
It is acknowledged that problems such as these may put certain limits on the quality 
of the knowledge produced by the study, but unfortunately, the exigencies of 
research mean that they are unavoidable. They are, however, not so confounding to 
the objectives of this enquiry as they may at first seem, given an assumption which is 
made throughout the analysis, and which is rooted in the ontological commitments of 
this thesis, and in particular the Foucauldian conception of what a discourse is. For 
if one employs a Foucauldian definition of the term, one cannot in truth study a 
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discourse as such, due to its not being a concrete thing; a discourse from this 
perspective is a way of thinking about something, a system of representations, 
meanings and practices through the interaction of which are established the truth of 
the objects of that discourse, and the possibilities of being for the subjects of it. 
Hence, what must actually be studied are specific individual texts, viewed as aspects 
and expressions of the broader, disparate discourse, and it is only through such small 
scale analysis that the parameters and workings of the larger discourse may be 
discerned (Parker 1992: 6). 
Moreover, any given discourse rests upon, is enabled by, particular regimes of micro- 
power. The assumption upon which such research must rely, then, is that the 
conditions of micro-power which enable whichever texts are actually examined, and 
which may be revealed by excavating such texts, are the same as those which enable 
those discourses which are not studied. It is here taken as given, then, that the 
conditions of possibility which allow, for example, the particular issues and pages of 
the Body Positive Newsletter or the National AIDS Manual which were scrutinised to 
come to be are the same as those which enable the unexamined issues and pages of 
those publications, and as those which enable the multitude of texts which remained 
entirely unexamined; hence one may draw a map which although perhaps not 
containing every detail, will describe broadly speaking the same discursive terrain as 
if it were possible to consider a more complete sample. 
Indeed, it is assumed that these micro-political conditions are the same as those 
which allow individuals to self-construct as HIV/AIDS in/affected persons. This 
assumption undermines the distinction made by much (but by no means all) 
discourse analytic work within which primacy is afforded to 'ordinary' or 'everyday' 
or 'natural' language - all terms more usually used to describe forms of talk than 
forms of written language - over more considered texts (Parker 1989: 66; Potter & 
Wetherell 1987: 164; Stubbs 1983: 1), for it implies that the regularities of thought 
visible in the written texts from which data are gathered are the same as those which 
obtain within and enable, for example, the conversations of HIV/AIDS in/affected 
persons (a state of affairs which strengthens the case for abandoning interviews as a 
methodological strategy). Thus, from this point of view, not only is meaningful 
analysis of the overall discourse possible using quite a limited sample, but also no 
category of discourse is to be considered more 'authentic', and on that criterion a 
more proper analytic target, than any other. 
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Making this assumption, then, allows one to look for regularities of thought in the 
ways and places which may be considered the least harmful and the most 
methodologically consistent - in this case published documents - although there are 
dangers inherent in doing so; if this assumption falls, then the whole research 
problematic is severely compromised, (as indeed would be much of Foucault's own 
historical work), and its analytical power is much reduced. 
2.5 Engagement with texts 
Exactly how one should engage with sample texts once they have been selected is 
also a problematic area, and one in which even the step-by-step guides to discourse 
analysis are not perfectly clear. Potter and Wetherell, for example, when trying to 
describe how it is done, state that they are at a loss for words, and have to resort to 
the very general principle that "analysis involves a lot of careful reading and 
rereading". The process, then, is somewhat similar to that of grounded theory 
research, in as much as that one immerses oneself in one's data - that is, those aspects 
of the documents under study which are deemed significant - and lets the pattern 
emerge. Such analysis has, they suggest, two phases, in the first of which one looks 
both for variability and consistency in form and content within and between 
accounts, and in the second of which one makes hypotheses to explain what one has 
found, and searches for linguistic evidence to support those hypotheses (1987: 168). 
This is a reasonable model for the process by which data were analysed herein 
(although in truth it was more circular - the initial theoretical position informed data 
gathering in the early analyses, which in turn generated tentative hypotheses, which 
then shaped not only the editing process for that data, but also the data gathering for 
subsequent analyses. The hypotheses which these latter analyses generated were 
then incorporated back into the earlier works when final writing up took place), it 
comprising in part an examination of consistencies across and within texts regarding, 
for example, the construction of objects such as 'HIV, 'AIDS' and 'HIV/AIDS 
in/affected communities', and differential variabilities in relation to the textual 
positioning of the various sub-populations which are frequently mentioned as being 
connected to HIV/AIDS ('gay men', 'lesbians', 'intra-venous drug users', 'women', 
'heterosexuals', 'hemophiliacs', &c. ). Given that the variabilities and consistencies 
exposed have in such large part to do with these sorts of identity positions, aspects of 
Parker's twenty stage model of how to do discourse analysis - which draws explicitly 
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on Foucault's work - are also particularly relevant; he suggests that one should 
(amongst other things) identify what types of person are articulated by a given 
discourse, what rights to speak such persons have within that discourse, and what 
rights to speak the reader who identifies with those persons would have (1992: 10). 
As will become apparent, such concerns were central to the readings made of all 
three of the major target texts. 
This sort of methodological thinking served as a useful springboard for the actual 
practices by which the analysis was forged, which may, however, be described quite 
simply. Firstly, a fairly cursory reading was made of the particular target text under 
immediate consideration, and notes made on the text itself of anything which 
appeared to be at all interesting - that is, not only the consistencies, variabilities, 
speaking subjects and possibilities for speaking articulated by the text, but any major 
themes or textual practices which were important to the way in which the text shaped 
itself. This may seem a slightly vague criterion, but that is exactly the point; the idea 
is that the theoretical scheme by which one subsequently imposes order upon the 
texts should be derived as far as possible from the text itself, rather than from the 
preconceptions of what is important provided by one's sociological training. 
Following this, a second reading was made, but this time many quotations were 
extracted from the text, according to the various criteria devised after the cursory 
reading, and copy-typed into a computer file. Careful note was made of the exact 
location from which the quotations were taken, as well as any relevant contextual 
information. Once this was complete, the quotations were coded into various sub- 
categories, once again derived from the initial readings; the purpose here was not so 
much to begin analysis as "to squeeze an unwieldy body of discourse into 
manageable chunks" (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 167), and very often the sub- 
categories employed at this stage were subsequently abandoned as the analysis 
progressed. A certain amount of editing took place at this stage as well, with many 
quotations being removed into a 'dumping ground' at the end of the file, such that 
they could be revisited and/or rescued at a later stage, if the insights gained from the 
subsequent analysis of that which remained demanded it. Quotations were pruned at 
this stage principally if they appeared to be representative of only minor trends or 
themes, or if there were a large number of quotations supporting the same point. 
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2.5.1 Deconstruction and irony 
Having got to this stage, analyses of each sub-section were written in turn, based on 
in-depth reading and re-reading of the material (cf Potter and Wetherell 1987: 168). 
The approach to the text employed in this reading was, in its procedure if not its 
theoretical imagination, similar to Norris's (1987) summary of Derrida's 
deconstructive technique, which can stand as a description of the method employed 
herein, in that both comprise 
"the vigilant seeking-out of those 'aporias', blindspots or moments of self-contradiction 
where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it 
manifestly means to say and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean. " 
(ibid: 19) 
Such an approach to text also has a congruence with Parker's contention that 
discourse analysis can be facilitated "by identifying contradictions between different 
ways of describing something", and by looking for those instances when one 
discourse is used to 'explain' another (1992: 13-14). 
This deconstructive method enabled the possibility of excavating from any given text 
aspects such as the ontology it constructed, its logical, philosophical, moral and 
political commitments, the subject positions it articulated along with the ethical 
relations which informed such, and the forms of thinking which underlay all of these. 
Once identified, the manner in which these various factors operated within the texts 
and their interrelation with each other was written up. An initial draft of the analysis 
having been produced in this way, it was then edited and re-drafted several times in 
order to come to the final version. It was principally during this last process that data 
in the 'dumping ground' were reconsidered and if necessary re-incorporated. 
It is important to underline the difference, however, between the deconstructive 
approach taken to the readings made within this work, and the more general trend 
within HIV/AIDS commentary towards making analyses which seek to ironize one 
account of the syndrome in order to supplant it with some other, 'better' account, 
which is not to be subject to the same ironizing gaze (cf for example Watney 
(1987,1989,1994) and Sontag (1989)). (For a detailed discussion of exactly why 
such an approach is methodologically unsatisfactory, see Woolgar 1983). Although 
the deconstructive technique does often involve the application of irony to a text, it is 
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of a qualitatively different form from this more commonplace variety, in that it is 
based on the ongoing recognition of the contingency not only of those knowledges 
and values which underpin that which is being observed, but also of those upon 
which the observing gaze itself is premised (cf Rorty 1989: xv). It is applied, then, 
only as tool by which to facilitate analysis, and not as a means by which supposedly 
to demonstrate 'truth'. This aligns the procedure with Potter & Wetherell's view that 
whilst consideration of possible alternative readings of an account can be helpful 
when trying to understand its workings, the discourse analyst should never be trying 
to show what 'really happened' in any given situation (1987: 5). 
Such is the position of this work; whilst it is held that the truth of HIV/AIDS could 
be other than it is, no suggestion is intended that this emergent truth is somehow 
ontologically 'false', nor morally 'wrong', nor that it could or should be replaced by 
some other account which is to be considered 'better' in either sense. Instead, it seeks 
to make sense out of the confusions of HIV/AIDS discourse by attempting to stand 
outside the current field of debate, and to turn upon the mass of competing 'truths' a 
gaze made philosophically sceptical by the confusion in which it finds itself. This 
fact has important ramifications for the manner in which data are addressed in the 
research, the implied problematic demanding less an intellectual engagement (of the 
sort apposite to answering the question of how well available accounts of HIV/AIDS 
correspond to the syndrome's putative noumenal reality), than an ethical one, 
concerned with how it is that certain accounts of HIV/AIDS have come to be 
considered true, with the difficulties with being and thinking with which the 
discourse of HIV/AIDS confronts one, and with the matter of how to address oneself 
to that discourse in the light of such difficulties (cf Rajchman 1991). This is in 
keeping with the research being located within the overall approach to research 
styled the 'history of the present' (discussed previously in 1.4.3). 
2.5.2 Value freedom 
There comes with such an approach, however, the danger that a historian of the 
present who finds him/herself liberated from constraining 'truth' discourses by the 
methodology adopted will be unable to resist the temptation to use his/her research 
as a platform on which to articulate any such nonsense as s/he would care to dream 
up, and in particular to use his/her (personal, ethical) work as a basis and justification 
for certain (public) moral or political arguments. Given this. certain of Weber's 
methodological prescriptions on the position of personal values in research provide a 
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useful guide by which to check any such tendencies. These are especially pertinent 
given that this study is seeking to engage with a morally and politically sensitive 
subject area. A brief summary of the relevant work will be helpful here. 
Weber is most concerned that the human sciences are guilty of collapsing, perhaps 
even ignoring, the absolute logical division which exists between descriptive and 
normative commentary; after Kant, he wishes to restate the old philosophical maxim 
that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is'. He is certainly not, however, 
suggesting that the social scientist should have licence to ride roughshod over all 
moral concerns in the name of 'objectivity', but saying the relationship which 
doubtlessly exists between scientific analysis and value statements is of a kind that 
while such analysis can provide guidance as to what the effects of employing one 
means to an end as opposed to another might be, it cannot show that it is logically 
necessary to accept a particular end as morally valuable. For Weber, (as for this 
thesis) we live in a world of 'irreducibly competing ideals', between which social 
science cannot hope to adjudicate; it can only clarify the terms of the debate 
(Giddens 1971: 135-136). Accordingly, the scientist must be brave enough to refuse 
to allow dominant moral ideas - even if held and cherished by the scientist 
him/herself - to distort his/her analytic vision. This point of view is reflected in 
Weber's great stress on the necessity that would be social scientists should learn to 
recognise "facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions", to distinguish such 
"personally uncomfortable" facts from their own evaluations, and to avoid making 
"an unnecessary spectacle of personal tastes or other sentiments" (ibid: 144; Weber 
1948: 147,1949: 5). 
Use of a deconstructive method of engagement with texts does not stand in 
contradiction with Weber's methodological prescriptions, then, so long as its 
application is governed by the principle that it is only to be used for the purpose of 
pointing out such 'inconvenient facts' within the account under consideration, and 
never for the propagation of any alternative ontological, epistemological, ethical or 
politico-moral vision. Ensuring that this principle is maintained entails the historian 
of the present doing work on him/herself such that s/he is able to take a detached, 
disinterested perspective on what is a personal difficulty - s/he must be 'objective' 
about his/her 'subjective' problem. It is only after s/he has disengaged with the 
discourse under study that s/he may allow his/her moral and political self access to 
the material. 
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In sum, then, for Weber, sociology should never - indeed logically cannot - be about 
finding good reasons to support the point of view one has already decided upon. 
Consequently, the researcher must maintain constant vigilance against the temptation 
to allow his/her moral and political difficulties with the subject at hand to govern 
his/her analytical vision. In practice, though, to sustain such a position requires 
considerable and constant effort, and failings do occur. And when they do, they are 
to be regarded as failings of the study as a whole, and should certainly be savaged 
without mercy by readers more diligent than the author. On the other hand, Weber's 
prescriptions also carry the implication that those discourses which are deemed by 
currently dominant relations of micro-power to be 'morally exemplary' are not at all 
exempt from throwing up 'inconvenient facts', and neither are discourses similarly 
marked as 'morally reprehensible' robbed of all insight by dint of their badness. 
2.5.3 'Textual anthropology' 
Doing this form of research, then, might well be described as the business of being 
an 'anthropologist of text' - in that, whilst being sure to maintain a studious 
detachment, one enters a textual realm (by means of careful reading of one's 
documents), seeks to understand that realm's ways, and then writes a monograph. 
Such an approach, of course, carries the implication that the problem space being 
opened is radically subjective, in as much as that it is a function of one's own relation 
to the discourse, and not a reflection of anything which necessarily inheres in the 
object of study. This kind of subjectivity, however, need not compromise the task at 
hand so long as the implications for the status of the discourse produced in the 
process of research is acknowledged when the final conclusions are reckoned; one 
must understand that the methodology employed places limits upon what can be 
safely said, and that though one's conclusions may be insightful, enlightening, and 
useful for informing subsequent action, they cannot be unproblematically equated 
with 'truth'. 
2.6 Summary 
There are difficulties in constructing a suitable methodology for a work such as this 
whose terms of reference are so radically embedded in Foucauldian thought, given 
that Foucault never provided an 'easy-to-follow' account of his own investigational 
methods. Notwithstanding this, the methodological thought behind discourse 
analysis has a sufficient alignment with the history of the present to be of some use 
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when trying to devise a workable method for the latter. Use of interviews for data 
gathering was ruled out, partly because to gather data in such a manner would be 
inconsistent with the view on the effect of such researches held by Foucault -a 
perspective inherent in the world-view which informs the problematic of this 
research - and partly because it was considered professionally ethically dubious. 
Hence a document based approach was adopted, but taking such a tack brings its 
own problems; how to select which texts to analyse and how to deal with the fact 
that certain of the texts under consideration were in continuous publication during 
the period of analysis. The assumption was made that both those texts which were 
actually studied and those which were not are dependent upon the same regularities 
of thought as their conditions of possibility, such that to omit a particular piece from 
analysis is not so important if these same conditions of possibility may be excavated 
from another piece. In addition, it was assumed that the ethical possibilities 
established within the texts under analysis rested upon the same regularities of 
thinking. These assumptions help to solve the two difficulties with document based 
research outlined above, but they are dangerous to make, in that if they fall, so does 
the entire research problematic. Finally, issues to do with the researcher's relation to 
the texts being studied, the uses of deconstruction and irony as analytical tools, and 





Put simply, the central argument of this thesis is that over the nearly two decades that 
HIV/AIDS has been with us, a particular way of thinking the syndrome has emerged 
as dominant, here characterised as the 'alternative orthodox' vector of discourse, and 
that that way of thinking has certain ethical and governmental properties. The 
following section consists of four related pieces of discourse analysis, which together 
form the empirical basis of this thesis. The first of these (chapter 3) is a historical 
account, a 'structural snapshot' of HIV/AIDS discourse circa the turn of the decade. 
Its purpose is to map the emergence to pre-eminence of this way of thinking 
HIV/AIDS, and thereby to contextualise and explicate the work in chapters 4-6, 
which comprises analyses of three major expressions of this 'alternative orthodox' 
rendering of HIV/AIDS - the commentaries of Simon Watney (chapter 4), the Body 
Positive Newsletter (chapter 5) and the National AIDS Manual (chapter 6). The 
reason for the selection for detailed study of these three texts in particular is that they 
are each not only exemplary of 'alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS thinking, but stand 
central among the major authorities on HIV/AIDS in this country. They are the 
gatekeepers of HIV/AIDS knowledge, they are "obligatory passage points" (Latour 
1987: 150; 181-182; 244-245) through which one's understandings of the syndrome 
must be channelled and filtered. As such, it is fitting that the knowledges they 
articulate should be painstakingly excavated, the better to comprehend the 
possibilities and limits - to knowledge, to thought, to action, to being - which this 
dominant mode of HIV/AIDS thought establishes. 
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Chapter 3 
SETTING THE SCENE: THE TRUTH(S) ABOUT AIDS 
Through the 1980s the field of representations of HIV/AIDS steadily expanded, via a 
variety of media and from manifold sources, producing a complex and often 
contradictory knowledge of the syndrome. By the turn of the decade, however, 
certain aspects of this overall discourse had achieved a hegemony of sorts -a way of 
thinking HIV/AIDS, with its own incumbent epistemological, ontological and moral 
commitments - which although arguably not dominant amongst people in general, 
had achieved ascendancy amongst those who were deemed to be 'in the know' about 
HIV/AIDS. Indeed, any individual's adoption or otherwise of this perspective began 
to become a marker by which those whose views on the subject were to be taken 
seriously and those whose views were not could be distinguished. 
3.1 Three 'vectors' of popular HIV/AIDS discourse 
Out of the enormous array of approaches to HIV/AIDS which appeared as the 
discourse burgeoned from the mid 1980s onwards certain common axes of debate 
emerged. These axes were manifested around a variety of salient issues, such as: the 
aetiology of the syndrome; epidemiological predictions and the epidemic in Africa 
and the rest of the Third World; preventative strategies; the roles of gay men, female 
prostitutes, people of colour and intravenous drug users in the spread of the disease; 
questions of blame; the problem of media coverage. As extensive and various as 
these concerns were, it is possible to make a tentative model embracing these 
multifarious responses to the syndrome, in which three vectors of discourse emergent 
from the complex of micro-political relations present in the general discourse may be 
identified. These will be labelled 'orthodox', 'alternative orthodox' and 'dissident'. 
These terms are used precisely because of the connotations they evoke; 'orthodox' 
raising images of 'conservatism with a small c', 'alternative' suggesting a particular 
and self-conscious type of liberalism, and 'dissident' carrying with it the notion of 
political heresy. Each one of these vectors comprises its own universe of responses 
and modes of response to the syndrome - they are each more than just various 
theories about HIV/AIDS, they are competing ways of thinking the syndrome; that is 
they each provide not merely a set knowledges of HIV/AIDS, but also a distinct logic 
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by which to articulate those knowledges - logics which are often radically informed 
by politico-moral party opinions. 
3.1.1 'Orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse 
'Orthodox' responses to AIDS premised themselves on a particular medical truth of 
the condition, which is as follows; AIDS is a syndrome in which the body's immune 
system is gradually destroyed, resultant from infection with a virus, HIV. This leaves 
the body vulnerable to opportunistic infection; that is infections which would under 
normal circumstances have been no threat become able to cause serious illness and 
eventual death due to the body's weakened state. There is no cure, nor even any very 
effective palliative therapy. There is no preventative vaccine against HIV, nor is 
there likely to be in the foreseeable future, because of the peculiar way in which the 
virus reproduces itself. HIV can lie dormant in the bloodstream for between 7 and 
11 years, and perhaps as long as 20 years, during which time the host is basically 
well but contagious. The virus cannot be caught by everyday contact, however, but 
only by exchange of bodily fluids. The most common route of transmission is sexual 
intercourse, by which the virus can pass from men to women, from women to men 
and between men. It is also frequently transmitted via transfusions of blood and 
blood products in areas where such are not systematically tested, from needle sharing 
in injecting drug use, and from a mother to her baby through the placenta, or through 
breast milk (Panos Institute 1990: 2). 
Estimates of the then current and projected future extents of HIV infection, and 
therefore of numbers of new AIDS cases, were also an important aspect of the 
foundations of 'orthodox' accounts, although such estimates proved very difficult to 
gauge accurately. In February 1985, for example, Dr. Marion McEvoy noted that the 
annual increase in AIDS in the United Kingdom roughly followed an exponential 
rise, and thereby calculated an extrapolation to 1990, reaching an estimate of 10,000 
new cases in that year. However, as she further commented, at 95% confidence 
limits the figure could have been anywhere between 1 and 295 million (Daniels 
1985: 6). In 1988 the Department of Health foretold 30,000 new cases a year by 1992 
(Times 11/2/92). (Both of these have proved to be severe over-estimates. ) 
In view of the lack of a cure, 'orthodox' responses proposed that the best hope of 
prevention was through education, with the emphasis on personal responsibility; 
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"Only by influencing individual behaviour and lifestyles can we hope to contain the spread 
of infection. " 
commented John Moore in 1988, then Secretary of State for Social Services (World 
Health Organisation 1988: xvi). Jonathan Mann concurred; 
".. education is the key to AIDS prevention, because HIV transmission can be prevented 
through informed and responsible behaviour... individual behaviour is responsible for most 
HIV transmission. " 
(World Health Organisation 1988: 9) 
Originally constructed as a condition affecting certain minority groups (the four 'Hs'-, 
Homosexuals, Haitians, Heroin users and Hemophiliacs) it was initially putative gay 
promiscuity that was seen as the major factor involved in propagating the spread of 
infection. The closing of gay bathhouses was tabled as desirable in order to slow the 
advance of the disease, and once again individual rather than social factors were used 
to explain such supposed gay behaviour; 
"Whether impelled by an uncontrollable drive or by deliberate choice, some [gay men] have 
opted for the role of sexual athlete... " 
(Siegal & Siegal 1983: 141) 
In the mid 1980s, however, thinking on the syndrome shifted such that it became 
conceived as a more general threat, a change resultant from reports of endemic HIV 
infection in certain regions of Africa. The 'orthodox' message to the heterosexual 
population given in the wake of this emphasised a particular variant of safe practice; 
penetrative intercourse, but permissible only within a heterosexual monogamous 
relationship. The only alternative to this was abstention. Female prostitutes were 
seen as a major conduit of infection, because of the 'astonishing' numbers of clients 
they were said to serve (Masters, Johnson & Kolodny 1988: 131-132). Young people 
were urged not to feel that sexual activity was a prerequisite of happiness (Gordon & 
Klouda 1989: 155) and the point was emphasised that given the absence of "other risk 
factors", total monogamy could guarantee against infection (Miller, Weber & Green 
1986: 177). 
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Neither was safer sex seen as a solution. It was argued that even if it does not break, 
the use of a condom would not ensure protection (Singer Kaplan 1987: 15), a point 
which Masters, Johnson and Kolodny put with some vehemence; 
"to rely on condoms for truly safe sex - or even a reasonable approximation of safe sex - is 
to blatantly disregard the facts. " 
(1988: 119) 
HIV was assumed to have originated in Africa, and to have mutated from a different 
virus, STLV III, found in the African green monkey. This virus was identified by 
Robert Gallo, the American scientist who claimed the discovery of HIV. 
Notwithstanding that fact that STLV III seemed to have no debilitating effects on the 
monkeys which carried it, the suggestion was made that in an altered and deadly 
form it was transmitted into humans through the "life of close contact with infected 
animals" which Africans are alleged to lead (Langone 1991: 63) and finally to have 
journeyed via Haiti to America and then Europe. The course that the epidemic 
appeared to have taken in Africa was seen as the shape of things to come in the West. 
Once again promiscuity, heterosexual this time, was seen as culpable for the spread 
of infection, mitigated by the putative in salubriousness of African life. It was 
thought that things over here, however, might never get as bad; 
".. although, biologically speaking, we may be no different from the people in Africa, from 
the standpoint of sexual practices, public health and all of the environmental and cultural 
factors that can promote disease, we are very different. " 
(Langone 1991: 110) 
And it was important to maintain that difference. It was individual turpitude on a 
grand scale, stemming from the erosion of moral values, which had to answer for 
AIDS, and the arrival of this terrible syndrome was therefore to provide the spur for 
a return to how things should be; "civil libertarian" morals and policies were 
demonstrated by the reality of AIDS to be wholly inadequate, and their abandonment 
in favour of a return to restrictive 'traditional' values was seen as a prerequisite of the 
continuance of civilisation (Masters, Johnson & Kolodny 1988: 142) 
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3.1.2 'Alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse 
Standing in direct contrast to the 'orthodox' vector was the 'alternative orthodox' one, 
a way of thinking HIV/AIDS which in part rested upon knowledges derived from 
social science, and which certainly reflected the same sorts of agenda which can be 
seen underlying much social scientific work; 'alternative' responses and the social 
sciences were aligned in as much as the former shared the latter's tendency to be pro- 
gay, pro-feminist, pro-people-of-colour and proletarian. 'Alternative orthodox' 
accounts, then, held that 'orthodox' responses were the continuation of a historical 
tendency to understand disease in terms of the plague metaphor, that is as something 
from 'outside' which affects 'them', and can be used as a justification for social and 
moral judgements (Gamson 1989: 351). 'Orthodox' responses were seen as exploiting 
widely held fears concerning homosexuality, prostitution, drug (ab)use and the like, 
and consequently as having been structured in such a way as to discourage 
transgression, thereby disguising the 'true facts' of the matter (Watney 1994: 8-9; 
Williamson 1989: 70). 'Alternative' responses sought to expose the hidden political 
agenda underlying 'orthodox' responses, by delineating certain things as 'fact' and 
others as 'fallacy'. 
Excepting a few points to do with women and AIDS, the 'alternative' position did not 
question the 'medical truth' of AIDS which underlay 'orthodox' responses, but, 
indeed, added to it several tenets of its own (largely to do with how this truth should 
be presented); people infected with HIV or who had developed AIDS were not 
'victims', and were 'living with' not 'dying from' it. AIDS and HIV were not 
problems confined to specific 'risk groups', and the idea that HIV/AIDS was a 'gay 
plague' was to be exploded as a myth. Indeed, talk of risk groups was largely 
proscribed; emphasis was to be on risky practices instead - the message was that it's 
what you do that's important, not with whom or how many. 
Social theory was brought to bear to back up this position; for instance, Treichler 
contended that the identification early on in the syndrome's history of the four 'H' 
categories informed the manner in which data were collected for several years, 
enabling the view that being a certain kind of person, rather than indulging in 
particular practices, was the most significant factor of risk (1988: 198). Having spent 
over a decade establishing for themselves a distinct and highly visible social identity, 
gay men were then the obvious 'kind of person' to be targeted (Altman 1986: 2 1). In 
the same vein, formulations of possible solutions to the spread of HIV which 
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involved monogamy were seen as merely buttressing the dominant familial ideology. 
'Safer sex' was the correct solution, for which enormous national and world-wide 
funding, free condoms, extensive education and advertising programmes (with a 
special focus on the risks to women) were to be provided. Injecting drug users were 
considered to have been forced into the habit by economic factors, as were female 
prostitutes. 
Haemophiliacs were largely invisible within this mode of discourse, except when 
being contrasted with gay, drug using or female prostitute people with AIDS in 
critiques of a supposed innocent/guilty divide in attitudes towards those infected, or 
when being conflated with those same categories, in critiques of the alleged tarring 
of all people with AIDS with the same stigmatising brush (Altman 1986: 24; Patton 
1988). 
Like 'orthodox' discourse, 'alternative' discourse held that HIV infection was endemic 
in Africa, a fact to be explained in terms of heterosexual intercourse. The African 
example again provided a model for future transmission in the West (as, to a lesser 
extent, did the case of Asia, where an epidemic of unheard of proportions was 
expected by the year 2000 (Guardian 11/4/92)). Notwithstanding this, however, 
media representations of African AIDS were considered to reproduce and legitimise 
ignorant white cultural images of an unsanitary and primitive continent and culture; 
hence attributing the prevalence of the virus in Africa to such things as "'traditional 
[and implicitly lax] sexual values"', unreported homosexual activity, "'traditional 
tribal medicine"', ritual scarification or voodoo rites was to be considered racism, 
though it was acceptable to doubt African reports that rates of infection were lower 
than was supposed by the West (Kippax et al 1992; Watney 1994: 120). 
Media reporting of Western AIDS was equally poor, and was thought to be; 
".. all of a piece with the way any issue linked with lesbians and gay men is reported... [and] 
simply a reflection of the prejudices and outlook of most media folk and of the way news is 
constructed. " 
(The Lesbian and Gay Media Group: 3) 
As such, it was party to a wider anti-gay discourse, which once again interrupted the 
conveyance of disinterested medical facts to the public at large (Watney 1987: 80-82; 
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Mort 1987: 212). Media pseudo-science was not a help, either, as oversimplified and 
inaccurate reporting served to give old prejudices the authority of science (Patton 
1989: 116). Criticism was made of the way in which medical sanction was sought to 
bolster 'traditional family values', through the construction of the discourse of AIDS 
in such a way that all but long term monogamous heterosexual relations were 
apparently dangerous and deviant (Alcorn 1988 69-75; Karpf 1988: 147; Sontag 
1989: 159). This related partly to the official education campaigns of mid-to-late 
eighties in which much was made of the fact that when you have sex with someone 
you are also, in effect, sleeping with all his/her previous partners. In a heterosexual 
encounter, this implies that each person will be having sexual relations, albeit 
indirectly, with a number of people of their own sex. Watney (1987: 43) held that 
this was in line with an ideological defence of the family which he contended had 
been in operation for over a century. He further suggested that AIDS 
"has been used to stabilize the figure of the heterosexual family unit which remains the 
central image in our society with which individuals are endlessly invited to identify their 
collective interests, and their very core of being. " 
(Watney 1994: 10) 
The question of blame also figured strongly in 'alternative orthodox' accounts. It was 
often noted that from very early on in the syndrome's history people with AIDS, and 
particularly gay men, were blamed for causing the disease, and that this blame 
extended from gay men with AIDS to all gay men, affording the chance to 
disseminate the idea that the danger to human survival was homosexuality itself, and 
not AIDS (Altman 1986: 25; Poirier 1988: 463-464). 'Alternative orthodox' responses 
sought to quash the notion that there are guilty (male homosexual, injecting drug user 
and female prostitute) and innocent (anyone else) people with HIV/AIDS, but made 
the point that even those who might under another scheme be considered 'innocent' 
could not escape stigmatisation as the power of the supposed connexion between 
AIDS and gayness was such that anybody who developed the disease would become 
"queer by association" (Patton: 1988). 
'Alternative orthodox' discourse was anxious to show that in the West HIV was 
becoming very much a problem of people of colour. Fee pointed out how in 
Baltimore, health statistics were collected by race but not by income, and that in the 
nineteen-thirties this led to syphilis being identified as a black disease, rather than a 
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disease of poverty. This same process was seen to be at work throughout the 1980s, 
linking people of colour to AIDS by virtue of their being people of colour, rather 
than seeing the connexion as a result of their paucity of life-chances (Fee 1988: 126- 
127). Another issue of concern was the difficulty convincing the Asian community 
in the West that AIDS was dangerous to them, as those who were looked to as 
leaders of that community had propagated the view that it was a white disease, born 
of decadence (Guardian 15/4/92). There was no clear consensus of opinion as to 
whether or not HIV/AIDS originated in and spread to the West from Africa, but there 
was certainly agreement that wherever it came from there could be no justification 
for the ascription of blame to any particular population. 
A particular focus was made on the fact that women had by the mid to late 1980s 
emerged as the fastest growing population with HIV/AIDS. Women were to be 
warned of the dangers inherent in relationships with gay, bisexual and intravenous 
drug using men. The scapegoating of female prostitutes as a reservoir of infection 
was criticised on the grounds that informed estimates had eight out of ten female 
prostitutes regularly using condoms, and that other studies suggested that a female 
prostitute was unlikely to be infected with HIV unless she also injected drugs 
(Kaspar 1989: 13). The effects that AIDS had had on lesbians, the syndrome having 
brought with it a resurgence of indiscriminate homophobia, and the risks of infection 
from lesbian sexual practices were to be highlighted (Richardson 1987: 61), as were 
the special needs of women of colour. The mood was that women had been woefully 
omitted from the discourse of AIDS, due at least in part to the phallocentricity of 
science. Treichler suggested that; 
"... Women's invisibility in the AIDS discourse... is based, then, on scientific constructions 
that have glossed over the 'Other' despite growing evidence that the category includes 
women (and men) who have been infected by way of heterosexual intercourse of the boy- 
meets-girl/missionary position/no frills variety. " 
(1988: 195) 
Several commentators went so far as to suggest that certain specifically female 
symptoms which may be the first indicators of HIV positive status in women had not 
been included in diagnostic criteria. Critchley contended that; 
"For many gay men, the appearance of the skin cancer Karposi [sic] Sarcoma is an early 
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warning of positive status but the vast majority of women have no such sign. Instead, 
relatively common gynaecological disorders - vaginal discharge, thrush, pre-cancerous 
changes to the cervix and even painful periods - may be a first symptom. Yet, despite 
campaigning, these female-specific illnesses have not yet been added to Britain's 
Communicable Diseases Surveillance Centre's (CDSC) Aids definition. " 
(Guardian 21/5/92) 
And the same was said to be so of the definitions used by both the American Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) (Kaspar 1989: 8), and the World Health Organisation 
(Independent 26/5/92). This illustrates that which was central to the project of 
'alternative orthodox' discourse; to increase the perceived personal relevance of 
AIDS across the whole population. The disorders to which Critchley referred are 
sufficiently commonplace that few women will never have suffered from any of 
them, but she offered women a new way to make sense of such conditions - as an 
indicator of possible HIV infection. 
3.1.3 'Dissident' HIV/AIDS discourse 
This third vector consisted of those accounts of HIV/AIDS which were contrary to 
both the first two vectors. As such, it comprised a number of rather disparate 
discourses, and a discrete and reasonably coherent mode of thinking HIV/AIDS (one, 
that is, which is common to a variety of sources, as is characteristic of both 
'orthodox' and 'alternative orthodox' discourse), was lacking. The only truly unifying 
feature was that they all in one way or another challenged the idea that the emergent 
and dominant 'orthodox / alternative orthodox' ontological 'truth' of HIV/AIDS 
should be considered to have been proven beyond refutation. 
The most significant of these 'dissident' discourses was that associated with the name 
Peter Duesberg. In the middle of 1992 great controversy raged between all the 
British broadsheet newspapers following the publication in the Sunday Times of 
several articles describing almost uncritically the opinions of this self-styled world 
leader in virology, who noisily rejected the hypothesis that HIV led to AIDS (Sunday 
Times 26/4/92; 17/5/92). There were two main lines to his argument; firstly, that 
there was no evidence that HIV was ever in a state other than dormancy (no other 
micro-organism can kill without entering an active phase), and secondly that there 
was far too little of the virus in the bloodstreams of people with AIDS to cause the 
degree of damage to the immune system which characterises the syndrome. Also, he 
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suggested that the amount of virus found in people with AIDS was less than that 
found in people who were seropositive but had not developed the 'full-blown' 
condition, which was the opposite of what he would have expected, and that a 
positive antibody test result only indicates that the body has at some time been in 
contact with the virus, not that the virus is still in the bloodstream (Adams 1989: 71- 
73). Even more controversially, he maintained that many putative AIDS deaths were 
iatrogenic, in reality being attributable to the high toxicity of AZT, which he saw as 
the true cause of immune collapse in the majority of HIV infected persons. He 
likened use of the drug to killing a harmless rabbit with a neutron bomb (Times 
11/5/92). 
Other gentler heretics also emerged, however. Jane Teas proposed a theory relating 
AIDS to African swine fever virus which was ignored by the medical establishment, 
receiving neither support nor funding for further investigation (Altman 1986: 52). 
Professor Junga Banatvala posited that HIV infection might well not move beyond 
certain risk groups (Times 11/2/92), and Richard and Rosalind Chirimuuta suggested 
that the apparent rife seropositivity in Africa was actually an artefact of inaccurate 
testing and racism within the practice of Western science. They cited research which 
showed high levels of supposed HIV infection in rural areas of Zaire; the only 
Zairians with clinical AIDS, however, were from the wealthy, well educated city- 
dwelling elite. Further to this they referred to an ethnic group, the Turkana, who 
when studied displayed a 50% seropositivity, but no cases of AIDS. This was 
attributable, they suggested, to the tendency of the commonly used ELISA HIV 
antibody test to give positive results when the person being tested has been infected 
with malaria. They pointed to a test carried out in South Africa using the more 
sophisticated Specific Indirect Immunoflorescence test on blood from Kenyans, 
Namibians, black South Africans, white South African gays, baboons and vervets, in 
which positive results were found only from male homosexuals, most of whom had 
recently visited the United States. Also they noted that a 1986 West German study 
found that 10% of the African blood samples they tested were HIV positive with the 
ELISA test, but only 0.07% were when more sophisticated testing was used, these 
findings suggesting that reckonings of the incidence of central African HIV infection 
had been exaggerated by a factor of approximately 150. They forcefully rejected 
Robert Gallo's green monkey hypothesis, and suggested that the best reading of the 
evidence indicated that HIV/AIDS came to Africa from the United States 
(Chirimuuta & Chirimuuta 1989: 54-66). 
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These and all such similar claims were vociferously denounced from all sides, but 
most particularly from exponents of 'alternative orthodox' discourse, and with a 
fervour usually reserved for the purging of heretics and dissidents. Complaints were 
made by (amongst others) the Terrence Higgins Trust and the Wellcome Foundation 
against the Channel Four 'Dispatches' programmes which first brought Duesberg to 
public attention in Britain, and were upheld by the Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission (Times 27/4/92). The Guardian's John Illman considered Duesberg's 
speculations so dangerous that they should not even be given a platform (Guardian 
1/6/92). Patrick Dixon, director of 'AIDS Care Education and Training', and Dai 
Rees, secretary of the Medical Research Council both suggested that to report 
Duesberg's view on HIV was criminally irresponsible (Observer 31/5/92; 
Independent 20/5/92). Rees further proposed that the media should; 
"... distinguish between the genuine scientific controversy... and the kind of argument that 
Duesberg is trying to conduct - an argument that ignores or distorts reliable research 
findings and has no evidence to support it. " 
(Independent 20/5/92) 
On the other hand, Andrew Neil, then editor of the Sunday Times, complained; 
"It's typical of the AIDS establishment to criticise us without ever confronting the facts. 
When we write articles about what we increasingly believe to be the true position it is very 
rare for us to receive considered replies - even from experts - that deal with the facts, or put 
forward alternative analyses or facts for us to consider, It's usually just abuse.. . Not 
scientific abuse, mind you, just plain abuse. " 
(Continuum Nov. 1993) 
The Chirimuutas' account of AIDS in Africa was also dismissed; while it was readily 
acknowledged that Western arrogance gave rise to the search for the origins of the 
new scourge first in Haiti and then in Africa (Watney 1989: 187), yet; 
"... it is a very strange anti-racist position which moves from criticising the undoubted 
racism of most Western coverage of AIDS in Africa, to denying that AIDS is really a 
serious problem in Africa at all. " 
(Watney 1989a: 34) 
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Africans who expressed views such as the Chirimuutas' were to be seen as having 
denied the true threat of AIDS, for fear of Western attempts to blame the spread of 
the syndrome on 'African Promiscuity' or 'cultural practices' (Panos Institute 1990: 25; 
cf also Seidel 1993 for a (re)construction of the HIV/AIDS situation in Africa in 
'alternative orthodox' terms) 
3.2 The relation between the three vectors of HIV/AIDS discourse 
Some explanation is required of the relationship which obtained between these three 
ideal-typical vectors. Initially the 'alternative orthodox' version was informed by the 
'orthodox' version, through the former's being a critique of the latter. As time went 
on, however, the 'orthodox' version waned, until it became really little more than a 
function of the 'alternative orthodox' vector's desire to criticise it; in other words, as 
the 'orthodox' approach became largely a spent force in the face of effective 
'alternative orthodox' critique, it began to be sustained ever increasingly by the 
'alternative orthodox' vector's need to attack something as part of the latter's efforts to 
define itself. Certainly by the early 1990s the 'alternative orthodox' view on 
HIV/AIDS had achieved ascendancy, in that failure to hold it was as good as an 
admission of ignorance of the subject. 
The suggestion here, though, is not that the 'alternative orthodox' position is 
authoritative in the sense that it is the most widely or popularly held stance, but that 
it has become the mode of thinking HIV/AIDS which is considered apposite to, and 
which thereby legitimates, discourses made on the subject which articulate a 
particular form of expertise. This form of expertise is that which seeks to represent 
the truth of HIV/AIDS to an interested lay public. Given the materials from which 
this mode of thought was observed, this claim is made only of the situation in the 
UK, although other related but not identical modes of thinking the syndrome seem to 
exist in the US, Canada and elsewhere. Similarly, there appear to be one or several 
related but not identical ways of thinking HIV/AIDS by which expertise is articulated 
within professional techno-scientific discourse on the subject (for example medical, 
virological and epidemiological discourse, where both the producer and user of the 
discourse are members of a given scientific constituency). (See section 0.4 for a 
discussion of why the 'alternative orthodoxy', rather than such techno- scientific 
discourse, is the focus of this work. ) 
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Defending the proposition that one discourse has displaced another is never 
straightforward, partly because social scientists cannot access discourses as such, but 
only individual textual expressions of them (Parker 1992: 6), from which s/he must 
infer the existence of a broader discursive regularity, and partly because competing 
discourses will very often co-exist simultaneously. Some support is given to the idea 
that there was a shift from an 'orthodox' to an 'alternative orthodox' mode in the 
official bureaucratic / governmental way of imagining HIV/AIDS by changes in 
Department of Health and Social Security and Health Education Authority literatures 
in the period from 1986 to 1993. 
1986 was the year of the first major governmental response to HIV/AIDS, the 
"AIDS: Don't Die of Ignorance" campaign, which aimed to deliver an information 
leaflet to every household in the UK. While this leaflet does ascribe a certain value 
to using condoms, its central messages are congruent with the 'orthodox' position, 
holding that in order to avoid infection "It is safest to stick to one faithful partner" 
and that "Anyone who misuses drugs should not inject" (Department of Health and 
Social Security 1986). Similarly, the Health Education Authority leaflets "AIDS: 
What Everybody Needs to Know" (Health Education Authority 1987) and "Guide to 
a healthy sex life" (Health Education Authority 1988) both advocate limiting the 
number of one's sexual partners as the primary precaution to take against infection, 
although the use of condoms and the need to understand that some sexual practices 
may be more risky than others are, again, also mentioned, but as secondary, less 
preferred possible strategies. The former leaflet once more articulates the idea that 
injecting drug users are "drug misusers". 
1988 also saw, however, the publication of a leaflet entitled "Your Guide to Safer 
Sex and the Condom" (Family Planning Association 1988), which suggested that 
official discourse was beginning to move to a more 'alternative orthodox' position. 
This leaflet did not display the previous HEA view of safer sex as a 'second best' 
alternative to the policy of reducing the numbers of one's sexual partners, but 
constructed it as a positive thing, holding that "Safer sex is healthier sex", a message 
also put forward by the 1989 Health Education Authority booklet "Exposure: Sex in 
the 1990s", a guide for young people, in which the practising of safer sex is definitely 
seen as the more important aspect of risk reduction, as opposed to limiting the 
numbers of one's sexual partners. By 1990, and the publication of the Health 
Education Authority leaflet "The Facts About HIV and AIDS", this transfiguration 
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from 'orthodox' to 'alternative orthodox' thinking was all but complete, official 
advice being that risk of infection goes up not with the number of sexual partners one 
has, but with the number of partners with whom one has unprotected sex. The same 
leaflet also gives information about condoms, and even advice to injecting drug users 
about not sharing equipment - all central concerns of the 'alternative orthodoxy', but 
things which the 'orthodox' position would have had none of (Health Education 
Authority 1990). Also, in a 1993 Health Education Authority campaign, run in 
several magazines aimed at women in the 18-25 age range (such as Cosmopolitan), a 
man and a woman were shown meeting at a disco, and then in various stages of 
increasing intimacy, and the question was asked at what stage you, the reader, would 
discuss condoms (see Wellings & Field 1996: 94). Contrast this with the campaign 
mentioned above in which the numbers of one's partner's previous partners was 
emphasised. 
By the time that this change in governmental / bureaucratic thinking had more or less 
fully taken place (1991/1992) many of the forces which had originally established the 
'orthodox' position had, in fact, ceased to inhabit it, with perhaps the exception of the 
lower reaches of the tabloid press. Other regions of the media, however, had by this 
time either acquiesced to the now dominant 'alternative orthodox' stance, or sought to 
move through 'dissident' discourse. This could be seen in 1992's bizarre battle 
between the Guardian and the Sunday Times around the issue of Peter Duesberg's 
views on HIV. The former paper, stereotypically viewed as a champion of 
radicalism and liberalism, made very illiberal criticism of the favourable reports on 
Duesberg in the latter journal, which one might more readily have expected to take a 
such a conservative position. This can be quite readily understood, however, if one 
recognises that 'dissident' discourse was there being used as a conduit for concerns 
which eight or so years previously could have been effectively articulated through 
the 'orthodox' vector, but could no longer; if Duesberg's hypothesis regarding the 
progenesis of the disease were to be accepted, it would clear the way for abandoning 
a generalised HIV/AIDS and reinstating an HIV/AIDS which affected specific 
groups, and for relating that construction of the syndrome to factors of lifestyle, with 
all the opportunities for prejudice that follow. In this light it is easy to see why a 
conservative newspaper would embrace Duesberg. 
The 'alternative orthodox' hegemony developed two basic strategies for combating 
such very real threats from 'dissident' discourse; 'dissident' accounts could be 
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squashed directly - by reconstituting them as heresy (as with the Guardian's 
condemnation of the Times), or more subtly, by taking the focus away from 
'dissident' discourse, on to the increasingly manageable semi-puppet opponent, 
'orthodoxy', which became ever more little else than the 'alternative orthodox' 
vector's punch-bag. This should not be understood as some sort of conspiracy, 
however. It should be re-emphasised that these vectors of discourse chanced to 
emerge out of a confusion of various motivations and interests, a multiplicity of 
relations of micro-power. For instance, although a generalised heterosexual AIDS is 
necessary to the internal coherence of many anti-homophobic and anti-moral-decline 
arguments, it would be untenable to claim that either perspective singly, or even a 
combination of the two, would be sufficient to establish such an AIDS as the truth. 
More realistic is to suggest that such perspectives are two of the innumerable factors 
which at one and the same time are facilitated by, and allow the possibility of, a 
generalised heterosexual AIDS. It can be seen then, that the emergence of any 
particular position as truth on the continua that are the axes of debate within AIDS 
discourse, is established and maintained by an accidental alliance of disparate 
elements; vested interests, earnest beliefs, material factors and the relations between 
truths, in an unending and reciprocal nexus. 
3.3 The history of HIV/AIDS discourse and the following analysis 
Having an awareness of the historical background outlined above is essential to one's 
understanding of the texts which follow, partly because some of the arguments had in 
the 1980s and early 1990s remain to this day meat for debate in those texts, but more 
importantly because of two related points: firstly that the battles for control of how to 
think HIV/AIDS which were fought and won by the 'alternative orthodox' vector 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s shape the character of that vector as it is today, 
and also of course the character of the ethical prescriptions it makes - one cannot 
make sense of the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected person' subject positions articulated within 
the texts in the next three chapters without knowing the struggles which were gone 
through in order to get to the position of being able to articulate them; secondly, it is 
in part the past successes of the 'alternative orthodox' mode which confer upon it its 
current authority to call the shots - 'alternative orthodox' discourse is able to use its 
current dominance as evidence of its past rectitude, and then use the fact that it was 
right in the past to defend any claims it has to being right now. 
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The three analyses which follow, then, are of recent exemplary expressions of 
'alternative' discourse; discourses the roots of which were radical, rebellious and 
revolutionary, but which have by now become established authorities - they are 
principal sources to which one turns when one wishes to become informed about 
HIV/AIDS. And both the knowledge of the syndrome which they propagate, and the 
ethical responses they suggest one should make in the face of that knowledge, are 
grounded in the history described above. 
3.4 Summary 
Out of the confusion of contradictory responses to HIV/AIDS which were made 
through the 1980s and early 1990s three distinct vectors through which the syndrome 
could be thought emerged. These were: the 'orthodox' vector, which provided for a 
particular ontological truth the syndrome, interpreted through a reactionary, right of 
centre politico-moral filter; the 'alternative orthodox' mode which accepted a largely 
similar ontology of HIV/AIDS, but interpreted this time through a discourse of 
liberal-pluralistic resistance; the dissident vector, which comprised any HIV/AIDS 
commentary which challenged the ontological premises of the first two vectors. By 
the mid-to-late 1990s, the second of these vectors had become the dominant mode 
for understanding HIV/AIDS. It is this mode of thinking the syndrome which 




THE HIV/AIDS COMMENTARIES OF SIMON WATNEY 
The HIV/AIDS commentary of Simon Watney is one of the most significant sources 
of 'alternative orthodox' authority which exists in this country. So numerous and 
visible are his writings that no-one trying seriously to gain an understanding of the 
syndrome - or at least of its cultural and political aspects - could fail to have contact 
with them. Certainly his 1987 book Policing Desire has served as the starting point 
and mainstay of many an undergraduate HIV/AIDS project, and provided many a 
social worker's or counsellor's understanding of their HIV/AIDS in/affected clients' 
disease and its context. His work contributed greatly to the location of discussion of 
HIV/AIDS within the realm of sexual politics, and in particular with regard to its 
relation to a number of pre-existing arguments about gay politics. This characteristic 
location of the discourse is now fundamental to all HIV/AIDS debate. Simon 
Watney is, then, as it says on the back of the his 1994 volume Practices of Freedom; 
Selected Writings on HIV/AIDS, "a leading international HIV/AIDS activist and 
theorist", and his commentaries comprise seminal reading for any and all who are in 
any way touched by HIV/AIDS. They form, like the Body Positive Newsletter and 
the National AIDS Manual, an "obligatory passage point" (Latour 1987: 150; 181- 
182; 244-245) through which anyone who wishes to become informed about 
HIV/AIDS has to negotiate a path, and which provides a crystallised account of the 
politico-moral universe in which people who are infected or affected by HIV or 
AIDS have to forge their self understandings. Given this location within the 
discourse of HIV/AIDS, these commentaries are targets which demand interrogation. 
Such is the endeavour of this chapter. 
The interrogation in this analysis will be organised around two central questions; 
how is it that authority is achieved by the discourse, and exactly what ethical and 
ontological ramifications does it imply? The answer to the first of these questions, 
however, may seem obvious; Watney holds the pre-eminent position he does because 
of the clarity, the consistency and the veracity of his position. However, it will be 
argued in the following that the positions articulated within these texts are often 
neither clear nor consistent (at least not when viewed from a dryly logical or 
philosophical perspective), a fact which, it could be argued, is problematic to those 
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truth claims they make. However, it needs to be understood that these texts are not 
detached sociological or historical analyses of HIV/AIDS, but are averredly 
polemical, their agonistic spirit reflecting a recognition that political activism is an 
obligatory aspect of intellectual enquiry - and one all too often reneged upon - and as 
such the texts are, quite understandably, designed more to further the causes which 
generated the need for the analyses they contain, than they are to describe, coldly 
from a distance, a horror unimaginable to those not touched by it. 
It is absolutely not the intention of this thesis to take issue with these texts at this 
polemical level. Within the "goldfish bowl" of the configured reality in which we all 
must live (Burchell 1993: 276-277), Watney's writings have done much to benefit the 
lives of gay men and lesbians, whose need, given the excluded and abjected place 
they are compelled to inhabit in our society, cannot be denied. Herein, therefore, 
engagement with these texts is intended only around the question of the relations 
which they set up between the truths they describe and their implied readers. To 
proceed with such an analysis it is, however, necessary to deconstruct the texts, in 
order to render visible the mechanisms by which the holder of the text's authority - 
the narrator, the voice of the text - and the implied reader are constructed and 
enabled to interact. As deconstruction is, however, often the precursor to critique, or 
to the ironizing of the examined account (in which the process of analysis serves to 
supplant the truths the text articulates with some alternative preferred truths 
(Woolgar, 1983; 1985)), it is easily assumed that such deconstruction is itself 
intended as criticism. That is not the case herein, and when the analysis renders 
these accounts problematic, no alternative preferred position should be inferred. 
Watney's work is of interest and demanding of analysis because it is in such a 
position of influence over the debate, not because of the specific effects it seeks to 
obtain through that influence (although an understanding of those desired effects is 
requisite to an understanding of the functioning of the texts). 
In keeping with this analytical spirit, it is the contention of this thesis that within 
these texts, it is not any supposed nearness of the account to some ontological 
actuality of HIV/AIDS which is of central importance to the overall mechanism by 
which they establish their authority. Rather, what is more significant here is a sort of 
'truth of mood' which is apparent in the work -a truth which need not be clear, 
consistent, rigorous nor even true in an intellectual sense, because its worth is not 
argued at that level; the textual voice's right to speak, and its claim to some 
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especially valid knowledge of HIV/AIDS, are both grounded in its presenting itself 
as having a grip on the syndrome which is authentic. This authenticity is resultant 
from a certain Fronterlebnis, from an ongoing experience of being in the front line 
of the fight against HIV/AIDS. In turn, this experience is granted its validity by 
virtue of its being located within an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community' which is 
constituted and articulated within these texts. (Similar 'in-groups are also central to 
the accounts given by the Body Positive Newsletter and the National AIDS Manual - 
see chapters 5 and 6. ) 
Given that its authority is conferred in such fashion, the textual voice is free to make 
pronouncements of quite a different nature from the sorts of cautious projections 
proper to more sober scholarship. It is able to articulate an almost prophetic mode of 
discourse, on occasions foretelling the certain retribution fate will deliver to those 
who fail to heed its warnings, on others describing something very like a 'natural 
order' (in particular with respect to human sexuality) against which most people have 
turned, a return to which will precipitate a speedy end to the current crisis (cf Stern 
1975 on the rhetoric of authority). The accounts are often impassioned and 
polemical, presenting themselves as radical, as self consciously beyond the borders 
of the 'normal' or the 'legitimate', and enjoined in battle against an ignorant and 
prejudiced establishment. Whilst standing outside the 'conventional', these accounts 
also seek to establish new boundaries, to set, as it were, the limits of acceptable 
radicalism. They thereby construct a sort of hinterland, between the old and corrupt 
on the one hand, and that which is still to be considered beyond the pale on the other. 
It is from this discursive space that the various polemics and commentaries are 
given. 
In the following, then, there are three concurrent objectives at hand: to show, by 
drawing attention to the points at which the accounts are intellectually problematic or 
inconsistent, that it is not intellectual coherence which grants the voice of the text its 
authority; to consider in detail the rhetorical moves merely sketched above, by which 
this authority is established; to describe the ethical and ontological implications of 
affording the accounts the authority they claim. These aims will be pursued through 
examinations of certain overlapping and interconnected themes in the texts; the 
various ways in which HIV/AIDS discourse is seen as having been moralised, with a 
particular focus on the critique of familialism, the relationship between HIV/AIDS 
and gayness, and the account of the truth of human sexuality. 
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4.1 The moralising of HIV/AIDS discourse 
The voice these texts articulate is unfailing in its criticism of the way in which 
HIV/AIDS has been treated as a moral rather than a purely practical issue, and tends 
to contrast the 'moralism' of, for example, the HIV/AIDS policies of the British 
Government during Mrs Thatcher's premiership, or the positions of fundamentalist 
religions, against its own 'matter of fact' or 'amoral' statements about the 'reality' of, 
say, the diversity of human sexual object choice. The following two quotations 
should illustrate this contrast; 
"The AIDS initiative... is a discourse whose words are sticky with blood-lust, hatred and 
thinly veiled contempt for the thousands of sick and dying, offering a heady brew of racism, 
misogyny and homophobia... " 
(1994: 21) 
as opposed to 
"... if our species has any worth or beauty it lies in our capacity to embrace and celebrate all 
our variously consenting states of desire. " 
(1994: 22) 
This contrast also reflects a wider dichotomy which is set up in these works, whereby 
two camps of people are constructed; those who are part of 'communities' which are 
'directly affected' by HIV/AIDS, and those who are not. The former are valorised 
for, amongst other things, their "astonishing courage", the latter criticised, in part at 
least for their complicity with the "criminal neglect and stupidity" with characterises 
much of the history of the syndrome (1994: xviii), and which is often revealed in the 
ongoing contest to "define the meanings of AIDS", wherein HIV has been employed 
by "all and sundry... interest groups" and "bigoted moralists" as an "ideological glove 
puppet", whose pronouncements on, for example, social policy, seemingly carry 
great weight due to their being made to appear to come directly and in an unmediated 
form from the source of the scourge itself (1994: 10,67). 
Overtly, the perspective proffered here is that the virus should not be used in this 
fashion at all, and at this level - in the wish to contrast HIV's 'medical' nature against 
'bigoted moralising' - one can see a certain similarity between the project expressed 
through these accounts and Susan Sontag's desire to separate diseases from their 
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metaphors (1989). However, the concern, manifested throughout all the texts herein 
considered, to police the issue of who is and is not 'directly affected', and therefore 
whose opinions are legitimate, has the effect of creating an ideological battle around 
the question of which (politico-moral) metaphors are and are not to be allowed to 
remain inherent in the constructed (ontological) nature of the syndrome. While these 
accounts rightly recognise that HIV/AIDS has been employed to articulate 
reactionary fears about the security of hearth and home (1994: 10), the possibility that 
their own project might comprise using HIV/AIDS in a very similar way, as a surface 
on which to articulate a response to fears that the gains made by gay men since the 
1960s are under threat, remains largely unacknowledged. 
Instead, the textual voice focuses on how HIV/AIDS commentary based on moral 
persuasions other than its own, and bolstered by institutionalised racism, familialism, 
nationalism and deep seated anxiety about sexuality (1994: 23), has transformed the 
disease into "the viral personification of unorthodox deregulative desire" (1994: 11), 
and on the effects that the propagation of this image has. 
4.1.1 The government's moral position and health education strategies 
These texts proffer the view that governmental responses to HIV/AIDS are directly 
responsible for the spread of HIV infection, and therefore the deaths of many 
hundreds of people. Although it is conceded that governments cannot be held at 
fault for failing to come up with a cure, nevertheless they can "justifiably" be blamed 
for "just about everything else", the ineptitude of their handling of the situation 
having made HIV/AIDS related suffering far worse than it needed to be (1994: 264). 
This governmental failure is rooted in the "ideological and... moralistic nostrums" 
which inform most Western government HIV/AIDS information campaigns, a 
moralism which may be contrasted against "effective health promotion" (1994: 139), 
which, from the perspective of these accounts, means detailed and explicit safer sex 
materials and information (even to the exclusion of other approaches, such as 
reducing the numbers of one's sexual partners). In the United Kingdom, this 
situation is seen as having been exacerbated by the particular regime which was in 
place throughout the early days of the epidemic (the Thatcher government), whose 
"hysterical modesty", "prudery" and opposition to the public dissemination of 
explicit safer sex information is to be viewed as directly responsible for the deaths of 
"thousands", and in particular of "countless gay men" (1994: 9,17), although a 
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concurrent warning is also given that homophobic, anti-safer-sex responses to 
HIV/AIDS, such as those typical of Thatcher's premiership, will, ironically, 
ultimately also result in large numbers of heterosexual deaths (1994: 83). 
The inference here is that there is an anti-gay and anti-sex moral stance shaping 
governmental HIV/AIDS policy, with an associated claim that the censoring of safer 
sex materials constitutes murder by default. Such a claim can only be made if 
certain moral assumptions about what constitutes being 'anti-sex', and about the 
rights of persons and the duties of governments, are made first. The position argued 
by the voice articulated within these texts relies upon the premises that not to be 
'anti-sex' means to uphold the free expression of all forms of consensual sex as an 
inalienable right, which the government has a duty to defend; on the other hand, to 
view gay sex as an aberration, tolerable if undertaken at one's own risk - which 
appears to be the British government's view - is morally repugnant. The textual 
voice's rejection, then, is not of 'moralism' per se, but of moral obstacles to the 
propagation of the alternative morality which underlies its own stance. In the light of 
the above, the frequent assertions within these accounts that issues to do with 
HIV/AIDS should be decided on purely practical grounds may be viewed less as 
straightforwardly sensible demands, than as rhetorical manoeuvres by which the 
voice of the text can secure its position as an authority on the subject, by making the 
moral changes which it proposes as vital in the face of HIV/AIDS appear to be self- 
evident, amoral, and given by circumstances of fate, rather than derived from the 
contingent value structures which these accounts seek to impose upon indifferent 
noumena - what it is to be 'practical', then, depends upon one's ends, and they are 
politico-morally determined. 
A similar moral policing of what comprises a practical response to HIV/AIDS is 
apparent in the discussion of health education strategies; it is insisted that the only 
effective approach to take to prevent the transmission of HIV is safer sex, and strong 
objections are made to any notion that the spread of HIV may be contained by 
promoting the taking of fewer sexual partners. This is problematic, though; if, as is 
contended within the texts, such objections to the latter approach are based solely on 
accepted scientific knowledge of HIV/AIDS, then it is untenable; assuming the same 
biomedical truth of HIV/AIDS which the texts themselves usually acknowledge, the 
adoption of safer sex but without an accompanying reduction in the numbers of one's 
sexual partners cannot guarantee freedom from HIV infection, but will reduce one's 
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risk of infection, by making exposure to the virus less likely through making it 
harder for it to enter one's bloodstream, if one has sexual contact with an infected 
person. Monogamy, or serial monogamy, on the other hand, reduces one's likelihood 
of exposure to HIV, by reducing the chances of one having sex with an HIV antibody 
positive person at all. Both strategies are effective for risk reduction, although in 
qualitatively different ways, and both are useless in the wrong circumstances - 
monogamy will be no protection if one partner is already HIV antibody positive, and 
if one opts for condom protected penetrative intercourse with an HIV antibody 
positive person and the condom fails, then one's risk becomes abnormally high. In 
truth, though, the worth of both strategies should rightly be judged only in terms of 
populations, and not individuals; looked at in this way they are both useful, for 
although there will be individual cases where either approach provides no protection 
whatsoever, to have fewer possible virus-transmitting connexions in the entire nexus 
- whether by having less sex overall, or by using barrier prophylactics - cannot help 
but reduce the incidence of new infection. 
One could legitimately think, then, that the most 'practically' effective strategy 
against HIV infection might be a combination of both approaches. The textual voice 
argues against this position, however, holding instead that the (serial) monogamy 
approach reflects an endlessly ongoing and "overriding commitment to a politically 
expedient vision of 'family values"', which are couched as being directly detrimental 
to "effective health education strategies" (for which one may read 'safer sex') 
(1994: 157). This view reflects an underlying moral assumption in these 
commentaries that the official promotion of the idea of sexual monogamy as a 
response to HIV/AIDS is in some sense "anti-sex", and therefore a bad thing 
(1994: 19). Monogamy is often condemned, though, not in such terms, but instead by 
the assertion that it is impractical, that to take it up will not achieve the desired end. 
Given the argument above, though, this assertion is (at least partly) wrong - once 
again assuming the bio-medical model of HIV which the texts themselves accept, 
absolute monogamy between two uninfected individuals carries less risk than the 
perfect practice of penetrative safer sex in a population with a high incidence of HIV 
infection, if one takes into account the failure rate of condoms. This apparent lack of 
intellectual coherence is not of great importance to the maintenance of this account, 
though, so long as it does not jeopardise the centrally important rhetorical 
manoeuvre undertaken here, the attempt to make the proscription of monogamy 
appear to be an indisputable fact of life in the time of HIV/AIDS. Through this 
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manoeuvre, the textual voice can strengthen not only its preferred politico-moral 
position, but also its position as an authority. The voice will be all the more 
commanding if it is able to leave unacknowledged the possibility that it too is 
manipulating HIV/AIDS to moral ends, and that it is in the interests of an alternative, 
but nonetheless 'overriding commitment to a politically expedient vision of a 
sexuality based on the free expression of diversity of object choice', that the fewer 
sexual partners option must be dismissed. 
In addition to this, there is a second manoeuvre which the text performs around the 
same issue. Whereas the last manoeuvre was to do with the textual voice's 
positioning of itself such that it might assume authority, this one is to do with 
placing the reader such that s/he will accede to it. The argument is proffered that the 
'moralistic' approach to HIV/AIDS health education is irrelevant to everybody except 
that minority of people who have only ever had one sexual partner, whose 
"exceptional experience" is promoted as 'intrinsically good' and is to be emulated 
(1994: 87; 229). Stating this allows the articulation of the implication that anyone 
who has had sex with more than one partner shares the sexual mores preferred and 
propagated by the textual voice and therefore should conflate their interests with its 
own. This manoeuvre simultaneously backgrounds the difference between, say, an 
approach to one's sexuality where the frequent taking of new partners is an ongoing 
practice of self-affirmation, something central to one's self-concept (an approach for 
which such an emphasis on safer sex is certainly cogent), and perhaps more 
pedestrian approaches wherein more than one partner is taken, certainly, but 
radically fewer than in the former, and wherein some sort of serial monogamy is 
likely practised. 
The value to the voice's argument in making this manoeuvre is that it enables it to 
present what is arguably a minority view - the desire positively and proactively to 
celebrate sexuality, and to "resist and overcome sexual guilt" (1994: 93) - as being in 
the true, practical interests of any (actual) reader who, through belonging to the 'more 
than one sexual partners ever' category, happens to recognise him/herself in the 
(implied) reader-subject position herein constructed. 
The authority of the textual voice here is heavily dependent upon this rhetorical 
technique. If the reader, whilst acknowledging that those elements which call for a 
'reproduction only' sexuality of shame and restraint represent only an energetic 
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minority, should realise the possibility that the presented vision of a radically 
pluralistic sexuality of pleasure is equally a minority view, then this piece of 
commentary ceases to have relevance to any reader who does not already agree with 
it. This danger may be countered, however, by forging in this way an implied reader 
subject position in which any deviation from strict monogamous- heterosexual - 
reproduction-orientated-sex-within-marri age on the part of the reader makes him/her 
complicitous with the discourse's arguably far more extreme perspective. Such an 
approach is understandable, though, given the view presented by the texts that the 
moral baggage which goes with the (serial) monogamy approach comprises a move 
by which HIV/AIDS may be appropriated for the purpose of sustaining a general 
scheme of sexual classification which is discerned, quite rightly, as being harmful to 
the interests of gay men - who are, after all, the principal constituency at which these 
texts are aimed. 
A word needs to be said about what is being claimed in this analysis about the 
morality articulated by these commentaries. The averred argument of these accounts 
is that historically and sociologically sexuality has never been in the monogamous 
form. The implied reader is constructed, then, as someone who finds this truth 
discourse compelling (or at least plausible). However, it is no part of the project of 
this thesis to decide the question of the veracity of the discourses on the historical, 
sociological or psychical truth of sexuality presented in the texts - for if one wishes 
to interrogate the nature of the reader-subject position which a given text articulates 
one cannot inhabit that position when one engages with the text. It is necessary to 
the analysis to align oneself to the text in a manner which is sceptical of any truth 
discourses which are articulated within it, and to which the implied reader would be 
expected to submit. Therefore, what is of interest here is not the issue of whether or 
not the account of human sexuality given in these texts is an accurate one (a question 
which is, anyway, beyond the scope of this form of analysis), but is the ethical 
effects which that account has on the implied reader-subject. The manner of 
construction of this historico-sociological-psychical account of sexuality affords it a 
privileged epistemological and ontological standing - it presents it as 'true', in a 
realist sense. This truth, however, if one observes it from outside the implied reader- 
subject position it articulates, displays certain politico-moral aspects. From the 
articulated subject position the politico-moral and the ontological qualities of that 
truth appear co-extensive, and necessarily rather than contingently connected. In 
other words, the writing of a history or sociology or psychodynamics of sexuality 
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cannot help but articulate, as an effect of the production of the discourse, a morality 
which will inform the ethical practices by which any reader-subject can constitute 
him/herself as an HIV/AIDS in/affected person. 
4.1.2 The moralising of HIV/AIDS and science 
In the above it was argued that the textual voice's polemical position contradicted its 
averred stance on the bio-medical and epidemiological nature of HIV and AIDS. 
This contradiction only holds, however, if one is engaging with these texts at an 
intellectual level, and, as has already been stated, it is not at such a level that this 
body of work coheres. To get a better idea of how this work does hold itself 
together, though, it will be helpful to consider the attitude it articulates towards this 
scientific knowledge of HIV/AIDS. 
As mentioned previously, there is a prima facie similarity between certain aspects of 
these writings, and the argument put forward by Susan Sontag (1989), that it is 
imperative to distinguish the metaphoric baggages that diseases carry from their 
underlying and dispassionate truth, as described by medical science. To this end, the 
voice of the text is unstintingly critical of the misleading and "politically motivated" 
cultural agenda through which most people are encouraged to engage with 
HIV/AIDS, but which is 'premodern' in its outlook, and ensures that basic, sound, 
medical knowledges of HIV/AIDS do not translate into a similarly dispassionate 
popular understanding of the syndrome, and that confusion is therefore rife; for 
instance, it suggests that media reportage consistently implies the contradictory idea 
that their audiences (which one may assume to be ideal-typically heterosexual) are 
simultaneously at risk and not at risk. This same cultural agenda tends to portray 
people with AIDS as dangerous, as "threatening rather than threatened", their 
sickness being an external sign of a supposed inner "depravity of will", reflecting a 
"moralised etiology of disease" which has displaced good scientific epidemiology, 
and is once again propagated by the media. Science is moralised in this way, it is 
argued, to give the appearance of medical backing to the constrictions on being 
concomitant with the ideological 'Family', so beloved of the British government of 
the 1980s (1994: 3,17,49-50,57,61,210,213). 
However, despite this inclination to rail against the lack of public understanding of 
the medical facts of HIV/AIDS in this fashion, the textual voice is also quite 
prepared to attack medicine - or at least the professionalised practice of it - when the 
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latter's position threatens the former's own claims to authority (cf 1994: 37 with 
respect to patient centred medicine). This suggests that in addition to the 'moralised 
preventative strategy' discussed above, the texts are also seeking to establish an 
equally 'moralised aetiology' (and 'moralised epidemiology') of HIV/AIDS. Medicine 
is to be criticised if - but only if - it gets in the way of this. For instance, while it is 
permissible to suggest that reports of HIV incidence in the UK are flawed, giving too 
low a figure, due to the prejudice induced diagnostic failure of many doctors, to 
suggest African diagnostic practices may have led to similarly unreliable statistics is 
outlawed (1994: 120). 
The voice of the text, then, claims authority over medical science, a claim based 
upon its Fronterlebnis, which is made manifest through its articulation of a language 
of community, by which it can separate out and dismiss those people who are not 
'directly affected' by HIV/AIDS (see also the privileging of 'community based 
experience' 1994: xix); 
"For those of us living and working in the various constituencies most devastated by 
HIV it seems.. . as 
if the rest of the population were tourists, casually wandering through 
at the very height of a blitz of which they are totally unaware. " 
(1994: 49) 
This is a highly effective rhetorical gambit; the voice can claim authority for what it 
says through being 'of the community', and can simultaneously, through claiming the 
right to define what is to be considered as legitimate 'community based experience', 
establish a situation in which only those who are admitted to the community have a 
voice, but only those who say the right thing will be admitted. The ability to 
construct reader subject positions within the work from which this stance is to be 
seen as apolitical and amoral relies upon moves such as this. 
A similar technique is employed when the voice couches HIV/AIDS related social 
scientific research of which it disapproves as being an "academic 'scenic tour' of the 
worst-hit areas of the epidemic" (1994: 235). Academics are not in the front line, so 
their views can be dismissed, if deemed unsuitable. And suitability is to be decided 
according to whether or not such views are based upon research which is in the 
mould given by those with what the text would consider as hands on experience, 
who will have "the best and most pragmatic sense of what is required" (1994: 236). 
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Similarly, it is held that while the epidemic is ongoing, social scientific HIV/AIDS 
research is only justified if it has "concrete implications for the development of 
effective health education strategies" (1994: 180). 
Once more it should be borne in mind that what is to be considered as 'pragmatic' or 
'practical' will depend upon the world view of whoever is making the judgement. 
And if, as the textual voice is seeking to, one can achieve a monopoly of entitlement 
to define what are or are not practical necessities in any given area, then one is in a 
remarkably good position to impose one's own moral perspective upon that area, in 
the semblance of disinterested fact. Further to this, if one has sole say in what 
constitutes 'concrete implications' and 'effective health education strategies' then on 
this basis one can preclude any research which is ideologically inconvenient - for 
instance into the effectiveness of monogamy as a means of preventing the spread of 
HIV infection. The voice of text is here using the fact of being in the 'midst of an 
epidemic' as a justification for arguing for the silencing of voices which are not in 
accord with it, using a similar logic and rhetoric to that which elsewhere it observes 
and criticises in its own targets, the moves to utilise the aetiological nature of the 
virus as an authority to defend heterosexual middle class familial sexual values and 
norms. 
4.2 'The Family' and sexuality 
One central concern of these texts is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS commentary and 
representations which display what is seen as a wholesale appropriation of the 
syndrome to the purpose of the maintenance of what is called the 'ideological 
fortress' of 'the Family' (1994: 62-63). It is suggested that such familialism is a force 
which, although central to the current social formation of Britain and the United 
States, is a fragile anachronism, desperate to shore up its mildewed palisades, 
necessarily having to deny the true diversity of sexuality and ways of living in the 
modern world in order to maintain any semblance of coherence, and quite ready to 
exploit the suffering of people with AIDS to its own ends (1994: 10). Indeed, the 
resilience of 'the Family' as a cultural object in the face of its own contradictions is 
regarded as an index of its usefulness to presently dominant forms of repressive 
governmentality, through which sexual subjectivities are forged, an end which is 
pursued in part by two complementary "rhetorics of defence", which are articulated 
upon HIV/AIDS, and which 
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"promise to protect the national family unit from both the powerful projective fantasy of 
imminent foreign invasion and the equally powerful introspective fantasy of sexual desire 
erupting in the bosom of the home with literally fatal consequences. " 
(1994: 63) 
The picture painted is of something constrictive and damaging, stagnant yet volatile. 
This state of affairs is resultant from its being grounded in a 'siege mentality' which 
reflects popular (heterosexual) anxieties born of "deep levels of sexual repression 
and guilt", and the New Victorian spectacle of "a heterosexual population threatened 
from all around by the sinister spectre of perversion". These sorts of fears also 
bolster this familialism in its resistance to change, because they serve to support and 
stabilise the figure of 'the parent', which is central to such thinking (1994: 63-64). In 
addition, familialism is labelled as irresponsible by connecting it to the averred view 
that safer sex is the only effective strategy available for the reduction of incidence of 
new HIV infection, the voice of the text chiding the "emotional dishonesty of 
Reaganite rhetoric concerning 'the family"' for its proponents' willingness "to see 
their own children die of AIDS rather than allow them to receive information about 
the modes of transmission of HIV... "(1994: 45). 
The implied moral contrast, then, is between supposedly traditional, familial, 
heterosexual monogamy, which is by definition psychically unhealthy, and the 
preferred alternative vision of the pluralistic free expression of all forms of 
consensual desire, with modes of sexual expression radically deregulated - although 
not, it would seem, to the point where contentment with a familial sexual situation 
would be unproblematic ally acceptable. The position presented within these 
accounts appears to be that most of the population needs to be forced to be sexually 
free, constrained as they are by the limited and stereotypical ethical representations 
given them by the multinational mass media industry; the contention is made that 
this industry has a tendency to regard its audience as being comprised of idealised 
family units, an assumption which allows it 
to picture itself actively 'serving' and 'satisfying' an audience which it has constructed 
through modes of address which systematically (mis)represent the entire panorama of the 
social in the likeness of consumer-spectators who recognise themselves with pleasure in the 
fantasy space of the national family unit. " 
(1994: 28) 
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What remains unacknowledged, however, is how strikingly similar the rhetorical 
strategy exposed as being at work in the media is to that which the texts themselves 
employ. They too are able to present themselves as serving the true interests of an 
audience of their own construction - the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community' (or the 
rather the population as a whole, but defined and thereby regulated along a division 
between those who are within and those who are without that community) - who are 
enjoined to recognise themselves within an alternative (and possibly equally 
fantastic) space of a pluralistic sexual utopia to be had if the current commonplace 
psychical denial of true human sexuality can be overcome. The claim to higher 
authority made by these accounts is, in this case, grounded in a simple assumption of 
a privileged epistemology, the bold assertion that what they say is closer to the 'truth- 
out-there' than that which they criticise. 
4.2.1 'The Family', sexuality and HIV/AIDS 
The view is articulated within these accounts that the "grotesquely oversimplified" 
"fantasy" of "'real families"' is one of the foundations of contemporary British 
culture, that it hides from people the truth of human sexual diversity, and that it 
invalidates the relationships of lesbians and gay men, through implying that they are 
not really members of families (1994: 42-43). The discourse's resistance to this 
dominant cultural agenda is manifested in part through a desire to resist the 
homophobic Clause 28 of the Local Government Bill 1988, and to do so by attacking 
the rhetorical objects of 'real' and 'pretended' families articulated therein. This 
informs the understanding of familial ideology in relation to HIV/AIDS presented by 
these texts. Although the textual voice is quite right to observe that the concept of 
family mobilised within this Bill is a rueful affront to the hard won rights of lesbians 
and gay men, it seems quite unproblematic ally to equate their interests with those of 
people with HIV/AIDS. The logic goes like this; most people with HIV/AIDS are 
gay men. 'The Family' is therefore antithetical to 'people with HIV/AIDS' (that is all 
of them, who are to be regarded as a distinct community, with group interests), 
because it is antithetical to lesbians and gay men; hence it is morally quite acceptable 
to use HIV/AIDS discourse as a wrecking ball to demolish 'the Family', while use of 
HIV/AIDS discourse to any other end remains in and of itself damnable. So it is that 
within these texts, the rules about appropriating disease discourses for political 
purposes are altered to the advantage of their own practices, by constructing 
HIV/AIDS as if it were inherently (rather than contingently) connected to lesbian and 
gay politics. 
77 
What can here be seen emerging once again, then, is a collapsing of what may be 
considered separate issues into one central agenda; the psycho-sexual re-orientation 
of those who inhabit the targets of the polemics the texts articulate. It is this motif 
which determines the content and approach of their problematic; 'the Family' is to be 
deplored because it keeps its charges in psycho-sexual denial and HIV/AIDS is to be 
regarded as an issue of importance because of its supposedly intrinsically sexual- 
political nature - rather than, for example, viewing sexual politics as an important, 
but not all important, aspect of what is principally a health problem. In the light of 
this continuing conflation of sexual-political and HIV/AIDS issues, the textual 
voice's declaration that its analyses are directed "towards the corrective 
transformation of the dominant cultural agenda concerning AIDS"(1994: 24) is 
afforded an additional significance; this is a transformation which is to be achieved 
through the winning over of the sexual hearts and minds of the populace - the 
delinquency of the 'dominant cultural agenda concerning AIDS' is only a reflection 
of the irresponsibility of its parent, the dominant cultural agenda concerning 
sexuality, and it is this latter agenda which must be therefore the principal quarry. 
The pattern of the relationship between a number of problematic objects - 'the 
Family'; gay men; human sexuality; HIV/AIDS - is beginning to emerge: these 
commentaries are engaged in a constant struggle against the sexual false 
consciousness of those they construct as oppressors, a false consciousness which is 
propagated within homes governed in the image of 'the Family', and which, through 
its simultaneous refusal of the multiformity of desire and its depiction of the 
'homosexual man' as canker incarnate, ensures that homosexuality must always be 
aligned with ideas of corruption, seduction and inexplicable, non-reproduction 
orientated and therefore inhuman desire (1994: 53). Familialism seeks to deny both 
that society is in actuality sexually pluralistic, and that it might legitimately be so. 
Those notions which enable it ("'decency', respectability', 'manliness', innocence', and 
so on"), serve to shield people from "the partially acknowledged fact of diversity". 
The simple existence of lesbians and gay men, then, comprises a constant reminder 
of the untenability of such a position; so in order to preserve its myopia, the theory of 
'the Family' names them as alien, as rightly disenfranchised, as "calculating perverts" 
who, having abjured "'family values"' through their choosing to be sexually deviant, 
are to be named as public enemies, as the principal threat to familialism itself and 
thereby to the broader social fabric (1994: 11,41). 
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The account given in these texts, then, has the discourse of HIV/AIDS connected 
into this relationship not only by the fact that in the West most people with AIDS are 
gay men, but also, separately and more fundamentally, by virtue of the fact that the 
construction of homosexuality and the construction of HIV/AIDS are radically 
intertwined; each informs the other, with the emphasis being on HIV/AIDS discourse 
following lines laid down by the discourse of homosexuality, but with both 
discourses ultimately at the disposal of 'the Family', which aims to defend itself, and 
the repressive sexuality it articulates and preserves, by constructing itself as 
something precious, fragile and endangered by freaks who are with the coming of 
HIV/AIDS inevitably disease ridden. The argument proffered by these texts readily 
acknowledges that this perceived vulnerability of 'the Family' is real, but this is not 
be explained in terms of a threat of ruination from without, but instead by virtue of 
the fact that the identities which one is incited to adopt by the discourse of 'the 
Family' are inherently unstable due to their discordance with the reality of human 
sexuality. Indeed, it is at the level of the family (rather than at governmental level) 
that sexuality is made problematic, through the ethical effects of the relation between 
this dominant image of what a family is supposed to be and each and every 
individual's experience of family life, which like as not will not match that image 
very closely. HIV/AIDS, then, is to be seen as having been fitted into a longer- 
standing ideological war to sustain 'the Family' against its own unsoundness, as a 
resource complementary to the more established dread, homosexuality (1994: 52-53). 
4.3 HIV/AIDS as a gay issue. 
The relationship between 'homosexuality'/'gayness' and HIV/AIDS, though, is 
complex. Fully to appreciate the overall position regarding this relationship, as 
articulated within the canon of work herein analysed, one must recognise that 
according to its understanding, the term 'homosexual' is not interchangeable with the 
term 'gay'. Each term carries its own set of connotations; the former was born of a 
medical discourse of unnatural proclivities, of sickness, of deviance in need of 
correction, and use of the term in relation to oneself would imply a conservative and 
anachronistic acceptance of lowly self-worth. On the other hand, to define oneself as 
'gay' is to refuse such a pejorative account of one's sexuality, to refuse to be 
'homosexual' and instead to "recognise the reality of sexual diversity". Also, in 
contrast to the former term, gayness affords a collective as well as an individual 
identity, based on the shared experience of discrimination resultant from homosexual 
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object choice (1994: 247). Understanding this difference, the conflation made within 
the text of the interests of 'people with HIV/AIDS' with those of gay men (cf 4.2.1) 
can be viewed as attempt to smash this identification of HIV/AIDS with 
'homosexuality', and in its stead to impose an alternative and preferable reading of 
the situation which describes a discourse of connexion between HIV/AIDS and 
gayness. 
This project is born of the bete noire which informs at the root the HIV/AIDS 
Weltanschauung in which these texts operate; the axiom that gay men are widely 
regarded as utterly expendable. This assumption comprises the central motivation 
behind the discourse in its entirety (1994: 250), is reiterated tirelessly within the 
individual texts which comprise it (1994: 9,21,28,35,60-61,67), and is seen as 
reflecting deeply felt heterosexual anxieties about homosexuality, manifested in the 
unconscious desire to kill gay men. In its construction as a 'gay plague', AIDS is 
made the "viral projection" of this repressed wish (1994: 161). Indeed, at times it is 
held that it is principally heterosexual persecution of gay men which connects the 
latter group to HIV at all (1994: 194). This supposedly denial-born rancour infests 
governmental and media responses to HIV/AIDS, a state of affairs which is all the 
more infamous given the peculiar degree to which gay men are suffering in the face 
of the syndrome; gay men are described as being "much more affected by the 
epidemic than any other social constituency in most countries in the developed 
world", and as "the social group most devastated" by AIDS, yet their "legitimate 
needs" have been all but completely ignored (1994: xix, 18). 
4.3.1 Gay men as the group most affected by HIV/AIDS 
It is through this notion that the ordeal of HIV/AIDS is to gay men both qualitatively 
and in a sense quantitatively worse than anyone else's that the discourse begins to 
forge the connexion of HIV/AIDS to gayness, employing a rhetoric of gay men being 
the group most directly and terribly affected by the syndrome and the most 
vulnerable in the face of it (1994: 5,83,138; see also 1994: xx, 91,138,201,216,243). 
The point is made that gay men comprise "the vast majority of people with HIV 
and/or AIDS" (1994: 49; see also 1994: 6,30). This contention is supported with 
statistics showing comparative HIV infection rates amongst heterosexual women (1 
in 436), heterosexual men (1 in 91) and gay men (1 in 5) attending UK STD clinics 
(1994: 244 - information current 1991). It is in the light of such statistics, it is 
argued, that management of the epidemic must be considered (1994: 200), and moves 
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to shift the focus of attention in discussions of HIV/AIDS away from the specific 
groups who are, according to this rhetoric, 'most affected', and towards a 'general 
public' which is assumed to be heterosexual are condemned; although the voice of 
the text decries the tawdry naming of HIV as a 'gay plague', acknowledging that 
anyone "who has unprotected sex or shares needles" is at risk, the contention is made 
that action against the spread of HIV which fails to target gay men (and injecting 
drug users) is misdirected, and it is asserted that failure to take such a course is often 
justified in terms of the fear of an "anti-gay 'backlash"' (1994: 91). 
However, the position articulated within these texts in relation to the fear of such an 
'anti-gay backlash' is not always altogether consistent, the type of slant put on the 
possibility of heterosexual transmission being seemingly dependent upon the 
particular line being taken at any given moment. When criticising the idea of AIDS 
as a 'gay plague', or the related idea of 'leakage' of infection into a general public 
which excludes gay men, the reality of the widespread risk of heterosexual 
transmission is insisted upon (1994: 19; see also 1987: 103; 1994: xvii, 43). When the 
interest is more to direct the application of governmental resources, however, any 
report which implies that transmission of HIV is as or more widespread amongst 
heterosexuals than amongst gay men and injecting drug users is lambasted 
(1994: 245-246). When the aim is to promote safer sex, heterosexual transmission 
returns, the argument being that heterosexual rejection of safer sex education can 
only be explained in terms of anti-gay prejudice - and not, for example, because of 
the fact which has been promulgated elsewhere within this canon of work, that the 
risk of infection amongst Western heterosexuals is relatively low, thus making the 
adoption of safer sex a much less urgent matter for them (1994: 158). 
Assuming that the theory of most-affectedness given by these texts is not self- 
evident, but is underdetermined by the evidence available such that contradictory but 
equally plausible accounts could be made (cf Hesse 1980), it would seem that there 
is a 'political ontology' at work here, which serves the needs of the discourse's 
authority establishing mechanisms; the 'fact' that 'heterosexual AIDS' is the chimeric 
child of misinformation stands to make the views given in these texts pertaining to, 
say, the allocation of resources, appear more compelling, but the opposite 'fact' that 
'heterosexual AIDS' is thoroughly real and indeed remains a major problem may 
nonetheless be used, for example, to make more credible the warnings given of the 
consequences for heterosexuals of continued anti-gay prejudice. The rhetorical work 
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here is of a similar fashion to these texts' some-time reliance upon and some-time 
rejection of medical authority, but in truth the balance in this case is very much 
skewed towards stating and restating the position that the most important problem 
pertaining to HIV/AIDS in the West is to do with the degree to which it has affected 
gay men. This does not really contradict with the above argument, though; although 
it may be useful from time to time to use the image of a heterosexualised HIV/AIDS 
to defend certain arguments, these accounts cannot afford to go too far down such a 
line because of the way it threatens the idea that gay men really are the most affected 
group, and therefore also the far greater authority the textual voice can claim through 
speaking as a gay man, and as one with direct community based front-line experience 
of coping with HIV/AIDS. The truth of the relation between gay men and their risk 
of HIV infection, then, is malleable according to the needs of political strategy and 
the textual voice's 'personal' authority. 
4.3.2 Re-invention of the connexion between homosexuality and HIV/AIDS 
Despite an occasional usage of number based rhetoric, the foundation of the 
connexion between gay men and HIV/AIDS within these texts is less the statistical 
affectedness of that group than it is an epidemic but unconscious anti-gay logic 
which "align[s] AIDS with homosexuality as if by essence" (1994: 14), and through 
which "HIV is dismissed as a deadly by-product of homosexuality per se" 
(1994: 274), a problem easily solved by allowing gay men to become extinct. That 
is; the pronouncements on HIV/AIDS emanating from (amongst other places) the 
'pro-heterosexual', 'pro-family' media and government - representations which are 
made available to the population at large, and with which they must 'make sense' of 
the syndrome - are in truth aimed against the 'fact' of sexual diversity, not against 
HIV, which is merely a contemporary conduit of an older vitriol. Such bile assumes 
an intrinsic relation between gay men and HIV/AIDS, based on the superstition that 
it is not a virus but gay sex that is the cause of AIDS, a credulity so ingrained that it 
can stand alongside, and even inform readings of, putatively dispassionate 
epidemiological and virological HIV/AIDS research (1994: 26). 
HIV/AIDS is thus recruited to the cause of a long standing project to constrain and 
define sexual desire, to disavow its (putative) natural mutability. This programme 
has concocted its own nemesis incarnate, the 'impossible' object of "'the homosexual 
body"', a distilled and crystallised burlesque of desire, and a sitting duck for 
vilification made with the aim of bolstering "fragile" heterosexual subjectivity. To 
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facilitate this process, HIV/AIDS has similarly been simplified into a signifying 
system through which the 'impossible homosexual body' can be rationalised through 
images of self-destruction resultant from deviant desire. There is a direct affinity, 
then, between the construction of the two objects, 'the homosexual body' and the 
'AIDS victim', the discourse which forges the latter being not much more than a 
relatively recent incarnation of this older ongoing violence against (homo)sexuality. 
This violence is so unremitting that even after death the "'homosexual body"', which 
is coextensive with that of the "'AIDS victim"', is still to be subjected to public 
humiliation, to show that the life it no longer has was valueless anyway (1994: 55- 
56). 
However, and notwithstanding the insight of this account, an inversion of this same 
sort of textual manoeuvre can be found in these writings, a move which is in keeping 
with their general attempt to wrest control of HIV/AIDS from the discourse of 
'homosexuality' and place it instead under the auspices of gay sexual-politics. Moves 
are made within these texts which seek to replace the illegitimate objects of the 
'homosexual body' and the 'AIDS victim' with the alternative objects of 'gayness' and 
the 'Person with AIDS'. Just as 'being gay' is to 'homosexuality', so is a 'Person with 
AIDS' to an 'AIDS victim' - to be a 'Person with AIDS' is to abjure the baggage 
which is so ably described throughout these works, to refuse this negative reading of 
one's illness. 
But it is more than this; it is also to take up an alternative set of baggage, to submit 
to an alternative ethical authority discourse, to a particular vision of what it is to be 
positive in the face of adversity, a vision whose parent is the sexual political struggle 
which has been fought by lesbians and gay men since the 1960s, when it was that 
'homosexuals' first became 'gay'. This fact goes some way to explaining the frequent 
concern (not only in these works, but also in the Body Positive Newsletter - see next 
chapter) with HIV/AIDS as a lesbian issue. This brings us back to the issue of being 
'affected by HIV again; if one judges affectedness either by levels of infection or by 
risk of infection, lesbians are liable to disappear, most forms of lesbian sexual 
practice carrying a lower risk of infection than any form of penetrative intercourse 
where there is a penis involved. If on the other hand affectedness is purely a political 
concern, lesbians can be conjoined with the 'dead and dying', while other groups who 
might claim to be affected (haemophiliacs, for instance) can end up being overlooked 
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due to their political inexpediency. For example, it is commented that the 
government's 'AIDS: Don't Die of Ignorance' campaign 
"... cynically looks entirely over the heads of everyone most immediately affected by the 
epidemic. Apart from lesbians and gay men, what other social group with almost 600 dead 
and dying could so casually be erased from all public consideration"" 
(1994: 20) 
(originally written in 1987) and of more recent (1991) NHS policy proposals that the 
health needs of "lesbians and gay men" remained unacknowledged, resultant from a 
lack of consultation with those groups (1994: 200). Hemophiliacs, however, are 
seldom mentioned except, for example, when being portrayed as supposedly getting 
a better lot because they are the 'innocent' victims of HIV/AIDS (1987: 3), or where 
their affectedness can be employed to secure some political advantage not of their 
own, such as where the fact of haemophiliac infection is used as a means to destroy 
Duesberg's contention that AIDS is the result of some putative gay 'lifestyle' 
(1994: 258-259). 
Indeed, these texts openly conflate the struggle against homophobia and the battle 
against HIV, arguing that they are always co-extensive (1994: 255), a position which 
subsumes the specific needs of HIV positive people whose connexion to the 
syndrome is non-sexual and/or non-'deviant' to the need of the 'most affected 
constituency' to wage the fight against anti-gay prejudice. The utilitarian hubris of 
this rationale is perhaps a little inconsistent with its avowedly being articulated in the 
name of pluralism, but it reflects a reading of HIV/AIDS informed by an ongoing 
discussion of issues concerning "sexual identity, representation and cultural politics" 
in which many lesbians and gay men have been engaged since the 1970s (1994: 134), 
and which provided a ready-made basis for a robust collective response to the 
epidemic (1994: 244-245). It is suggested that such debate was almost a "limbering 
up" exercise for the greater challenge which HIV was to bring, and that it 
"substantially improved our [that is lesbians' and gay men's] understanding of much 
of the political and cultural hysteria that surrounds us... ". Accordingly, it was 
invaluable training for devising "effective strategic interventions on behalf of people 
living with HIV disease, and their various communities" (1994: 134), interventions 
which, while it would be unconscionably remiss to dismiss their efficacy, 
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unsurprisingly mirror both the style and the concerns of the sexual-political 
consciousness which spawned them. 
In the light of this combination of heightened awareness of the sexual-political 
dimension of HIV/AIDS and practical experience dealing with the epidemic at grass 
roots level, gay culture is to be seen as exemplary in a number of ways: it provides 
the most reliable information HIV/AIDS; gay men's "frankness and articulateness 
about sexual behaviour" is a laudable lead which others could profitably follow, 
displaying a psychical health absent in fragile heterosexual identities; gay men 
world-wide have often selflessly defied "a climate of widely legitimated bigotry and 
discrimination" in their constant struggle improve the lot of "everyone" who is 
affected by HIV; gay culture spawned and adopted safer sex, with the effect of 
radically reducing rates of new infection amongst themselves, and has thus dutifully 
provided an example to follow by which heterosexuals may save themselves 
(1994: xv-xvi, 32,131-132,136,247,278). 
Gay culture (as constructed and articulated within these writings), then, provides an 
entire curriculum of object-lessons in how one should address oneself to HIV/AIDS, 
and this may be read as an ethical authority discourse -a didactic dissertation on the 
conduct of conduct in relation to the epidemic which ties in with the project to 
reconfigure HIV/AIDS in terms of 'gayness' rather than 'homosexuality', and indeed 
with the parent project to replace 'homosexuality' with 'gayness' as the dominant way 
of understanding certain configurations of human sexuality. It may be argued that, 
despite - or perhaps in keeping with - its progressive aspirations, this latter project is 
a reflection of a more general historical shift in society in which the importance of 
what Foucault termed disciplinary modes of regulation has declined in favour of 
forms of self-regulation (Gordon 1993(1986): 31). 
From this perspective the discourse of 'heterosexuality / homosexuality', born as it is 
of the medical gaze, is a conduit of panoptic power, and serves to construct people as 
sexual objects. The discourse of 'gayness' is a reinvention along ethical lines of the 
half of this discourse which dealt with those people who were to be constructed as 
homosexual objects. That is; the term 'the homosexual' was coined as an epithet to 
be used by someone who inhabits a position of authority -a psychiatrist, for example 
- to name someone else, who thence becomes an object in terms of the discourse of 
deviance which lies behind that name. To describe oneself as 'a homosexual', 
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however, is to make an ethical response to a disciplinary discourse, to constitute 
one's subjectivity in terms of what is more an objectifying than a subjectifying 
mechanism - the representations of self open to 'the homosexual' being both very 
limited and very limiting, often parodic, and almost always morally pejorative. 
To 'come out' as gay, therefore, is to refuse disciplinary regulation, and to do so by 
adopting a particular ethical relation to an alternative discourse of self which names 
itself as a discourse of liberation and liberalism, of radical pluralism, of 'freedom'. 
However, this discourse carries with it certain prescriptions about conduct to which 
one must submit in order to take the preferred epithet 'gay' - one's freedom must be 
of a certain shape. To become 'gay', then, is to accept a particular emergent form of 
ethical regulation as a preferable alternative to the previous particular emergent form 
of disciplinary regulation. And that this new form of regulation does not imply the 
same difficulties as the old one does not mean that it is not problematic at all; any 
given discourse of subjectivity will delimit both possibilities and restrictions, in 
terms both of one's being as an ethical subject and of the exercise of one's thought in 
relation to the specific terms of that discourse (cf Rajchman 1991). 
Seeing things in this way, then, both the adoption of a gay identity and the adoption 
of its more nebulous offspring-identity 'someone who has addressed themselves to 
the issue of HIV/AIDS in the manner preferred by this way of looking at things' are 
equivalent to acquiescing to ethical regulation of and through one's sexuality, in a 
move which is congruent with the times. However, this may not be such a bad thing; 
some or other form of regulation is inevitable, and one which affords its subjects the 
strength and dignity which is to be found in much of the gay-inspired response to 
HIV/AIDS may certainly be considered more seemly than most of the currently 
available alternatives. 
4.4 An alternative morality 
Put simply, then, the project these texts articulate comprises an ideological struggle 
over people's understanding of their own sexuality - and the moral and political 
ramifications which accompany that understanding - reflecting a view that there 
exists in the American and British societies a widespread and deep-seated cultural 
censorship which prevents general acknowledgement of the "intrinsically 
unremarkable" truth that sexual behaviours and identities are widely diverse 
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(1994: 45,123). The contradiction between this truth of human sexuality and the 
politico-moral purdah which denies it has led to the waging of a "fundamental 
conflict" between the widespread demand for a radical broadening of sanctioned 
expressions of sexuality, and the dominant, institutionalised, secularised Christian 
cultural tradition (1994: 136). 
This altercation has come to be articulated upon the surface of emergence which is 
HIV/AIDS, and not only by such 'secular Christian' forces, but also by those texts 
analysed within this chapter; the assumption of this ongoing and epidemic denial of 
the diversity of "people's actual sexual wishes, pleasures and identities", together 
with the need to counter it, underwrite almost all of this commentary (1994: 230): the 
views given on right and wrong approaches to combating the spread of HIV, and to 
HIV/AIDS education (1994: 20,86,111,157); the judgements made about which 
doctors are good and which bad (1994: 36-37,120); the criticisms of photographic, 
filmic and televisual images pertaining to HIV/AIDS (1994: 76,157,226,230); the 
analyses of familialism, and of heterosexual attempts to construct HIV/AIDS as the 
direct result of homosexuality (1994: 53,274) - in each case it is the putative 
commonplace disavowal of the true diverse nature of human sexuality upon which 
the presented arguments rest. 
4.4.1 The truth of human sexuality and HIV/AIDS 
These writings connect HIV/AIDS into this truth of human sexuality by holding that 
in a world afflicted by the syndrome, to ignore the fact that actual sexual practice and 
desire are far more heterogeneous than the mainstream hegemony would have it is 
not merely anachronistically moralistic - it is downright dangerous, especially when 
such an attitude informs AIDS education (1994: 88). With this in mind, then, society 
at large could do much worse in its attempt to reconcile itself to the disease than to 
look to the famous example of 'people with AIDS' themselves, and in particular to 
their recognition and welcome acceptance of the 'fact' of human sexual diversity 
(1994: 32). In these accounts 'people with AIDS' hold a very similar position to that 
of gay men - indeed they are largely collapsed into each other, both being presented 
as exemplary, as harbingers of humankind's otherwise disclaimed psycho-sexual 
destiny, as keepers of truth. By constructing 'people with AIDS' in this way, 
HIV/AIDS can be made to speak on behalf of a particular view of 'how people 
should be' (albeit presented as a description of 'how people really are'), in a rhetorical 
manoeuvre - the use of a putative fact (biological, psychical or whatever) to imply 
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that a preferred moral position is undeniable, is 'true' - of a kind which would be 
outlawed if it were made on behalf of, say, familialism or the promotion of 
monogamy. 
The discourse achieves an apparent intellectual coherence for its position by means 
of what Woolgar and Pawluch have called 'ontological gerrymandering' (1985) - 
while HIV/AIDS is averredly a function of its representations, which contain no 
absolute or fundamental 'truth' to be discovered, sexuality, which has the role of "the 
sine qua non of modern social organisation and control, operating all other levels of 
gender, class, race and nationality", is described in terms of its having a definite 
empirical reality, albeit one which is "invariably articulated through practices that are 
intimately connected to contingent cultural forms and institutions". This (distinctly 
Freudian) sexuality is rooted in the erotic, in the body's potential for pleasure, "in 
desire and desiring fantasy", and is to be contrasted with "the narrow compass of 
heterosexual identities which defensively equate sexuality with sexual reproduction" 
and with the "mechanical and simplistic notion of 'sex', taken as an a priori reality" 
which informs so much of the research currently made into HIV/AIDS issues. 
Instead we must have a (conceivably equally a priori) reality of "multiple, uneven, 
shifting relations of desire to sexual behaviour and identities, both in the lives of 
individuals and desiring collectivities" and of "the finely nuanced variations of 
sexuality, understood as an extremely complex site of overlapping and frequently 
conflicting sexual desires, behaviour and identities". Indeed, within these accounts it 
is foolish even to attempt to demarcate sexuality's proper territory - anything may be 
desired, therefore anything may be experienced as sexual pleasure. Hence the 
dismissal of casual ideas of "behaviour change" in attempts to halt the spread of 
HIV. If it is to work, HIV related health education must be about the libidinisation, 
at the level of "individual and collective sexual fantasies", of those "substitutions and 
displacements" which comprise safer sex (1987: 9; 1994: 14,28,135-136). 
As they are currently found, heterosexual identities cannot cope with the threat of 
pleasure which this 'true' sexuality implies; they cannot hope adequately to contain 
those desires and fantasies which are incongruent with their limited scope, and there 
is the ever-present and ominous possibility that such wishes will return to 
consciousness. This provides the explanation for anti-homosexual sentiments 
(articulated on the surface of HIV/AIDS or elsewhere), in terms of a displaced 
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heterosexual anxiety that their conscious identities will become destabilised as a 
result of their own internal contradictions (1994: 14). Thus 
"... we may arrive at the unconscious of AIDS commentary, operating in systematic reversals, 
in disavowal, and in the most aggressive modes of self-defence.. . 
AIDS evidently threatens 
the fragile stability of the most fundamental organising categories for both individual and 
collective identities, insofar as it raises the reality of sexual diversity. " 
(1994: 28) 
Within such a scheme - if one ignores the possible dubiousness of its assertion that 
modern Western heterosexual identities really equate sexuality with reproduction so 
very closely - lesbians and gay men, having faced up to the truth of their desire, and 
through their advocacy of a liberal sexual ethics based on the principle of mutual 
consent, can "provide a more mature, and flexible, and above all honest model for 
social and sexual relationships than is currently sanctioned anywhere else in British 
culture" (1994: 71); they are the only ones who have realised their latent sexual 
potentialities, and therefore the only ones who are psychically and sexually healthy. 
Attacks on homosexuality, then, may be read as attacks on sexuality per se, as may 
propagating the idea that reduction of one's sexual partners is a valuable strategy in 
combating the spread of HIV. 
The argument is, then, that with the peculiar threat which HIV/AIDS has brought, it 
has become more important than ever that "for everybody's sake" we should 
"constantly affirm and celebrate" "the diversity and richness of our various ways of 
living and loving". In the face of HIV/AIDS it has become "imperative that we 
accept and celebrate the social, racial and sexual diversity of our species", because 
only by doing so can safer sex be made into a new and exciting erotic possibility, 
rather than a restriction (1994: 46,70). There is some sense in this. However, the 
account remains problematic, because the parallel between this preferred logic that 
says 'the reality of HIV/AIDS means we should celebrate our diversity', and the 
outlawed logic which suggests that 'the reality of HIV/AIDS means we should all be 
married monogamous and heterosexual' remains unacknowledged. Given this, and 
bearing in mind the doubts which may be cast over the reasoning within these 
accounts with respect to the reduction of the number of one's partners as an effective 
strategy to reduce the risk of being exposed to HIV, it becomes even clearer that a 
'progressive' aspiration such as the propagation of safer sex is as much infused with a 
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moral agenda as are calls for compulsory testing of members of 'risk groups'. 
quarantining, or the tattooing of the buttocks of HIV positive gay men. Proponents 
of each side of the debate seem to be using a similar logic, which is that the practical 
problem of HIV/AIDS would be much reduced by the acceptance of a particular 
moral stance. 
Authority may be claimed for such an approach by the rhetorical device of presenting 
one's moral bones of contention as if they have been brought into the limelight by 
HIV/AIDS itself, rather than by one's own partial, specific reading of HIV/AIDS. 
For instance, in a polemic on "Gay Teenagers and Gay Politics" it is suggested - 
without overtly developing the specific reasoning to any great degree - that "... HIV is 
the single most important reason why we should continue to campaign energetically 
for reform of the age of consent laws". Similarly elsewhere, it is as if it is not the 
voice of the text, but some given nature of HIV/AIDS which, having putatively 
apolitically and amorally determined what is and is not "effective HIV/AIDS 
education", declares the moral 'truth' that all varieties of consensual human sexual 
expression are "much of a muchness"; as if it is HIV/AIDS, and not the voice's 
presentation of it, which seeks to problematize theories of sexual identity grounded 
in gender specificity; as if the syndrome itself, rather than the politico-morally laden 
responses to it made by particular interested groups, encourages collective action and 
generates new political identities (1994: 146,162,267). 
These accounts, then, have an intentional AIDS, which, having "the power to 
condense almost all the other issues into itself' raises the politico-moral issues which 
the voice of the text wishes to see discussed, and manages to do so in spite of the 
assertion made elsewhere in the discourse that HIV/AIDS has no truth beyond the 
sum of its representations (indicating the operation of a similar gerrymandering to 
that employed around the issue of human sexuality) (1994: 187). When it is needed, 
HIV/AIDS has a truth, a truth which gives shape to these debates, and which favours 
the textual voice's camp. The alternative possibility that HIV/AIDS has the shape it 
has due to its appearance at a time when there already existed an overdetermined 
problem-space around the issues which it allegedly condensed, and for which the 
syndrome makes a convenient platform - for both sides of the debate - is afforded no 
place in these texts' new moral vision of a desired future. 
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4.4.2 Community 
However, exactly such a problem space did exist, as can be seen from the treatment 
of the issue of community within these writings. It is rightly observed that 
community based responses to the epidemic differed in various countries largely 
according to "the degree of self-confidence and organisation within the communities 
affected by AIDS in the period before the epidemic began" (1994: 220). The 
implication of this fact is that for certain subsets of the people who subsequently 
came to be involved in the issue of an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', the idea of 
'community' was already a pertinent one prior to the arrival of HIV/AIDS, which 
then was fitted into and made sense of in terms of a pre-existing discourse. Hence 
the emergent 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community' has a distinct political flavour, and 
includes certain subsets of people which from an alternative perspective might 
appear not very connected to HIV/AIDS, and excludes (or includes upon acceptance 
of certain ethical propositions) other subsets which, again it could be argued, perhaps 
have a very good case not only for being allowed in without such preconditions, but 
also for having a central role in its construction. 
The pre-HIV/AIDS shaping of the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community' is also 
reflected in the tone and content of the 'Statement of Purpose of the National 
Association of People with AIDS', published in September 1986 in San Francisco, 
within which the (properly irreproachable) claiming of certain rights - not to be 
victimised, and to be "treated with respect, dignity, compassion and understanding" 
(quoted in Watney 1994: 35) - is connected directly and as if necessarily to a 
particular reading of political history, with the implication that to be a 'person with 
AIDS' one must speak with the same voice as those privileged by that reading. 
"We are born of and inextricably bound to the historical struggle for rights - civil, feminist, 
disability, lesbian, gay and human. " 
(ibid) 
The intellectual problem here is that at certain points within this canon of discourse, 
the textual voice is deeply critical of a large scale and efficient cultural censorship 
which "faithfully duplicates the positions the social groups most vulnerable to HIV 
found themselves in even before the epidemic began" (1994: 49), whilst allowing to 
remain unrecognised the possibility that its own commentary (and such statements as 
the example above towards which it is sympathetic) reflects just as closely the 
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positions those same groups held prior to the epidemic in the alternative moral 
scheme to which it subscribes, and that it is itself operating a quite similar moral, 
cultural and political agenda on the surface of emergence which is HIV/AIDS 
discourse. Such would explain the relative invisibility in these works of HIV/AIDS 
affected social groups which fit badly within this preferred vision - the obvious 
example again being haemophiliacs who have been infected with HIV through 
treatment necessary for their condition. 
So it is, then, that the epidemic can be read according to a script familiar before the 
advent of HIV/AIDS, in which a stylised 'good versus evil' dualism is established. In 
this particular case, the 'community', and its organisations are romanticised into a 
heroic position (such organisations were "set up in the first place by groups of 
friends, often stretching across national boundaries and generations" and were the 
source from which "the most efficient and effective responses to the epidemic have 
almost invariably arisen" (1994: xxi-xxii)) from which they may be contrasted with 
(no less romantically) evil governments, media and the like (cf 1994: 245). 
And, perhaps unexpectedly given the frequent and ongoing interest in proselytising 
the gospel of diversity, the voice of the text is averredly comfortable with the idea of 
thinking about the responses to HIV/AIDS in the United Kingdom in terms of such a 
simplistically reductive dualism. However, this apparent contradiction is perhaps 
explicable if the aim is less to disparage the media and the government than it is to 
establish a 'community' which has been fashioned according to the discourse's own 
moral predilections as the final authority in all HIV/AIDS matters, propagation of 
which is essential to 'effective' HIV/AIDS education, due to the "sense of individual 
and collective worth and responsibility" it fosters. In other words, the 'community' 
as the best basis for HIV/AIDS education is a primary conduit through which ethical 
incitements informed by a given political morality can be dispensed (1994: 159,245). 
On similar lines, it is to be insisted "as a non-negotiable condition" that "people with 
HIV and their advocates are consulted at all stages of health promotion, treatment 
and research". Acceptance of this would, of course, be distinctly advantageous to 
whosoever controls the appellation 'advocate of people with HIV/AIDS'; consider 
again, for example, the comments made on the role of social scientific research with 
respect to HIV/AIDS. The voice of the text is generally critical of the liberalism 
which lies behind the like of cultural studies, psychoanalytic criticism, textual 
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analysis, ideological theory &c., arguing that despite the reasonable expectation that 
such debates should afford the world "a better understanding of what is being done - 
and what is not being done in the name of AIDS", this liberalism has not "addressed 
itself to the question of AIDS with anything like the concern which it has shown for 
other examples of gross social injustice" (1994: 23,133). 
In other words liberalism has failed in its moral duty, as it is articulated by these 
texts. Consequently, its researches must be policed. Thus, any work not sanctioned 
by the involvement of lesbians or gay men (for which one presumably may also read 
'advocates for the HIV/AIDS in/affected community') or any undertaken on a purely 
academic basis, and not designed specifically to deal with issues raised by those 
"working in the field", is to be regarded with contempt because it lacks the sanction 
of those with the authority of Fronterlebnis (1994: 177). Such disdain is justified and 
bolstered through use of a rhetoric of danger; non-community sanctioned social 
scientific research is "bad", "lazy and dangerously homophobic", has led directly to 
"unacceptable levels of new cases of HIV infection", and causes "real harm" by 
"squandering precious resources". Once title to this sort of policing has been thus 
established, it becomes possible to make calls to action, or rather to activism, to the 
confident targeting of those institutions which control HIV/AIDS related social 
research, in order to ensure that HIV/AIDS research funding is "spent intelligently 
and to the maximum practical purpose" and to demolish the barriers such institutions 
may raise to the development of better care through new treatments (1994: 208,239- 
240). 
This sort of activism is often discussed using a rhetoric of pragmatism (cf 1994: 240 
where ACT UP's acronym is re-styled to suggest that what is needed is an "AIDS 
Coalition to Unleash Pragmatism") which is significant, for while phrases like 
"maximum practical purpose" muster considerable rhetorical clout by virtue of their 
connotations of 'self-evident, amoral, non judgmental life-in-the-real-world', what it 
is to be practical or pragmatic are of course dependent upon what one desires to 
achieve, upon one's politics and one's morals. In this context, then, such terms 
articulate a particular knowledge of HIV/AIDS which is to be taken as given, and 
which is to inform one's activities in relation to the syndrome. Such activities will in 
turn reconfirm the account of HIV/AIDS which at the first gave them shape; that is, 
'pragmatic' practices of the kind advocated within these writings are technologies for 
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the production of exactly the kind of 'truth' which Foucault would have suggested is 
contingent, and dependent relations or micro-power (1980: 131-133). 
This language of community, then, is placed by these texts at the service of their new 
morality. That the relationship is this way around, that the case is not of a given 
community demanding a morality to which these accounts merely give voice, is 
evidenced in the ambivalent attitude within these works towards the legitimacy of 
community as an object. At times, other people's usages of notions of community 
are lambasted; for example the French social scientist Michel Pollak's use of the 
phrase "the French gay community" is attacked, because it homogenised a disparate 
population of lesbians and gay men. At other times, though, the voice of the text 
itself employs the phrase 'PWA community' unproblematic ally (for example, in 
certain calls to action 1994: 239), through which usage we are invited to accept that 
the concept 'the PWA community' suffers from no cognate limitations. Similarly, 
elsewhere the text constructs "British heterosexuals" as a population group which 
display sufficient homogeneity for the very personal characteristics of being 
"hysterically modest" and "pathologically inhibited in their ability to discuss sex" to 
be attributed to them (1994: 142,237). For these writings, then, the worth of such all- 
embracing concepts is to be assessed according to their immediate rhetorical utility 
in the particular circumstances of the given argument being constructed. 
For instance, one ongoing aim within these texts is to establish that the best possible 
preventative strategy in relation to HIV is to make the practice of safer sex the norm 
"regardless of known or perceived HIV status" (1994: 137,204). It is argued that 
safer sex education has had its greatest success when "rooted in the recognition that 
HIV is a community issue, requiring a community-based response" (1994: 137) a fact 
which provides both supporting evidence for the discourse's preferred position, and 
the possibility of citing this 'community' as an exemplar for others to follow. 
Consequently, at the times when this aim is being pursued, the idea of a 'gay 
community' of exactly the sort which is disallowed to Pollak (one, that is, 
sufficiently unified to be referred to as "us" and have discrete "gay practices" 
(1994: 139-140)) , 
is readily articulated, or even promoted. 
The principal reason for this refusal Pollak's 'gay community', then, would seem to 
be a discontentment - in large part a moral discontentment, although tied up with 
methodological issues - with his explanation of the lower than ideal take up of safer 
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sex amongst French gay men (1994: 238). This would suggest that a sort of 
'moralised ontology' is at work here, such that a morally unsatisfactory 'gay 
community' like Pollak's may be disregarded as untenable because it collapses the 
differences between the individuals who comprise it, whereas a morally suitable 'gay 
community' such as the discourse's own, may be sustained in spite of its doing the 
same thing. 
4.4.3 Safer sex 
It is in the light of the form of this moralised ontology that the issue of safer sex as 
discussed within these accounts must be considered; safer sex is presented as the 
obvious solution in relation to a realist conception of HIV/AIDS, in which issues 
around aetiology and transmission are fixed, and which stands in stark contrast to 
prevalent distorted and distorting lay perceptions of health and disease. All 
discussion of AIDS should take as its starting point the relation between these 
"known facts" and such popular misconceptions, and, knowing the facts, the only 
plausible reaction to posited solutions other than safer sex is exasperation 
(1994: 26,51). 
Having established safer sex as the only strategy to combat the spread of HIV which 
is congruent with both the reality of human sexuality, and the reality of the virus and 
its modes of transmission, it becomes possible to use it more overtly as a politico- 
moral platform. Safer sex education should seek "to counteract unjustified fears and 
anxieties" deriving from moves within "politics and religious fundamentalism" to 
justify their own forms of prejudice (1994: 142), and may possibly provide a way to 
"make some good from the tragedy of AIDS" by using it "to enlarge rather than still 
further decrease the possibilities of human relationships" (1994: 92-93). 
This second point is to be achieved through making safer sex education revolve 
around the development "of individual and collective self-esteem in relation to erotic 
practice" 1994: 146). One of the consequences of this approach, however, is that 
safer sex education (which, it is observed, is most effective when actualised "in 
small face-to-face group sessions" (1994: 92)) will thus provide the means for an 
extended ethical technology by which individuals will be encouraged to constitute 
their subjectivity in terms of a particular vision of the erotic, born of the politico- 
moral discourse of the truths of sexuality and HIV/AIDS found within these texts, 
both of which truths are immanently intertwined with the texts' account of the 
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morality which they view as ultimately responsible for the tragedy and which they 
seek to displace, all three of which together become the foundations of an ethical 
authority discourse. The message is that in order to survive and thrive in the age of 
HIV/AIDS, one must radically eroticize one's subjectivity, and safer sex education 
provides the mechanism by which to do so. 
"The erotics of safer sex remain the only effective means by which we can challenge and 
resist the literally deadly consequences of a stunting moralism that refuses to accept that all 
our consensual sexual needs are equally valid. " 
(1994: 148) 
Thus HIV/AIDS is made the surface upon which regulation around sexuality can 
shift from being based on the clinical sexuality of the Scienta Sexualis (Foucault 
1979) - which although rooted in the techniques of the confessional, remained, 
through its 'vertical' alignment of the confessional relation (that is between the doctor 
who is the minister and the embodiment of the authority discourse and the patient 
who is subject to it), an objectifying sexuality, and retained a concomitance with 
disciplinary technologies - to being founded upon the erotic, upon an ethically 
subjectifying sexuality (possessing a more lateral confessional relation, in which the 
subject accesses the authority discourse him/herself, without any such mediator, 
through, for example, self-help user discourses or writings like Watney's which 
invite subjects to examine and describe the truth of themselves either internally or to 
each other, rather than to some human incarnation of authority) in a move aligned 
with the general drift away from disciplinary regulation and towards self-regulation. 
4.5 Conclusion -a moral problem 
It is interesting to note that in the article from which most of the comments upon 
eroticizing safer sex here quoted are taken ("Safer Sex as Community Practice", 
1994: 134-150) the text, somewhat unusually, couches its own project expressly in 
terms of articulating and promoting a preferred morality. The textual voice 
comments; 
"... we need to sustain the development of the erotics of safer sex in the context of a morality 
that is founded on respect for diversity and choice, and which accords with Foucault's 
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rejection of any form of morality that seeks to be acceptable to everyone: 'in the sense that 
everyone would have to submit to it'... " 
(1994: 148) 
(Cf Foucault 1989. ) The problem is that this is exactly the kind of morality which 
this canon of work seeks to establish; the message repeatedly coded within in these 
works is that the anachronistic pseudo-Christian morality which is dominant at the 
moment is absolutely unacceptable, and should be replaced with another - for 
example, diversity of sexual expression is to be encouraged, but this discourse will 
brook no diversity on the issue of whether diversity of sexual expression is a good 
thing. This same difficulty bedevils the political vision presented in these texts of 
citizenship as preferable to subjecthood. Whereas subjecthood demands of us a 
"subjection to political, juridical and regal authority in our sense of who we are", 
citizenship is in concord with the fluid, multiform and inconsistent nature of identity 
and offers the chance for ethical rather than legal or political forms of identification 
between people. Once more quoting Foucault, the textual voice contends that 
"citizenship also offers a concrete alternative to the type of humanism: 'that presents 
a certain form of ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom"' (Watney 
1994: 166; Foucault 1988: 15). 
On the following two pages, however, the case for citizenship is argued in exactly 
those terms; an ethics based in citizenship will work in the interests of "the entire 
population", and is an indispensable condition for universal liberty. Yet throughout 
this discussion the text maintains the theme it has derived from Foucault that it 
would be catastrophic to try to search for a form of morality which would be 
universally acceptable and before which all would have to bow. It is never 
recognised that the moral pluralism in citizenship the text describes is also just such 
a morality; in this preferred plan the population may not any longer be obliged to 
picture itself as being "fixed rigidly in mechanical dualistic polarities", in the way the 
text asserts is currently true, but it is instead obliged to think of itself as "a complex 
unity of many overlapping and interrelated groups and identities". The principal 
argument to support the contention that this alternative plan is better, is, in essence, a 
crude correspondence theory of truth; citizenship, we are told, is the best way 
forward because it proceeds from the "recognition" - not the contention - "that our 
identities are multiply formed and positioned" - that is because it has the best fit with 
what we are really like. And any discourse which describes what people are really 
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like necessarily in so doing also demarcates their possibilities of being, and thus at 
some time or another confronts at least some people with an ethical difficulty in the 
exercise of their thought and being, and thus (de)limits their freedom (1994: 167- 
168). 
The vision in these texts has come up against liberalism's age old paradox: the 
principle of tolerance articulates a logic which demands that one suffers that which 
will destroy that principle; and if one tries to counter this by setting limits to 
tolerance, then the principle is undermined anyway, as any such limits must be an 
expression of someone or other's morals, which are, as the arbiters of acceptability, 
something to which failure to submit can then not be tolerated. Perhaps the problem 
is that it is inherent in morality as a concept that it demands that all should yield to it 
eventually - if one believes one's morality is right, then there must come a point 
where one will wish to compel dissenters to submit to it, regardless of whether or not 
they actually agree. 
The voice of the text complains bitterly, and understandably, about cultural images 
of AIDS which sediment the syndrome into a particular and 'unsuitable' form, and 
then "forbid further enquiry" (1994: 30), forbid the possibility of alternative readings 
and constructions, and about those putative "advisers and 'experts"' who wish to 
promote their and not its moral beliefs on the back of safer sex education 
(1994: 143). But this line of argument cannot logically escape the fact that it is guilty 
of exactly what it condemns in others; to show what AIDS really looks like, to use 
this expert knowledge to promote a particular moral conception (irrespective of any 
of the texts' readers' consensual needs and pleasures if they happen to conflict with 
this morality), and to render itself immune from the kinds of unsettling 'further 
enquiries' which may result from Mark Harrington's directive, quoted within the 
discourse as exemplary (1994: 133), to accept nothing which is written or said on the 
subject of AIDS uncritically. 
But, in the last analysis, these accounts still work. This is partly a question of 
history; the texts' approach to the question of moral pluralism is entirely 
conventional within debates on the subject, and the failure of this or any text to deal 
with the logical extension of the paradox observed above is seldom a major problem 
in practical terms. But more than this, these texts have no need to extract themselves 
from this or any other logical difficulty, for it is not at the level of logic that these 
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commentaries function. These commentaries successfully exempt themselves from 
reflexive criticism of the sort which this examination of them would suggest is 
apposite, by being managed such that theirs appears to be the authentic voice of the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community, and as such is the rightful wielder of 
experientially based authority in the face of which mere logic is meaningless. As 
will be seen in the following chapters, this timbre of authentic experience over cold 
logic permeates the entire terrain upon which HIV/AIDS related technologies of self 
operate. 
4.6 Summary 
Watney's commentaries define the politico-moral universe in which HIV/AIDS 
related ethical operations can take place, and do so as part of an overall project, 
operated on the surface of HIV/AIDS, to re-define people's understandings of 
themselves as sexual beings. The world presented in this account is one which is 
heavily morally overdetermined, at the governmental level, at the scientific level, 
and in relation to familialist ideology. This moralising is antithetical to a textually 
constituted and carefully policed 'in-group', the community of those directly affected 
by HIV and AIDS, which are seen as having authority in debates about HIV/AIDS 
due to their authentic experience of the syndrome. It is on this same basis that the 
textual voice articulated within these writings establishes its own authority to speak, 
not on the basis of the intellectual coherence of the arguments presented. This 
authority affords those who have it the right to define truth - of HIV/AIDS, of human 
sexuality - and therefore to determine what is and is not a practical response to the 
epidemic. The construction of this community also has the effect of collapsing two 
groups of people, 'gay men' and 'people with AIDS' into the same space, thereby 
conflating their interests and properties, and connecting HIV/AIDS to sexual 
political debates as if necessarily rather than contingently. This authoritative 
community discourse does not comprise an amoral reading of the situation, but 
provides an alternative moral vision which, through the opportunity afforded it by 
HIV/AIDS, is able to operate as an ethical authority discourse, presenting members 
of the community as exemplary, thereby encouraging the reader to submit to this 





THE BODY POSITIVE NEWSLETTER 
Body Positive (London) is an organisation set up to support people infected with and 
affected by HIV. It is based at a drop-in centre in Earls Court, but it also publishes 
the Body Positive Newsletter (BPN), which with a circulation of 3,700 (amounting to 
some 11,000 readers in total), is the organisation's primary mode of contact with its 
users (BPN 158: 7). The nature of this newsletter's aims, and the sorts of HIV/AIDS 
related truths upon which its commentary rests, locate it firmly within the 
'alternative' HIV/AIDS discourse space, as outlined in chapter 3. 
In its 'Vision Statement', Body Positive (London) describes itself as "a living network 
of people affected by HIV... [which]... seeks to transform the diagnosis of a positive 
test for HIV antibodies into positive views and actions about keeping healthy and 
living well". Other avowed intentions are to increase the life choices of people living 
with HIV, and thereby to empower them, to propagate unity amongst people with 
HIV, regardless of their backgrounds. Such aims are to be achieved via the 
encouragement of "self-determination, autonomy, and personal responsibility among 
people with HIV and AIDS" (Body Positive Annual Report 1993: 3). The principal 
means through which this project is actualised is the three-weekly Newsletter, which 
is self-reportedly "written, edited, proof-read and despatched by volunteers" who are 
themselves directly affected by HIV. The magazine sees itself as a rare conduit 
through which "people affected by HIV and AIDS have a chance to put over their 
point of view and tell the world what it's really like", and as a possible mechanism of 
catharsis for those who choose to contribute (BPN 154: 8 You Can Do This). In other 
words, it sets itself up as a 'passage point' through which HIV/AIDS in/affected 
people may come to know both the truth of their sickness and themselves, and how 
to be in the face of HIV/AIDS (cf Latour 1987). That this 'passage point' is 
'obligatory' will be demonstrated in the following analysis. 
5.1 Overview of the contents of the Body Positive Newsletter 
Much of the text of the Body Positive Newsletter takes the form of confessional or 
testimonial discourse. where people affected by HIV share their experiences, 
ostensibly for catharsis and for the benefit of others who may be in similar situations 
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(cf Travelling Light, BPN 159: 6; Seven Years On, BPN 161: 1; Anne's Story, BPN 
163: 1; Jan's Story, BPN 165: 7). Such representations tend to construct a 
phenomenology of life with HIV/AIDS, with which the HIV affected reader is 
invited to identify. This phenomenology is "what it's really like", contrasted with 
false media articulations (BPN 154: 8), and privileges the perspectives of infected 
and/or affected persons regarding HIV/AIDS related issues. 
There is also a lot of material seeking to give technical information. This is mostly 
to do with medical matters - what kinds of therapies are available and their relative 
advantages and disadvantages (cf Catheters: an overview, BPN 154: 2; Thalidomide 
and HIV, BPN 157: 1; Passive Immunotherapy, BPN 158: 4), or practical ways to 
cope with conditions which are common to people with HIV infection, such as 
diarrhoea, thrush and weight loss (cf Scatologically Speaking, BPN 159: 5; Thrush, 
BPN 161: 1; Weight Loss: A role for Growth Hormone and Anabolic Steroids? BPN 
163: 1) - but some also give 'helpful hints' on non (or at least not strictly) medical 
issues, such as precautions to take before going on holiday (Travels & Holidays, 
BPN 163: 8), how to complain when dissatisfied (On Making a Complaint, BPN 
165: 8) or the practical problems of going into hospital (Admission to Hospital, BPN 
167: 4). Such material is sometimes presented in an impersonal way, as reported fact, 
and sometimes takes the same confessional/testimonial form described above. 
In addition, there are items of news concerning broader and policy related issues (cf 
Unkind Cuts, BPN 159: 1; Employers Promise Fair Treatment, BPN 154: 5) and 
others which deal with what the Body Positive Organisation itself has achieved or 
aims to achieve (cf Faith! BPN 154: 1; A Word From the Chair, BPN 164: 1). The 
first two strands of discourse, however, will provide the focus for this study. 
5.2 Introduction to the analysis 
To understand the approach taken to the analysis of the Body Positive Newsletter in 
this chapter (and indeed of the National AIDS Manual in chapter 6) it is necessary to 
recall the different forms of relation obtaining between the disciple and the master 
articulated within the two models of the care of the self which Foucault described (in 
keeping with the contention put forward in the introduction that these could be used 
as models by which to understand modern technologies of self). On the one hand, 
the Greco-Roman model employed first a pedagogical and later a medical relation 
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between the subject and the master (Foucault 1988; 1993). Speaking of this relation 
in Seneca, Foucault states; 
it was instrumental and professional. It was founded on the capacity of the master to 
lead the disciple to a happy and autonomous life through good advice. " 
(Foucault 1988: 44) 
In contrast, the relation within Christian monasticism was one of total and unending 
obedience to the master, and moreover to a set of obligatory truths - for even when a 
monk became the master, this spirit of obedience was to be maintained. 
The aim to lead people 'to a happy and autonomous life through good advice' very 
closely reflects the sentiments of the Body Positive manifesto with respect to people 
who are in/affected by HIV/AIDS. Body Positive seems to have reproduced the 
Hellenistic perspective on the care of the self, in which "one must become the doctor 
of oneself' (Foucault 1988: 3 1). Prima facie, with its target of 'keeping healthy and 
living well', there appears within the magazine to be a technology of self which 
promotes a 'technical-ethical' subjectivity; 'technical' in the sense of articulating 
certain wisdoms pertaining to the achievement of practical ends (in particular auto- 
therapeutic knowledges and skills), and ethical in that guidance is offered on how 
one should as an HIV/AIDS in/affected person address oneself to these knowledges, 
and indeed one's situation in general. An ethos is constructed whereby a certain 
positive, forward looking and self-reliant attitude is encouraged, presenting defiance 
of the disease as worthy and resignation to it as rueful. The object of this chapter, 
then, is to explore this ethos more fully, with particular attention to how it is 
technically-ethically achieved. 
Both the components of this preferred subjectivity are manifested in such ways that 
they reflect and reproduce the conception of the nature of health which Body Positive 
has - in which 'health' is something beyond the kinds of negative definitions 
commonly reckoned to be dominant in anatomo-clinical medicine (which would 
have health as merely the lack of sickness), but instead is something closer to the 
WHO's 1955 definition of health as being the achievement for each person of 
"complete physical, mental and social well-being" (Hart 1985: 2). Health for Bodv 
Positive is to be couched as something almost spiritual (or at least attitudinal), and as 
something radically individual, the possession or want of which is to be judged 
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according to each HIV/AIDS in/affected person's own sensibilities. However, as 
there are certain common problems relating to HIV infection, it is deemed to be 
desirable to have a pooling of experience, from which guidance or insight can be 
drawn. The didactic relation envisaged in the publication, then, is between a, master' 
in the form of the collected wisdom and experience of those who are in/affected by 
HIV/AIDS, and any and every individual HIV/AIDS in/affected reader as the student, 
who is voluntarily subject, whose relation to that master-discourse is 'instrumental 
and professional', and who seeks to utilise the discourse as a resource to achieve self- 
fulfilment. 
5.2.1 Method of analysis 
In order to fulfil the objective of this chapter - to explore the possibility of reading a 
project such as the Body Positive Newsletter as an attempt to establish an ethical 
regime of 'the care of the self (Foucault 1984; 1988; 1991; 1993) - close readings 
were made of various issues of the magazine, using the kinds of principles outlined 
in the section 2.5. Selection of which particular editions were to be examined (issues 
154 to 167) was based largely on the pragmatic criterion of availability. Once 
obtained, each issue was then read thoroughly, and from this reading a purposive 
sample of individual articles or sections of the text was made, favouring those which 
upon considered reflection appeared to contain significant amounts of ethical 
material. These selected texts were then subjected to very close reading, from which 
the final analysis was derived. In order to counter potential bias arising out of such a 
sampling procedure, close readings were also made of a smaller purposive sample of 
texts which appeared at first sight to have no relevance to the study, any surprising 
findings being then incorporated into the analysis. For further discussion of 
problems associated with analysing this sort of material, see sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
5.3 Axes of community within the Body Positive Newsletter 
The Body Positive Newsletter 'performs community' along a number of axes - that is 
it employs a number of textual devices by which it encourages a particular reading of 
itself, principally through the construction of a specifically located implied reader 
with which it is intended actual readers should identify, and it does so in relation to 
several distinct textual themes (Iser 1978; Woolgar 1993). 
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Political Community (5.3.1). The publication is properly to be seen as inhabiting the 
"alternative" ideal-typical discursive vector described above, a fact most clearly 
visible in the degree of attention the journal affords to the underprivileged groups 
central to "alternative" concerns. Whilst the magazine's averred target readership is 
all people affected by HIV, the discourse is often flavoured with what may be 
considered to be gay cultural mores (or rather a particular construction thereof, 
specific to the Newsletter), and the ethos of community expressed therein, to such an 
extent that certain sections of this target readership tend to disappear - hxmophiliacs, 
for example, were largely invisible within the sample of the publication used for this 
study. 
Community of Positivity (5.3.2). There is an unrelenting emphasis on positivity, on 
living with not dying from HIV infection, as a principal strategy for coping with the 
condition. This is reflected by the fact that there is very little discourse devoted 
specifically to the issue of death in relation to HIV/AIDS; whilst not seeking actually 
to deny death, it is not discussed very often, and when it is, it is presented as 
something to be managed rather than feared (cf Rites of Passage, BPN 158: 1; Whose 
Life is it Anyway, BPN 161: 3). This principle of positivity also connects to the 
political axis, in that those things against which the readership is incited to rail, those 
things in the face of which they need to be positive, are as often the prejudices and 
misunderstandings that one has to endure when one is HIV positive, as they are the 
ravages of the disease. 
Anti-Medical Community (5.3.3). In some of the testimonial accounts, and often in 
the manner in which the technical information is given, is to be found criticism of the 
medical profession, who are described as insensitive and/or incompetent. 
Alternatively, modern medicine is often couched as a service upon which the person 
with HIV/AIDS can draw as, when and if required. Whichever line is taken, 
anatomo-clinical medicine is not to be allowed to be the discourse which defines the 
experience of having HIV infection. 
5.3.1 Political community 
The particular political orientation of the Body Positive Newsletter is well illustrated 
in an article Lesbians Coming Out (BPN 154: 2), in which it is assumed that the 
reader unproblematically accepts the by no means self-evident contention that HIV 
infection is a matter of particular relevance to lesbians. The management of the text 
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operates to a large extent through its style; the tone of the piece is intimate and 
confessional, the voice vulnerable, demanding a sympathetic reading. The article 
begins; 
"It has taken me a long time to sit and put this article together, as I have never been 
quite sure where to start or what I wanted to say. But with all the press that has been 
around about lesbians and HIV, I thought it was time to put pen to paper. " 
(ibid) 
Such presentation facilitates the text's ability to present its message as a shared 
concern, constructing both reader and author as 'those in the know', fighting together 
against external ignorance. (That HIV is to be seen as relevant to lesbians is further 
expressed in an article Lesbians and HIV in BPN 167: 1. ) Similar devices, whereby 
the assumption of a shared understanding of HIV serves to conjoin the voice and the 
reader, are employed quite frequently in the Newsletter (cf Travelling Light BPN 
159: 7 for another example). 
In Lesbians Coming Out such community work is then followed by work to 
deconstitute the possibility of community within various other groups with which the 
reader might identify - members of an alternative support organisation called 
Positively Women are said to be "totally stunned and confused" at encountering an 
HIV positive lesbian, and other lesbians are couched as foolishly believing 
newspaper reports which suggest that they are immune from infection. This 
movement is geared towards leaving voice and reader alike in the same very specific 
location; within a community which claims access to the truth of HIV/AIDS by 
virtue of its members being in/affected by the virus. 
Through rhetorical operations such as these, however, the textually articulated 
community is effectively also afforded the right to establish the correct ideological 
response for HIV/AIDS in/affected persons to make. This aspect of the ethos of 
community within the magazine is clearly illustrated in Coming Of Age, (BPN 
158: 6), a report on a seminar given for seropositive haemophiliacs, in which similar 
attempts are made to de-constitute one community in favour of another. If there is 
such a thing, then the community of hemophiliacs is based upon a particular 
property of their blood, its inability to clot efficiently. The special relevance of HIV 
and AIDS to that population stems from this fact, through the risk they endure 
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resultant from the high number of transfusions of blood products many of them 
require in order to treat their condition. If someone with haemophilia were to be 
infected with HIV via some other route, their identity as a haemophiliac would be of 
little relevance to their identity as an HIV infected person. In other words, the 
identity of the 'hxmophiliac with HIV/AIDS' revolves around a discourse of deviant 
physiology rather than a discourse of deviant behaviour. The voice in this text, 
however, works to undermine this factor; 
"It is clear that haemophiliacs have been misconstrued as people who don't have sex, 
cannot be gay, bisexual or promiscuous, couldn't possibly be non-white, IV drug users 
or sex workers. Many people still believe that haemophiliac infection could only have 
occurred through blood transfusion. " 
(ibid) 
Indeed, any connexion between this 'non-deviant' discourse of haemophilia and the 
discourse of being HIV/AIDS in/affected is to be backgrounded, criticism being 
made of any attempt to afford the status of being a haemophiliac priority over the 
status of being HIV antibody positive (ibid). These textual operations have the effect 
of defining and regulating what one must be if one is HIV antibody positive, such 
that it takes more than simply having been infected with the virus to join the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community which the Body Positive Newsletter articulates. 
This is evidenced very clearly at the close of the piece; 
"What I heard on this Seminar was a loud and clear message being sent by this HIV 
affected community. It is apparent that HIV+ haemophiliacs are more than ready to 
take their place in the HIV community and that, in this regard, they are coming of age. " 
(ibid) 
The former of these two articles, then, in using a confessional lesbian voice, and in 
criticising lesbians who believe what the papers tell them, seems to be telling lesbian 
readers that they should ignore HIV/AIDS at their peril, that they should enter the 
community, that there is a place ready for them if only they will realise their need. 
This advice flies in the face of the perhaps more conventional wisdom which 
suggests that if a lesbian came to be infected with HIV it would very likely not be 
through her practising lesbian sex (which, within that wisdom, is thought to be about 
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as safe as sex can get), but through some other conduit, not specifically related to her 
sexual orientation. 
On the other hand, the latter article seems to suggest that there is no such place for 
HIV in/affected haemophiliacs until and unless they reconfigure their connexion with 
the disease as being somehow largely separate from their hxmophilia. That is, rather 
than it being impossible for a haemophiliac to be 'gay, bisexual or promiscuous, non- 
white, an IV drug user or a sex worker', it is problematic on the terms established 
here for a haemophiliac to have an HIV related identity which is not radically 
informed by the needs and natures of exactly those states of being. Some 
commentators have suggested that there are 'guilty' (male homosexual, IV drug user 
and sex-worker) and 'innocent' (anybody else) people with HIV/AIDS (cf Patton 
1988). The Body Positive Newsletter seems to address this issue by inverting this 
relation, rather than undermining it or making it irrelevant, effectively privileging 
forms of being which would be on the 'guilty' side of this supposed divide. Thus, to 
take their place in Body Positive's HIV community, haemophiliacs must refuse their 
putatively 'non-deviant' status, and construct their HIV/AIDS in/affected selfhoods in 
a way which is informed by a number of politico-moral truth obligations which are 
not necessary to an 'HIV in/affected haemophiliac' identity, and which have their 
roots in a politics which has nothing to do with the condition of hemophilia. 
Such a celebration (or at least valorisation) of 'deviance' is characteristic of 
"alternative" AIDS discourse, but within the Body Positive Newsletter it is more 
specifically related to sexual 'deviance'. Accordingly, the group which can be seen as 
the greatest influence over the general tone of the publication is gay men, the special 
interests and approaches of whom are apparent throughout the text. Consider, for 
example, the style of the humour employed in Scatologically Speaking (BPN 159: 5, 
an account of how to deal with diarrhoea) when advising on the use of incontinence 
pads; one would be highly unlikely to find any similar form of humour in non- 
HIV/AIDS related health care publications. The voice here is male. 
"INCONTINENCE PADS are not the fashion accessory for the year. They are effective 
but some of them are fairly bulky, add inches to the hips and buttocks and make those 
tight jeans unwearable. When I tried them I felt like a cross between Marilyn Munroe, 
Little Abe and Donald Duck. " 
(ibid) 
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Likewise, it comments later on that 
"I have become an expert on public toilets in the London area (no heckling from the 
back row please)... " 
(ibid) 
(See also Deeply Probing BPN 154: 3 for further examples displaying a very similar 
kind of rhetoric. ) While it is certain that presenting information about the life 
changes which come in the wake of HIV infection in a humorous way such as this 
can make the prospect of those often unpleasant realities more bearable, for such a 
technique to work the recipient of the information must find the particular mode of 
expression used pertinent and funny. Accordingly, the implied reader who is 
constructed by this text is someone who not only appreciates and understands the 
importance and relevance of the issues being raised, but also is familiar with and 
accepting of the form of the rhetoric and the targets of the humour. This is a 
humour, then, which in its campness reflects the conception within the publication of 
its ideal-typical reader/user as being a gay man, or at least as someone who is 'in 
tune' with the publication's ongoing inclination to reconstruct that which might more 
usually be couched as 'deviant' as something to be celebrated (and conversely to 
expose the putative fallacy of supposedly normal behaviour and attitudes), reflecting 
an inclination which, although not nearly so pronounced as in Watney's work, 
nevertheless makes "leather, chains and piercings" and the "enjoyment of things 
"perverse and risque"" the order of the day (cf Positive Lives: Responses To HIV 
BPN 159: 3). Hence, the use of camp expression here serves to connect the implied 
reader into a particular form of cultural critique, which is manifested through camp 
praxis, and which is exclusively "queer" in its possibilities and ownership (cf Meyer 
1994: 1-22). 
Such leanings are, of course, understandable reflections of the fact that gay men 
constitute a very high proportion of the magazine's readership. Again, however, 
there is a tension between such an emphasis and the organisation's expressed 
intention to serve the needs of all persons with HIV. Such editorial emphases can 
create exclusionary dynamics, of exactly the sort described above as operating in 
texts such as Coming of Age. Body Positive is avowedly a health related 
organisation, and yet in order to access its benefits, there is a pressure to submit to 
certain politico-moral obligations of truth, which are derived from the gay forms of 
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thought and action which gave rise to the organisation in the first place, and which 
are not strictly health related. Any HIV/AIDS in/affected individual who would like 
to join the Body Positive community, but for whatever reason feels compelled to 
resist such pressures, will therefore likely obtain only limited and problematic access 
to the support mechanisms which the organisation provides. 
5.3.2 Community of positivity 
Texts expressing this form of community often (but not always) follow a script in 
which the voice first describes the adversities of enduring HIV infection, and often of 
HIV infection in connexion with some other stigmatising life state (being gay, for 
example), but then returns to resolute positivity in the face of such adversities. 
One such text is Jan's Story (BPN 165: 7), in which the voice is once again intimate 
and vulnerable, constituting any humane reader as one who will commune with it, 
who will be sympathetic; the voice is offering her "experience of life", and asking for 
the reader's "support and encouragement" in return. That such a response on the part 
of the reader is appropriate is confirmed in the narrative which follows; the virgin 
voice is raped by her landlord, wanders homeless for three weeks and is left HIV 
positive. She decides not to tell her family, compounding her sense of isolation, and 
the reader's incitement to commune with her. Towards the end of the piece, 
however, she speaks of her hope that a cure for HIV/AIDS will be discovered, and 
suggests that "we [voice and implied reader in communion] just have to keep the 
faith. " Then the voice boldly recites a poem, to declare that she can move on from 
where the man who did this to her has left her, and concludes with the words 
"Onwards and upwards". 
Notwithstanding the considerable pathos of this account, nor indeed the creditable 
resolve expressed in the face of what is for many almost unimaginable misfortune, 
the effect of the voice's construction of the relationship between itself and the reader 
is interesting when viewed more dispassionately; the reader is made the voice's 
confidant, perhaps even the voice's kin, in that they are unified by blood, although 
not in the usual way - this blood union stems from infection with HIV. More than 
this, though, the voice constructs itself as an exemplary figure of the 'ever resilient 
abused'; that is, the incitement in the relationship between the voice and the reader is 
not merely that the reader should give the voice its sympathy and admiration, but that 
the reader should follow the voice's example of eventually unerring positivity in the 
face of adversity. 
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Such construction, in which the union between voice and reader is emphasised, is 
only one side of the way in which community is established in text, however; in 
other articles the difference between voice and reader on the one hand, and 
everybody else on the other is the central theme. For example in Lesbians Coming 
Out (BPN 154: 2), the exemplary voice expresses her anger both at those around her 
who rejected her when her HIV antibody positive status became known, and at those 
who claimed to understand how she felt, who she considered to be patronising her. 
The voice, however, goes on to describe how she was eventually able to cope with 
the stress that such attacks created, not least through establishing for herself 
community with the Body Positive women's group, which accepted her with neither 
conditions nor reservations, provided strength and succour, and thereby enabled her 
to face the future positively. Once again, this narrative stands almost as a parable, 
from which the reader can discern what to do if suffering similar miseries - s/he must 
be positive in the face of them and can best achieve this by entering the preferred 
community which the Body Positive Organisation and Newsletter provide. This can 
be done either by joining an actual Body Positive meeting group, or, more 
immediately, by choosing to occupy the implied reader position that texts such as 
these construct. 
Not all the texts have such an optimistic finish, however. Indeed A Painful, Lonely 
Reality (BPN 159: 2) directly addresses the question of doubting the preferred vision 
of positivity, through a voice which has only quite recently (within the last two years) 
received an HIV positive diagnosis, and who has not reacted to this with unbridled 
positive resolve. Indeed, the focus throughout this piece is the severe physical pain 
and psychological injury which HIV infection brings - it is despair, pain, loneliness, a 
sense of being controlled by the virus, and "a longing for it all to end" which 
characterise the account. And, in contrast to most other similarly confessional 
articles in the Body Positive Newsletter, this pessimism is left unresolved by any 
comforting up-beat commentary which might re-establish hope. 
Textually, however, this article does not stand alone, and must be considered in its 
relation to another piece with which it shares the page, the article cited previously 
Positive Lives: Responses To HIV. This second article is a review of an exhibition of 
photographs, presenting images of people who "do not seek our approval but are 
worthy of our respect" - that is are exemplars of what a good HIV/AIDS in/affected 
person should be, their presence in the text creating the possibility of an 
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'instrumental' ethical relation (Osborne 1998) - and whose responses to their 
suffering are described using such adjectives as "defiant" and "uncompromising" 
(terms which deliberately contradict dominant negative images of people with AIDS 
- cf Gilman, 1988; Mort 1987). In this account, then, the suffering caused by 
HIV/AIDS, although not denied, is nevertheless utterly squashed by positivity. 
The relation between these two articles established by their position on the page has 
an interesting effect on the implied reader subject position, in that it allows the two 
pieces to work in tandem; the former, despite it's message of isolation, constructs a 
position in which the implied reader is in communion with the textual voice, within a 
'community of pain and loneliness'. This positioning of the implied reader also 
serves as an invitation to any (presumed) HIV positive actual reader to achieve 
community with the text in similar fashion, by identifying the description of the 
despair into which HIV infection pushed the voice with their own situation. The fact 
that the account does not resolve itself on a positive note has the effect of making the 
account credible, as to do so might give the impression that the textual voice's 
description of its initial misery was exaggerated or false. However, whereas the 
implied reader of the first article is someone who feels the hopelessness which can 
come with HIV in/affectedness, the implied reader of the page as a whole recognises 
the need for and worth of positivity, and, indeed, is equally a member of the 
'community of the positive' created in the adjoining article, as s/he is a member of the 
'community of pain and loneliness' articulated by the former. In this way, the text is 
managed such that positivity can be maintained as the central ethical necessity of 
HIV/AIDS in/affected subjecthood, but without denying the often deeply unpleasant 
aspects of life with HIV. 
When taken at a personal level, all of the above accounts (with the possible 
exception of A Painful Lonely Reality) doubtlessly display an admirably affirmative 
approach to HIV infection, and the sort of analysis herewith undertaken may seem 
churlishly critical. Such criticism is certainly not the intent of the analysis, however; 
all that is intended is to make the point that all forms of positivity need to be 
constructed, need some sort of technology of thought by which they can be 
articulated, and which will give that positivity its shape, will establish the 
possibilities of what it is to be positive. It is at this level that the analysis is aimed. 
Within the Body Positive Neit'sletter this technology is a function of the editorial 
process, of the selection of articles, or, as in the above example, of their 
juxtapositioning, a process which connects the axis of community which centres on 
positivity with the previously discussed political axis. 
Going back, for example, to the two articles just described, in order to escape the 
'painful lonely reality' of life alone with HIV, the reader must join the 'community of 
positivity', but in order to do that the reader must submit to those political obligations 
of truth which define what being positive means in Body Positive's terms. In other 
words, the reader has to make him/herself of one voice with the textual subjects 
constructed in the second article as exemplary members of that community, who, as 
well as being "worthy of our respect" and displaying "love and strength", are also 
those who chose to celebrate the "perverse and risque" in section 5.3.1. Such people, 
then, are the preferred role models by following whose example those newly 
diagnosed as having HIV can come to terms with their own irreversibly altered state 
of being. Patton (1988) has noted how anyone who has AIDS is likely to become 
'queer by association', such is the link between the syndrome and gayness. The Body 
Positive Newsletter, rather than seeking to abnegate such an assertion, has employed 
the fact of it as a device by which to construct a particular vision of an ethical 
positivity. 
That positivity is the desired end, but the specific positivity apposite within the 
(implicitly politicised) community established by the discourse is further 
demonstrated in Rising Above It (BPN 165: 1), which seeks to exclude concerned 
HIV un-in/affected persons, by establishing two categories, 'they' (all HIV un- 
in/affected persons, regardless of qualification or intent, no matter how well 
meaning), and by implication 'we' (that is voice, reader and the rest of the HIV 
in/affected community). There are those who are HIV/AIDS in/affected, and there 
are those who are not, and only the former are given any credence. It is assumed that 
both voice and reader are on the 'we' side of the divide, again establishing 
community between these two parties, and allowing the largely unchecked 
lambasting of 'they' which follows in the text: however politely 'they' may ask, they 
do not really want to know the truth about the state of one's health as an HIV/AIDS 
in/affected person; further to that, 'they' can be expected to take out their frustrations 
at their own ineffectuality upon those who they proved unable to help or understand. 
Well meaning suggestions from the 'they' that to cope with HIV/AIDS one needs to 
"think positively/rise above it/not dwell on it etc, etc" can only leave HIV/AIDS 
in/affected people themselves with "feelings of inadequacy and worthlessness" (ibid). 
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The intended implication is certainly not, however, that 'rising above it and/or 
thinking positively' is a damaging occupation, a suggestion which would violate the 
code of positivity central to the magazine. On the contrary, it is just that 'they' cannot 
understand what it means to 'we' to be positive, and that "we do rise above it simply 
by getting through each day. " The free floating good intentions of non-community 
members are to be contrasted with (an almost romantic discourse of) the mundane 
exigencies of life with HIV (cf also Scatologically Speaking BPN 159: 5); 
"['They' are suggesting that] "if you think more positively you can change anything. " 
When all you're thinking is "where's the nearest loo? " because on top of everything 
else you happen to have diarrhoea that day. " 
(ibid) 
Throughout Rising Above It the incitement to positive thinking from persons 
excluded from the community is couched in such terms, as an insensitive and 
damaging assault on community members. However, once 'they' have ceased their 
bombardment, once one has successfully worked through "all the self doubt they 
have just dumped on you", it is possible to regroup, to re-establish a positivity, but 
one localised to the 'we' community, based on the realisation that the business of 
coping with HIV infection day to day in itself displays an astonishing positivity, 
assumed to be wholly beyond the comprehension of those not touched by the 
syndrome. This assumption is indicative of the general trend which exists in the 
Newsletter to construct a community where some kind of existential experience of 
HIV is seen as the factor which determines who is and is not to be considered a 
legitimate member of the HIV/AIDS in/affected community. Of course, however, 
existential experiences do not spring pre-formed into the minds of those who have 
them; like all other experiences they have to be managed and shaped according to 
some or other criteria, in order to make them meaningful, and it is just such a project 
- that is one which seeks to organise the experiences of people who are in/affected by 
HIV/AIDS - which can be seen operating in the textual community work done here. 
The Newsletter's various invitations to community, including (but not exclusively) 
that to community of positivity, provide a prefabricated and user-friendly mechanism 
by which form can be given to the unshaped experience of illness, such that it will 
come to be understood rather than just felt. At its most effective, this project would 
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establish a self-confirming cycle, wherein once the experience of illness has been 
made sense of in the Newsletter's terms -a sense which will reflect closely the 
politico-morally informed obligations to truth which exist within the publication - 
the fact that it is now comprehensible in such fashion will stand as evidence that that 
way of looking at the experience of being HIV antibody positive is the true way. 
This will in turn increase the likelihoods both that other newly sick individuals will 
accept that interpretation as the correct one (because of the ever increasing number of 
testimonial accounts of those who have gone that way before and benefited), and that 
individuals who have already comprehended their situation in such terms will 
continue to do so, becoming with each self-confirming interpretation of their 
experiences ever more certain of the truth of their approach. 
That a mechanism which operates in this way could be considered to be logically 
flawed in no way undermines the progressive aspirations of the overall project, 
though. Any attempt to make those people who are in/affected by HIV/AIDS more 
able to cope with their situation - in this case by establishing in them a positive 
outlook - should be judged according to its efficaciousness, not its theoretical 
coherence; and the evidence, in the form of such testimonial accounts given in the 
magazine of life with HIV/AIDS before and after joining the Body Positive 
Newsletter's HIV/AIDS in/affected community, suggests that within that community 
certain of the negative effects which life with HIV/AIDS brings can be successfully 
ameliorated by the adoption of just such a positivity. 
However, the invitation to enter this therapeutic ethical space of being is neither 
universal nor cost free; those who lack any kind of direct, lived experience of HIV 
are excluded, however sympathetic they may be, however well they may recognise 
their own ignorance. Neither is entry guaranteed, though, even if one has had such 
experience; one must first interpret it via the scheme of meanings provided by this 
project - as has been previously noted, those who fail to understand their own 
condition, their own experiences of HIV/AIDS in the terms required of them by the 
Newsletter, remain excluded, and regarded as rather immature, or perhaps even 
falsely conscious. Such negative attitudes towards those whose construction of lite 
with HIV/AIDS differs from the Newsletter's own suggest that an affirmative 
response to this limited invitation to be positive within the community is to be 
regarded as mandatory - the implication being that the ethical space constructed by 
the Newsletter is the only appropriate location for anyone and everyone who finds 
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him/herself to be HIV/AIDS in/affected. That is, the Newsletter is saying that if one 
is HIV/AIDS in/affected then one must be positive and must be so within the 
sanctioned community. 
And just to reiterate, that positivity, and that community - the ethical space within 
which positivity operates - are both informed by a particular set of politico-moral 
values, to which one must ascribe in order both to join the community and to be 
positive. This, it may be contended, is unsurprising; any community based on 
allegiance, and indeed any politics based on identity, necessarily establishes forms of 
exclusion for those for whom giving such allegiance is problematic. What is 
significant here, however, is the way in which the text combines such exclusionary 
dynamics with devices which make the political and moral space which the text 
constructs the only proper location for an HIV/AIDS in/affected person to inhabit. 
This is, though, no great issue for HIV/AIDS in/affected persons whose political and 
moral leanings are anyway broadly in tune with those of the community as 
articulated by the Newsletter, as is doubtless the case with many (perhaps a majority) 
of the actual readership. The cost to those whose views differ from the norms which 
Body Positive seeks to impose, however, may be greater, in that they will either have 
to subject themselves to the political and moral truth obligations established within 
the political axis of community, or remain excluded from the succour and support 
which the organisation provides. 
5.3.3 Anti-medical community 
One recurrent theme within the magazine is the failure of conventional medical 
practice adequately to cope with HIV in/affected persons, a concern which has the 
effect of ensuring that medicine does not become the principal discourse by which 
the truth of life with HIV is informed. One expression of this is that accounts of HIV 
related treatments made by those who have experienced them at first hand tend to be 
privileged over accounts from medically qualified personnel, a trend which is in tune 
with both the Newsletter's ongoing project to construct a relatively self-sufficient 
community of sufferers, which is as independent from medicine as possible, and its 
more general construction of the truth of HIV as something which is only accessible 
experientially. An example of such is Deepl_y Probing (BPN 154: 3) an account of 
those investigative procedures which the voice of the text has himself undergone, 
intended to convey to the reader those things of which s/he should be aware, but is 
unlikely to be told by his/her doctor. 
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The ignorance displayed by medical professionals of the phenomenological reality of 
enduring the various procedures is seen as problematic, the voice suggesting that 
none of the procedures he has had to endure were as bad as they sounded when 
described to him in the bald technical terms favoured by doctors; he contrasts, for 
example, the terror-inspiring leaflet designed to explain what a bronchoscopy is 
against the experienced reality - which is couched in terms of its being the actuality 
of the event; 
"What actually happens, however, is you don a surgical gown, lie down on the trolley, 
have an injection in the back of your hand and then wake up. Simple as that. No pain, 
no gagging, nothing. " 
(ibid) 
Sometimes, however, the doctors get it wrong in the other direction, and the 
procedure as experienced is worse than the description. An example of such is 
described in the voice's account of a motility test, which involves a balloon filled 
with saline solution being inserted rectally into the bowel. 
"What goes in, must come out and it was rather distressing to realise that I was leaking. 
I didn't know about the saline, so drew my own conclusions before being reassured by 
the doctor. They told me to bring a book to read, as you have to do this for half an 
hour. However, I found it hard to concentrate while someone was inflating a balloon 
up my backside... " 
(ibid) 
This experienced truth of being on the receiving end of such medical procedures is 
privileged over the detached accounts of them with which doctors would be familiar 
such that the voice even suggests that in training all doctors should have to do these 
things to each other, in order that they should gain the understanding they currently 
lack. Such questioning of medical competence, with the attendant problematization 
of the possibility of community with medicine, is a recurrent theme within the Body 
Positive Newsletter, although it is not often expressed with such good humour (cf 
Seven Years On and we're still here BPN 161: 1; Tuberculosis and HIV BPN 165: 1; 
Now Is Not The Time BPN 165: 5). 
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In the light of this the ethos of self-help (that is help within and of the preferred 
community) is privileged over medical expertise. As mentioned above, the place to 
be given to medicine is as a service to be drawn on as, when and if required. not as 
the guiding discourse by which the person with HIV/AIDS is to shape his/her 
existence. That place is reserved for the community, as ministered through Body 
Positive and other such organisations (the Terrence Higgins Trust for example), 
through the advice of friends who are of that community, and through publications 
like AIDS Treatment Update and the National AIDS Manual. The patient 
him/herself is considered to be the person who unquestionably has the best 
understanding of his/her own body and condition, and one's treatment programme is 
to be regarded as something to be negotiated between one's doctor and oneself. And 
if one's doctor is reluctant to approach treatment in such fashion then one should 
"shop around" to find one who will, using "approximately the same criteria you 
might use for choosing a plumber" (BPN 161: 5). 
Further to this, medical knowledge as articulated within the Body Positive 
Newsletter's textual community is subject to a politico-moral regulation, similar to 
that which applies to the concept of positivity, such that the technical-ethical and the 
politico-moral aspects of its truth cannot be separated; for example, in Weight Loss: 
A role for Growth Hormone and Anabolic Steroids? (BPN 163: 1) the promotion of 
the notion that proscribed anabolic steroids are good for preventing weight loss in 
HIV infected persons is made directly to imply that therefore HIV infected persons 
should be of a mind to oppose the general prohibition of the use of such drugs. The 
reader is placed into the politico-moral subject position of someone who regards the 
prohibition of anabolic steroid use as an infringement of personal freedom, by way of 
the incitement to adopt the technical-ethical subject position of someone whose 
interest in these drugs is solely to do with the preservation of his/her health. 
5.4 Summary and conclusion 
The three axes of community within the Body Positive Newsletter work together to 
engender in its readership a progressive positivity in the face of HIV, in keeping with 
the expressed aims of its parent organisation's vision statement. This is achieved by 
the construction of an ethical space of being, a location into which HIV/AIDS 
in/affected persons could and should position themselves which, once adopted, 
allows one to address oneself to the issue of HIV/AIDS in a forthright and forward 
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looking manner; it is a format for responding to HIV/AIDS, a guide for what work 
one needs to do upon oneself in order to gain a degree of protection from some of the 
many negative aspects which come with the syndrome. 
This project is actualised via the ongoing construction throughout the text of a 
certain ethical relation between the collected wisdom of the HIV/AIDS in/affected 
community and the implied reader(s) articulated within the text, the former acting as 
the master, the latter as student. At this level this relationship most closely 
resembles the Hellenistic model described earlier. Within this relationship the 
student is always on the borders of the community; s/he will be initiated into the 
body of the community when and if s/he reaches a certain understanding which is 
mature in the sight of the master community, but s/he is not sufficiently integrated 
with the community to be able to effect change in it through challenging its dictates. 
Any such resistance would lead only to exclusion. Although the specifics of this 
relation between community wisdom and implied reader vary from article to article, 
there are certain constants, or at least recurrent themes: 
The community/master's authority is in part grounded in its phenomenological/ 
existential experience of HIV/AIDS - it is this which gives it the right to say it knows 
better than professional medicine about certain aspects of both the reality of having 
HIV disease and what is therapeutically appropriate for those who have it. It is the 
implied reader's assumed similar experience which affords him/her the chance to 
become a member of the community, so long as s/he ensures that that experience is 
shaped in certain ways. In other words, included in the technical-ethical responses 
s/he must make in order to enter the community are certain politico-moral truth 
obligations (ones which are in line with the general 'alternative' politico-moral 
stance). The frequent statement and restatement in the text of these preferred 
responses in a multitude of specific contexts serves as a ready-made mechanism by 
which to inform the understanding any actual reader has of his/her experience of 
being HIV/AIDS in/affected. 
So it is, then, that despite a certain rhetorical similarity to the Hellenistic model of 
ethical instruction, upon closer examination the ethical relation constructed within 
the Body Positive Newsletter seems more akin to those relations described by 
Foucault (1988; 1993) as existing in Christian monastic environments, which 
demanded of the student and the master alike ongoing obedience to a certain (moral 
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as well as ontological) truth discourse. Within this relationship, individual mastery 
was only to be obtained by complete submission to the discourse involved - the 
abbot's authority over the ordinary monks resided in the former's more complete 
subsumption of himself to the relevant truth obligations. A similar situation can be 
seen with regard to the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', which, like the church, 
exists very largely as an institutionalised reflection of the truth discourse to which 
those individuals seeking entry must accede. This discourse on the truth of life with 
HIV/AIDS is to be subjected to control. Foucault discussed procedures by which the 
conditions of application of a discourse could be determined, by which rules could be 
imposed upon the individuals who exist in relation to such discourses. He described; 
".. a rarefaction.. of the speaking subjects; none shall enter the order of discourse if he 
does not satisfy certain requirements.. " 
(Foucault 1984a: 120) 
While it must be acknowledged that Foucault was discussing very different types of 
discourse from those considered herein (his argument was to do with the ways in 
which doctors - who are officially recognised in a way that the textual voices 
examined here are not - gain the right to make medical statements), it is not 
implausible to contend that the Body Positive Newsletter, in its role as the medium of 
the community, operates a highly similar technology of rarefaction, ensuring that 
membership of the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community', and the acquisition of the 
attendant right to speak, involves the surrender of those possibilities of being which 
contradict that truth discourse. 
These politico-moral truth obligations can be seen in the ethical responses demanded 
of the reader. The principal such response is to be positive in the face of HIV/AIDS. 
Responses such as despair, fatalistic apathy or spiteful anger (rather than anger which 
is focused and directed towards progressive and probably collective action to deal 
with the practical and policy issues raised by the syndrome) are understandable, but 
are not to be viewed as realistic options - one must triumph over the challenge of 
HIV/AIDS, at least in attitude if not in body, and an ongoing failure to be 
appropriately positive would also be likely to result in exclusion from the 
community. It might well be argued, though, that such prescriptions are justified on 
purely technical-ethical grounds, and give no evidence of any mandatory politico- 
moral truth. However, not everything which might conceivably be considered a 
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positive response is deemed to count; the very idea of positivity is policed such that 
it becomes an expression of the obligatory politico-moral truth discourse. The 
ethical work involved in becoming and being positive is, then, tied up with the 
adoption on the part of the reader of the correct views - for it is only the community 
which really understands what it is to be positive, and that understanding reflects its 
politico-moral commitments. 
Further to this, the HIV/AIDS in/affected community as constructed by the Body 
Positive Newsletter is presented as the only appropriate place for an HIV/AIDS 
in/affected person to be. The possibility of finding an alternative but equally 
satisfactory ethical space from within which to deal with being HIV/AIDS 
in/affected is severely discouraged. It is, for instance, presented as impossible to 
thrive as an HIV/AIDS in/affected person amongst those who are not so in/affected, 
because of their lack of the special knowledges and experiences which come with the 
disease, and which set one apart. But the most significant example of such a closure 
of an alternative space of being is found in the Newsletter's constant attacks on 
medicine, which criticism serves to problematize severely the possibility of coping 
with HIV/AIDS through becoming a model patient, that is through subjecting oneself 
to professional medical knowledge alone and directly, without first having done 
ethical work on oneself such that one always understands that knowledge through the 
filter of the community's preferred (politico-moral) gloss. 
Medical knowledge is admitted to the community because its ability to prolong the 
lives of those who are infected with HIV means that to exclude it completely would 
not only be absurd at a practical level, but would also undermine the Newsletter's 
claim to authority. As it is, the Newsletter is able to reinforce its position as an 
ethical authority discourse by aligning itself to those bits of medical knowledge 
which have some demonstrable efficacy, whilst simultaneously distancing itself from 
those aspects which are clinically, theoretically and politico-morally doubtful. (This 
process sometimes works in reverse, where the authority which the Newsletter has 
successfully afforded itself is used to give credence to a politico-morally appropriate 
but therapeutically questionable medicine, such as in the last instance given in 
section 5.3.3. ) 
In sum, then, to inhabit the ethical space of being constructed for HIV/AIDS 
in/affected persons by the Body Positive Newsletter, one must be or become of an 
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'alternative' politico-moral bent; one must be or become positive, as that concept is 
interpreted through those politico-moral truth obligations; one must have or acquire a 
certain technical-medical competence, again regulated by the same politico-moral 
elements. And one must do all this in a spirit of communal activity, in which one 
realises one's own potential as an HIV/AIDS in/affected person by deferring to, by 
becoming one with, the communal will, as embodied in the word of the Ne%t'sletter. 
Acceding to such demands can reap for one a very good return - history gives clear 
testament to the improvement in actual material quality of life which successful 
communal action can bring, not to mention the psychological advantages to be had 
simply by recognising and being in contact with others who are suffering a similar 
fate to one's own. In order to achieve such gains in the concrete political world, 
though, any such movement would need develop something akin to the kinds of 
politico-morally informed ethical technologies it has been the task of this chapter to 
try to bring out, technologies by which affected individuals can both order their 
conduct and come to understand the truth of their own experience - for if one is 
trying to change the world by means of identity politics, then one must have some 
mechanism by which to construct a politically potent identity, which is, ideally, at 
one and the same time both able to be shared by the group and relevant and adaptable 
to each individual actual or potential member of that group. Such universality is, 
however, always an ideal and could never be perfectly achieved in practice. 
So it is then, that whilst those individuals whose lives prior to becoming HIV/AIDS 
in/affected were such that the adoption of that new identity is a relatively small and 
comfortable transformation will doubtless benefit greatly from making the jump, 
others, those who find that to make the shift involves their doing a far greater 
violence to themselves, and yet others who find the change demanded of them to be 
simply too great, will benefit rather less. Indeed, they may even find themselves 
worse off than before, because of the double exclusion which has come to bear on 
them - from non-HIV/AIDS in/affected society by dint of being HIV/AIDS 
in/affected and from the 'HIV/AIDS in/affected community' as a result of being 
unwilling or unable to adopt and adapt to the prescribed ways of being and thinking. 
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Chapter 6 
LIFE AND HOW TO LIVE IT: 
THE NATIONAL AIDS MANUAL 
The National AIDS Manual (NAM), as its name implies, is designed to be a bench- 
mark reference text, providing accurate and regularly up-dated information, 
principally on treatment related aspects of HIV/AIDS, and is avowedly intended to 
serve the needs of anyone who wishes to become informed about HIV/AIDS, 
regardless of their "experience, expectations, education and resources" (Q 1-2). 
Indeed, a list is given of those who it is hoped will benefit from the manual, which 
runs the gamut of those who may be considered to be 'HIV/AIDS in/affected'; it 
includes anyone diagnosed with HIV infection of AIDS, their carers, friends, lovers 
and families, voluntary helpers, and all manner of health professionals, researchers 
and counsellors (ibid). The NAM sets itself up as a major authority in this country 
on HIV/AIDS, to which any and every interested party should turn, irrespective of 
the reason for and nature of that interest, and indeed, anyone who wishes to inform 
themselves about the syndrome will very likely soon find themselves directed 
towards the Manual. Hence, the NAM is another gatekeeper or 'obligatory passage 
point' of HIV/AIDS knowledge (cf Latour 1987), similar to those considered in 
chapters 4 and 5, and close scrutiny of it is imperative for any study such as this, 
seeking as it does to describe and understand the dominant ('alternative orthodox') 
field of representations by which HIV/AIDS is constructed, and the forms of thought 
which underlie those constructions and their articulation. 
6.1 The NAM as an aspect of the 'alternative orthodoxy' 
It is not terribly contentious to argue that the NAM sets itself up as an authority 
(ethical or otherwise) on HIV/AIDS. However, to argue (as this thesis does) that, 
similarly to the work of Simon Watney and the Body Positive Newsletter, this 
authority both fits within and is an expression of the 'alternative orthodoxy' is rather 
less immediately compelling. There are, however, a number of indicators which 
suggest that such a claim is legitimate and that there exists a certain congruence 
between the NAM and those other two previously considered authorities, perhaps the 
most obvious of which being the simple facts that the NAM quite frequently refers to 
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the Body Positive organisation as a sound source of information, support and advice, 
and that Simon Watney is one of the trustees of the NAM charitable trust. 
In addition to such concrete indicators there also appear to be within the NAM a 
number of implicit politico-moral concerns which are familiar to the 'alternative 
orthodox' vector in general, although they are not so flagrantly displayed as in other 
expressions of that vector - for example, the shapes of the bio-medical and 
epidemiological truths of HIV/AIDS are akin to the 'alternative orthodox' account (cf 
chapter 3), and the characteristic privileging of certain HIV/AIDS in/affected sub- 
groups is also apparent. This is not, however, to imply that the NAM is covertly 
political, in the sense of having an intentional hidden agenda. Rather, the 
(ontological, moral, logical) precommitments which the NAM has, and which enable 
it to talk about HIV/AIDS at all, reflect political opinions which are sufficiently 
ingrained in the 'alternative orthodox' way of thinking HIV/AIDS that to its own 
point of view they appear not as political stances but as truths. These (political) 
truths then form the basis of the technical-ethical relationships which the NAM sets 
up with its (implied) reader, and which will be the focus of the greater part of this 
chapter. 
6.1.1 The NAM as an ethical technology -a manual about HIV/AIDS 
As befits a manual, the NAM's avowed principal objective, then, is neither to inspire 
agitation based on an uncompromising polemic, nor to provide emotional-cum- 
psychological-cum-spiritual support for HIV/AIDS in/affected persons, but is 
dispassionately to provide good, solid, accurate, practical, technical information, to 
enable its readers to negotiate the business of surviving and thriving as HIV/AIDS 
in/affected persons on a day to day basis. 
To such an end, the Manual's material is broken down into alphabetically labelled 
sections (beginning with the letter 'Q'), and numbered sub-sections, dealing with a 
multitude of pertinent issues, and cross-referencing is common. The information 
given is sometimes purely factual in character (cf sections T1-4, T2, T3), but often of 
a sort which can be considered more specifically ethical, in that it provides 
frameworks by which the reader can give shape to what may previously have been a 
vague sense of need, and turn it into something discrete and discernible upon which 
specific action may be taken; it provides the reader with convenient sets of life-style 
choices, appropriate for the HIV/AIDS in/affected subject, complete with practical 
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advice on how to go about actualising them once made (cf QI -4). All in all this 
approach makes for a highly 'user friendly' and compelling HIV/AIDS information 
technology; for people who are in/affected by HIV/AIDS, the National AIDS Manual 
is a veritable ethical cornucopia. 
6.1.2 Introduction to the analysis 
The aim of this analysis, then, is to explore the contention that the NAM's textual 
management of itself has two coextensive effects: on the one hand it establishes an 
authority discourse (which is at least in part ethical in character) which having 
certain politico-moral precommitments is 'alternative orthodox' in nature; on the 
other it creates sets of ethical relations between that authority voice and the (implied) 
reader by which the latter can come to know how HIV/AIDS in/affected persons 
should conduct their conduct. 
Given that these two aspects of the NAM occur concurrently and continuously 
throughout the work, it is also necessary to consider them simultaneously within the 
analysis. To explore the NAM's politico-moral orientation as if somehow separate 
from its ethical aspect would fail to give a satisfactory idea of the technology the 
NAM effects. For when one describes the NAM's political, moral and ontological 
positions on the wide variety issues on which it touches, one is also describing the 
limits of thought afforded to the ideal ethical subject - the implied HIV/AIDS 
in/affected reader. 
The dual politico-moral and technical-ethical operations of the Manual do, though, 
follow certain themes (as indicated by the sub-headings in the following analysis), 
some more pertinent to the former such operations, some to the latter, and focusing 
on each in turn affords a way of getting to grips with the extremely large and often 
unwieldy amount of discourse on HIV/AIDS to be found within its pages. However, 
the fact that the material is organised in this way is purely a methodological 
convenience, and should not be taken to indicate any order of priority; these various 
themes are all played out throughout the Manual, and operate simultaneously 
together to produce the ethical technology as a whole. 
The methods used in this analysis were very similar to those employed in the 
analyses in chapters 4 and 5, in that the entire text was subjected to a close reading 
from which a purposive sample of individual sections of the text was made, again 
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focusing upon those which were either considered to be ethically significant, or 
where they appeared to display moments when the text involuntarily betrayed its 
politico-moral underscoring in those slippages and marginalisations which are 
necessary to its self-logic, but where the politico-moral nature of which is 
inadvertent or in contradiction with the expressed stance being taken. For a more 
detailed account of the methodology which was brought to bear on this chapter and 
indeed which was employed throughout the thesis, please refer to section 2.5. 
6.2 The truth of HIV/AIDS 
The account of the nature of HIV/AIDS given in the NAM is highly similar to that 
accepted by those other texts examined above which are constitutive of 'alternative 
orthodox' discourse (cf chapter 3). This is most significantly manifested in the 
attitude the NAM expresses towards the HIV hypothesis. 
6.2.1. Negotiating closure - the truth of the HIV hypothesis 
For although it is readily recognised by the NAM that understanding of the exact 
pathogenic relationship between HIV and AIDS is incomplete (RI-2, R3-7), 
nevertheless doubts about the HIV hypothesis are proscribed. What is interesting 
here, though, is not the simple fact that the NAM is concerned to steer its readers 
away from dangerous speculations that HIV may in fact be harmless (given the 
current state of knowledge any responsible publication would do the same), but the 
way in which it does so; the NAM's approach serves to prevent its reader from 
regarding the HIV hypothesis as a hypothesis - that is, as the best theory currently 
available, and one which subsequent evidence may well upturn - and instead 
encourages him/her to regard it as an immutable article of faith. 
While such an approach doubtless reflects the fact that the NAM has to operate in 
relation to a regime of biomedical truth which was established largely independently 
of the efforts of the Manual, and in which such an attitude is requisite, it is 
nonetheless significant that the Manual itself 'buys into' and reproduces that truth 
rather than resisting it. The Manual aligns itself with the dominant account through 
careful and effective management of the area which is established within which 
legitimate debate can occur - by the management of the boundaries of doxa. For 
instance, the Manual admits to a number of uncertainties pertaining to HIV disease. 
However, while those uncertainties which imply no questions about HIV's position 
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as causal agent - such as that variable delay between infection and the production of 
antibodies, and the long and unpredictable latency period which the virus apparently 
displays - are discussed freely in the spirit of self-education (R1-3, R1-4, R3-6), those 
uncertainties which it is possible to interpret as throwing doubt on the HIV 
hypothesis (two such mentioned in the text are the debates around the issues of why 
one HIV infected person should develop AIDS while another remains perfectly 
healthy, and around the possible role of 'co-factors') carry stern implicit warnings that 
such questions are not to be asked; HIV is necessary and sufficient to cause AIDS. 
and this is what one must believe (R1-2, R3-6, R3-7). 
Scientific opinion is cited to reinforce this closure around the space of debate. The 
reader is told of the evidence from "literally thousands" of studies which 
"overwhelmingly confirms" the necessary role which HIV has in the development of 
AIDS, and also of the acceptance of such a view by "the vast majority of researchers" 
(RI-8, R2-4). Notwithstanding the question of the truth or otherwise of such a point 
of view, it can nevertheless be observed that the limits of thought which the NAM is 
seeking to set up here are premised on rhetorical manoeuvres fully as much as upon 
arguments: the claims made are not exact empirical ones - details of precisely which 
researchers and researches are being included here, and exactly how many of them 
say what, are lacking. What the reference to scientific opinion does, then, is confer 
authority on the textual voice of the NAM such that it may legitimately and 
compellingly advise its reader to take the preferred view on the HIV debate, without 
providing the reader with any easy way to take issue with the required perspective, 
should s/he wish to. This is the normal mode of deploying scientific evidence in the 
NAM (cf R4-2, R4-3) - as a rhetorical assistant to the successful negotiation of 
authority to speak. Another similar usage is worth taking as an example and looking 
at in detail. The claim is made that 
"Improving technology now makes it possible to isolate HIV from nearly 100% of 
people with AIDS. " 
(R4-2) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the NAM's language here is inaccurate on its own 
terms - people with AIDS are routinely only tested for the presence of antibodies to 
HIV, not the virus itself - the evidence afforded by these "nearly 100% of people 
with AIDS" is problematic on two counts, investigation of which will illustrate one 
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of the ways in which the negotiation of closure in the NAM is achieved. The first 
issue is that this claim is in contradiction with the information sympathetically given 
elsewhere in the NAM on WHO recommendations for AIDS diagnosis in Africa 
(wherein due to lack of laboratory resources a positive HIV test result is not a 
prerequisite of an AIDS diagnosis (R1-13)) which suggests that it is the rhetorical 
clout of the term "100%" rather its literal truth content which being called upon 
defend the HIV hypothesis. 
The second issue is that the argument is tautological. If one defines AIDS as a 
syndrome resulting from infection with HIV, then the fact that one can isolate 
(antibodies to) HIV in 100% of cases becomes a necessary effect of how one has 
chosen to define the syndrome, and cannot, therefore, be used to defend the 
contention that the HIV hypothesis is correct, because, given the terms of the 
definitions used, no other outcome is possible. This, in turn, problematizes the 
'scientific' status of the knowledge of AIDS and HIV as presented herein, because to 
disable in this way the possibility of the existence of a non-HIV infected person with 
AIDS, renders the conjecture that 'HIV causes AIDS' irrefutable, and therefore, in 
Popper's (1969: 33-65) terms, merely 'pseudo-scientific'. 
Again, the significant factor here is not what the implied reader is being asked to 
believe, but the way s/he is being asked to believe it; that HIV causes AIDS is an 
obligatory starting point of one's thinking, making it impossible to make any even 
gently speculative interrogation of that position without stepping outside doxa, and 
taking on all the risks which come with such a move - ridicule, exclusion, contempt 
&c. This sort of closure is found throughout the Manual, in the difference between 
the presentation of those treatment issues which are deemed legitimate, in which 
information is given in a style and quantity such that the reader can effectively make 
up his/her own mind about the matter in hand, and those which are not, in which 
information is presented in a form designed to predispose the reader to the preferred 
interpretation (cf AIDS without HIV? (R1-5-R1-6)). 
Indeed, such closure is a necessary condition of existence for such a thing as a 
manual - if practical advice is to be given it cannot be 
boundless without being next 
to useless. Neither, though, can it be completely restrictive without jeopardising its 
readers' acceptance of its claim to authority. Consequently the technique which the 
NAM employs uses the complementary devices of constructing spaces within which 
127 
the reader can make up his/her own mind, but which are bounded by fundamental 
tenets which must not be violated, the latter making the giving of specific advice 
possible, the former establishing and securing the text's authority to do so. 
6.2.2. Textual communities 
The kind of textual work we have been considering can be understood as an 
expression of what Woolgar calls the textual performance of community (1993). 
Similarly to the Body Positive Newsletter, the NAM articulates an HIV/AIDS 
in/affected community, although at first sight the boundaries of the latter's 
community seem to be slightly different from that of the former; whereas Body 
Positive's HIV/AIDS in/affected community retains a certain distance from medicine 
and medical science, the NAM's HIV/AIDS in/affected community inhabits much the 
same space as the particular and regulated medico-scientific one which is also 
established within its text. It is this encompassing of science within its HIV/AIDS 
in/affected community which allows the NAM to utilise science in the way that it 
does - it assumes the right to share possession of scientific knowledge, complete with 
the authority such knowledge affords, and thereby is able to delineate the legitimate 
field of debate. 
6.3 The policing of legitimate treatment issues 
The kind and degree of the NAM's policing of treatment issues - and thereby of the 
parameters of doxa - is perhaps best revealed by juxtaposing two of the themes dealt 
with at length within the text. One of the things which will be demonstrated by 
doing so is that the authority which the NAM establishes for itself, despite the 
processes described in the previous section, is neither fully dependent upon medico- 
scientific authority nor does it merely exist as a reflection or copy of that authority. 
Medico-scientific authority is one of the resources the NAM turns to at times in order 
to confer authority upon itself, but it does not do so consistently to the point that 
areas of thought which are politico-morally appropriate to the NAM's 'alternative 
orthodox' vantage point but are inappropriate to a medico-scientific one are 
excluded. It is the NAM which decides what of medicine and science is 
authoritative, not the other way around. The two themes in question, then, are the 
HIV and AIDS related commentaries of Peter Duesberg, and the role(s) which 
'alternative' or 'complementary' medicines may have in coping with HIV infection. 
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6.3.1. Duesberg 
In the late eighties and early nineties, much publicity was given to the views of Peter 
Duesberg, a virologist who held that HIV could not be the cause of AIDS, and that 
instead various 'lifestyle factors' were responsible. Such a position is anathema to 
the viewpoint of the NAM, and is unsurprisingly given very short shrift indeed. No 
area of debate or individual choice for the patient-reader is opened - Duesberg is 
simply wrong, and this is what one is to believe; what is provided for the reader is 
not an account of the strengths and weaknesses of his position, but "a discussion of 
the fallacies behind these arguments". This is significant not because one would 
necessarily expect it to be otherwise - it is, after all, entirely in line with the current 
regime of biomedical knowledge - but because this refusal to entertain or to allow the 
reader to entertain the possibility that Duesberg and others with similar views could 
have identified a genuine difficulty with the hegemonic truth of HIV/AIDS which is 
deserving of measured consideration, is at odds with the way in which the reader is 
encouraged to address him/herself to the majority of HIV/AIDS related issues dealt 
with in the manual, including others which go against the current of mainstream 
science (in particular 'alternative' and 'complementary' therapies, discussed in full 
below in 6.3.2). Whereas in most cases the reader is to be self-determining and 
make up his/her own mind within certain parameters, Duesberg's position is to be 
regarded as simply beyond the field of legitimate debate (cf Q3-4). 
Such gaps and problems as there are with the dominant account of HIV, in particular 
the lack of any thoroughgoing account of how HIV actually causes AIDS at a cellular 
level, are acknowledged but always downplayed, with the implication that although it 
is possible to take all the various unresolved issues as evidence that HIV may not be 
the cause of AIDS, to do so would be to make a specious error; under no 
circumstances is the reader to consider that any or all of the seeming problems with 
the dominant conceptualisation of HIV/AIDS (such as the different rates of disease 
progression amongst different individuals, the fact that it is possible to get most 
opportunistic infections without having HIV, or that definitions of AIDS seem to 
change with considerable frequency) indicate that AIDS is not a new, discrete 
syndrome, or that anyone can get it without being HIV antibody positive - no matter 
how things may appear, such assumptions are most definitely "mistaken". The 
reader must therefore be vigilant against the "alluring attraction" of anti-HIV theories 
(R4-3-R4-4). 
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Once again, the above position is negotiated by recourse to medico-scientific 
authority (R4-4), the successful deployment of which allows the NAM the 
opportunity to move from disposing of anti-HIV theories merely because of their 
incorrectness to making more overtly moralistic contentions; it holds that Duesberg 
and his supporters have argued that there exists an "'AIDS establishment"' which is 
deliberately suppressing unorthodox views, because of vested interests. This notion 
is presented as a scurrilous attack on noble, selfless "health educators and 
researchers" whose only aim has been to try to "prevent the harm caused by HIV to 
individuals and communities", and is doubly damnable because to say that Duesberg 
has not had a fair hearing is - it contends - patently untrue. The NAM's position is 
neatly encapsulated in the following piece of editorial, in which once again a 
rhetorical community of "AIDS researchers and scientists" lend their authority not 
only to the NAM's ontological claims, but also to its moral ones - science says 
Duesberg is wicked (R4-8); 
"It is, to say the least, unreasonable to impugn the motives of those working in the 
AIDS field in the manner in which Duesberg's supporters have. The truth is that his 
views are familiar to virtually all AIDS researchers and scientists, who have considered 
his arguments and concluded that they are at best ill-founded and at worst reckless and 
irresponsible. " 
(ibid) 
What is fascinating about the whole of the NAM's account of Duesberg is the 
question of why it is there at all, if his ideas are really as tired and anachronistic as 
the NAM portrays them. In truth the importance of Duesberg's commentary is not 
that he is the moment's principal anti-HIV hypothesis thinker at all - indeed, it would 
be hard to take issue with the NAM's own characterisation of his ideas as old hat - 
but that he continues to be an ogre against which up-to-date 'alternative orthodox' 
texts can rail. What is of interest here, then, is that the NAM devotes such a 
considerable amount of space and effort to debunking his views. It would seem that 
it does so because dissident voices like Duesberg's provide a frame of falsehood 
which can focus one's attention on their opposite, the truthfulness of 'alternative 
orthodox' accounts. Duesberg, then, comprises a useful 'other' in contrast to which 
the NAM can establish its own parameters, and as such the views herein presented as 
belonging to him are more a function of the NAM's own 'alternative orthodox' 
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construction of HIV/AIDS information than they are any real threat to that 
construction. 
6.3.2. Alternative medicine 
The mobilisation of medical authority against Duesberg should certainly not, 
however, be taken as evidence that the NAM articulates a strictly 'medicalist' 
discourse. The error of such an interpretation is to be seen in the marked contrast 
between the very uncompromising refusal to allow any consideration of the 
possibility that HIV may not be the cause of AIDS and the much more open attitude 
towards 'alternative' or 'complementary' medicine. Homeopathy, herbal medicine 
and acupuncture, for instance, are all afforded a degree of both respect and 
respectability, and the processes by which they are said to work are discussed 
without cynicism. Sometimes, though, their effects are explained (and so their use 
justified) in terms of modern bio-chemical theory and the reader is encouraged that 
s/he should educate him/herself "about the medical basis of any alternative 
treatment" (Glossary p8, Tl-25, T4-4, U2-3). Such understanding is a secondary 
matter however - the reader is to accept the worth of holistic and complementary 
therapies first (cf Q3-4), and then find out how they work in bio-medical terms as a 
pleasing addendum - if one favoured a particular complementary therapy but no 
satisfactory bio-medical explanation for how it worked was forthcoming, this would 
not be sufficient cause to abandon that treatment. 
The NAM does not advocate complementary medicines to the exclusion of orthodox 
allopathic bio-mechanical therapies, but sees the two approaches as truly 
complementary. The reader is expected to do the same 
"Only by being sympathetic and critical to both [orthodox and complementary 
therapies] can any individual find the right balance of therapy for his/her needs. " 
(Q3-4) 
One may infer from the above not only that the reader should not dismiss alternative 
therapies, but indeed that s/he cannot do without them. Although the NAM overtly 
disavows such an idea, stating at the start of its list of widely used complementary 
therapies that inclusion of a given treatment in its pages should not be taken to 
comprise a recommendation of that therapy (T4-3), nevertheless, its editorial 
decision that the use of such therapies comprises a legitimate treatment issue, that 
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they are within the field of doxa (in the way that theories suggesting that the HIV 
hypothesis is problematic are not), coupled with the amount of information given and 
the generally sympathetic tone of the commentary, seems to go against this averred 
position. 
Arguable as that claim may be, the order of the day is certainly to afford credence to 
ideas more normally dismissed within mainstream thinking. Work is done to rebut 
the idea that the users of complementary therapies are "cranks", and however odd the 
choices of people who use alternative therapies may seem to those who do not, such 
choices are to be respected. An acknowledgement of the fact that some practitioners 
of alternative medicine would be rightly called "quacks" is tempered by a reminder 
that there are also some conventional doctors are who are "dishonest and 
incompetent" (T4-2). A highly sympathetic reading is given to various 'psycho- 
immunological' therapies, which involve being trained to "engage in special fantasy 
images" of how your body is fighting disease, on the basis of the anecdotal 
recommendation of the many who have tried them (T4-5). Even things such as 
"Crystal therapy", which is very far detached from orthodox therapeutic thinking, are 
allowed a hearing on an equal status (T4-4). 
In order to understand the significance of the juxtaposition between the presentation 
of the cases for anti-HIV theories and for alternative therapies, one must first recall 
the premises upon which this thesis rests. It is not part of this work's remit to decide 
the truth or falsity of either perspective; indeed, if this analysis is to be successful on 
its own terms then it is essential not to make any such assumptions about the truth of 
claims being made. 
What is of interest here, then, is the way in which when faced with two areas of 
debate both of which are on the borders of the field of opinion, the NAM manages its 
text so as to place one of them quite firmly within it and the other equally firmly 
outside. The possibility of doing this resides in the underdetermination of 
HIV/AIDS therapies (cf Hesse 1980) - the lack of any compellingly effective 
approach to treating the condition means that either one of these two areas could 
readily be constructed as rightly being on the other side of the pale from that which it 
is in the NAM; for a while (in the early nineteen-nineties) the anomalies and 
difficulties with the HIV hypothesis were such that even some of the staunchest 
'alternative orthodox' voices were forced to acknowledge them, and at that time it 
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would have very easy for Duesberg's line of thinking to have been afforded a more 
respectable platform. Similarly, the considerable drawbacks associated with some of 
the agents given sympathetic readings by the NAM (the potentially fatal side-effects 
of compound 'Q', for example (T 1-25, T 1-31, U2-3 ). ) could well have led to a greater 
cynicism about alternative therapies in general. 
But the fact is that it is Duesberg's arguments which are constructed by the NAM as 
ignominious idiocy, whereas alternative medicine is constructed as something to be 
regarded cautiously but positively, a fact which reflects and reveals the underlying 
'alternative orthodox' politico-moral commitments of the text. Similarly, it is this 
underdetermination of the matter of how to deal with HIV/AIDS infection which 
allows the NAM to articulate medical authority when it is in line with the journal's 
politico-moral commitments, while still being able to dispense with that authority yet 
maintain its own authority through other textual means when medical perspectives 
are at odds with that politico-moral bent - if medicine could deal with HIV/AIDS as 
effectively as it can deal with measles then the space for negotiating such a non- 
medical authority would be virtually non-existent. 
6.4 Be positive! It might not be you! 
Similarly to the implied reader of the Body Positive Newsletter, one of the NAM's 
implied reader's principal tasks is to be positive in the face of his/her HIV/AIDS 
related adversity. This is not some call to collective bad faith, however, and it is 
emphasised that one should never "deny the reality of illness, and of terminal 
illness", given that it is with such a reality that so many HIV/AIDS in/affected people 
have had to come to terms. Nor should one allow oneself to be tempted to give 
"unrealistic reassurements" [sic] or overstate what possibilities currently exist for 
treating HIV infection, for these carry the danger of both undermining people's 
understanding of the necessity for treatment, and of raising unfounded hopes (Q3- 
6, U 1-9). 
6.4.1 Uncompromisingly positive. 
The project overall is neatly summed up in the NAM's proposal that both it and its 
readers need "to honestly confront the worst and nevertheless show what genuine 
grounds there are for optimism" (R3-20). However, the balance very definitely 
swings towards the latter aspect of this task; this is evidenced by frequent statements 
133 
which (in a manner which once again is reliant upon the underdetermination of 
HIV/AIDS knowledge) posit that in the uncertainties that obtain in current 
knowledge of the prognosis of HIV infection there is cause for personal hope (R3- 
20, U1-9). The variability of the effects of HIV infection which can be observed 
between different individual cases is the space in which such hope can be forged, and 
so is foregrounded; the reader should remember that AIDS is only one end of a 
continuum of possible eventual results of being HIV infected, with "staying well" at 
the other, and understand that the conception that there is a "one-way inevitable 
progression from asymptomatic HIV infection to illness with AIDS then to death" is 
false and unhelpful (Q3-6, R l -4, R l -8). (See also R3-20 & UI-9 for similar 
commentary. ) So one may legitimately hope to find oneself at the "staying well" end 
of the continuum, or if one has already become sick, hope to get better again to some 
degree. 
It is not merely the possibility of hope that the reader is presented with here, though; 
it is also the expectation that s/he will take a hopeful attitude to heart. That HIV is 
not a "one-way traffic system" leading inevitably to death, and that a diagnosis of 
having AIDS is not equivalent to having crossed "some sort of fatal barrier where 
there's no going back" (R3-2 1) is such an important ethical principle that rejection of 
it is to be deemed not merely "inaccurate" but "inappropriate", even in the face of a 
general ethos of pluralistic tolerance and self-determination (U 1-9). For instance, the 
point is made that a poor CD4 cell count (a marker which may lead one from having 
a diagnosis of 'asymptomatic HIV infection' to one of 'AIDS') is not a reason to fail 
to be positive in one's response to HIV infection - one must instead understand that 
someone with a low CD4 count may nonetheless be healthier "in both subjective and 
clinical terms" than someone with a higher count, and be aware that paying too much 
attention to monitoring such surrogate markers can lead to "considerable anxiety", if 
one believes that illness will imminently follow a poor result. Positivity always 
governs scientific knowledge, and a good HIV/AIDS in/affected person is a positive 
HIV/AIDS in/affected person (R3-14, S 1-6). Pessimistic prognostic statistics 
suggesting that over 90% of HIV infected people will eventually develop AIDS are 
also explained (away) in terms of "inappropriate" usage (U 1-25. See also Q3-6, R 1- 
3, R3-20). 
Similarly, studies which suggest that currently available therapies are not doing such 
a wonderful job are not allowed to tarnish the required positive outlook, but are to be 
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interpreted in its terms - data which seemed to show that HIV infected people have 
since the late 1980s survived the onset of AIDS for a shorter time than previously are 
to explained in terms of the success of prophylactic treatment - people with HIV may 
not be living any longer all told, but those who use prophylaxis develop AIDS later, 
so they have a longer period of good health (R1-5). In other words, prophylaxis may 
not have improved their quantity of life, but has improved their quality of life, so is a 
good reason to be positive. This positivity is likewise unrelenting in the face of 
certain of the most frightening of the conditions to which HIV infection may lead - 
neither blindness nor encephalitis can cause hope to fail to spring eternal (U4-9, U4- 
12). 
While one could never blame any population facing a scourge as terrible as AIDS for 
trying to find what little good there may be in their situation, it would certainly be 
possible to imagine an alternative HIV/AIDS related ethical discourse which was not 
wedded to positivity in this way. Once again, it is the underdetermination of 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS which is central here, in that it has opened a space for an 
implicit psychosomatics - that if one is sufficiently positive, then such force of will 
alone may be able to prevent you, the individual reader, from succumbing to the 
ravages which statistics suggest is likely to be the lot of someone who is HIV 
infected. 
Indeed, the NAM's apparently contradictory attitude towards statistics is illustrative 
of the primacy of the ethical necessity of positivity. The NAM constructs a (set of) 
reader subject position(s) in which the kind of logic the good reader brings to bear 
upon the informations with which s/he is confronted is dependent on the (politico- 
morally informed) ethical demands of the authority discourse, such that whereas 
pessimistic prognostic statistics are to be disregarded in accordance with the 
positivity principle - on the grounds that they can only give information about 
populations, not about any given individual's chances (cf Q3-6, R 1-5, R3-20, U l -25) - 
other similarly population orientated statistics are to be taken personally - notably 
those which are employed to establish the principle that safer sex is a good idea for 
each and every individual. In each of these cases, then, it is the desired ethical 
response which is to govern the logic the reader employs by which s/he comes to 
grips with the matter in question - data suggesting that 90% of people with HIV will 
develop AIDS and die within eleven years contradicts the principle of positivity, so it 
is expunged; data which suggests that populations where safer sex is widely practised 
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show lower incidences of new infections is in line with the need to be positive, so it 
is acceptable, not only in the form of knowledge of populations, but also as 
something which can be translated into individual ethical responses to HIV/AIDS. 
6.5 Education and empowerment 
Notwithstanding the importance of calls to positivity within the NAM, probably the 
principal ethical directive imposed on the implied reader within the text is that s/he 
should educate him/herself about HIV/AIDS related 'treatment issues'. The emphasis 
placed on this directive is such that for the NAM self-education is more than just an 
aspect of dealing with the disease; rather it is held to be integral to treatment itself. 
The implication of this is that treatment is conceived fully as much in an ethical as in 
a "scientific" (or any other) form, a state of affairs which fits well with the primary 
positivity ethic - self-education is one way of turning a positive attitude into action. 
6.5.1 The educational imperative 
The aim of enabling the self-empowerment of HIV/AIDS in/affected people through 
self-education is so central to the NAM that it shapes the manual's design, in terms of 
the way the material is ordered, the kinds of language that are used and the unusual 
amount of technical detail which is supplied for the reader's consumption. Indeed, 
one might well argue that the text's self-construction as a technology through which 
this self-educational ethical imperative can be actualised is what makes it a manual, 
rather than simply an encyclopaedia. The NAM is not just a source of information, it 
is a machine by which HIV/AIDS in/affected persons can deal with being HIV/AIDS 
in/affected through partaking in a variety of ethical activities for which the NAM 
provides a framework. 
Self-education is logically one of the first such activities, in that it provides the 
mechanism by which one can achieve the ultimate ethical end of becoming a well- 
rounded, informed, articulate, self-determining HIV/AIDS in/affected individual. 
Information gained through self-education is seen as the precursor to access to 
treatment, and is essential if the principle of giving one's informed consent to therapy 
is not to be meaningless (U2-2). It is argued that self-education, although perhaps 
demanding in terms of effort and self-confidence, will give one a sense of being 
actively involved in one's own therapeutic regime, which would be entirely lacking if 
one chose to remain in ignorance (ibid). Overall, self-education is to be viewed as 
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the most practical pathway to the best life possible for each individual HIV/AIDS 
in/affected reader, and is something which the communal authority voice of the text 
strongly recommends (Q2-5). 
Although it is acknowledged that some people will not want to be this proactive 
about their health care, and that such an attitude should be respected (Q3-3), 
nevertheless the preferred course for the reader to take is that of self-determination, 
but under NAM guidance. This principle of self-determination therefore can be seen 
to be a surface upon which may be articulated particular ethical ideals - the vision of 
self-realisation through education, coupled with a ready-made mechanism for 
supplying that education (the NAM) providing a powerful technology by which 
HIV/AIDS in/affected persons can have their understandings of themselves and their 
conditions informed. So it is, then, that passivity, although not formally proscribed, 
is definitely couched as the lesser option: respect may be due to those who choose 
such an approach, but the measure of that respect is to be reckoned against the 
greater good of self-education (Q3-3). 
The NAM's central aim, then, is the empowerment of those who are HIV/AIDS 
in/affected. Acquiring the relevant knowledge is the means by which to achieve this 
end. Such a task, of course, may seem daunting; note is made of the "motivation, 
time and energy" it requires, and of the fact that the relative newness of HIV/AIDS 
related research and therapy means there is a lack of easy "black or white" answers to 
the problems HIV/AIDS poses (Q2-2, Q2-4, U1-20). It is suggested, then, that in 
order to ease the burden of such obstacles to acquiring knowledge, and thereby 
power, what is needed is a guide, something born of previous experience - or indeed 
someone with that previous experience - which can show the safest pathways, and 
warn of any otherwise hidden and perilous pitfalls (Q2-2). 
In answer to this need the NAM sets itself up as a "step-by-step guide" to self 
education about HIV/AIDS (Q1-5). It aims to supply both a map of the alien terrain 
of HIV/AIDS treatment issues, and instruction in how to "map-read". It thereby can 
be seen to operate in both senses of the term guide - as an impersonal chart of the 
area concerned and as a personal (ethical) authority on it, the combination of these 
two elements enabling the reader to find the answers to his/her questions (Q2-2, Q2- 
5). An extended textual mechanism for the furtherance of this process exists, in a 
section entitled Learning about HIV/AIDS medicine (section Q2) in which the 
137 
manual outlines a recommended practical procedure for doing just that, and to which 
the reader is frequently referred throughout the rest of the text (cf T 1-3, U 1-24 & U2- 
4). 
The NAM, then, is setting up a situation in which it first establishes a need on the 
part of the implied reader (to take an active approach to the business of dealing with 
being HIV/AIDS in/affected) and having done this, it then provides a ready means by 
which that need can be met (by subjecting oneself to its authority), and at the same 
time closes alternative routes one might take (by problematizing the taking of a more 
passive approach to one's sickness, in which doctors rather than NAM community 
voices would hold the authority over the HIV/AIDS in/affected subject's self 
understanding and experience of the disease). This is a technique familiar to street 
preachers everywhere - who first tell their audience that they need God, and then 
offer to provide a leaflet explaining how to find Him - and is a highly effective way 
of establishing and maintaining the ethical authority of the truth discourse involved; 
for once the reader has accepted the need to take an active role in his/her therapy, 
then s/he will need constant guidance as to how to go about it, and such an ongoing 
requirement will confer authority on whoever or whatever the reader turns to in order 
to have it filled. 
6.5.2 Education in the community 
As in the Body Positive Newsletter, various forms of community are performed by 
the text (Woolgar 1993), which achieve, amongst other things, the making of the 
implied reader into someone who is open to educating him/herself about HIV/AIDS 
treatment issues. One of the ways in which this is achieved is by locating the voice 
of the text and the implied reader in the same space, often through use of the pronoun 
"we" (as in "we" need to do or understand such a thing) (cf Q3-3, U 1-20) or through 
constructing the voice of the text as that of someone whose claim to speak is simply 
that s/he has travelled a bit further down the same road that the reader him/herself is 
on (Q2-4). This establishes a didactic relation between the textual voice and the 
implied reader which is not so much that of a pedagogue to a student, as that of an 
old hand showing the ropes to a raw recruit - both voice and reader are 'in the same 
boat', so to speak. And this space into which the voice and the reader are being 
placed, as in other discourses examined within this thesis, comprises an HIV/AIDS 
in/affected community, from which the voice of the NAM springs (and to the 
authority of which it is subject), and into which the implied reader is being invited. 
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Right from the dedication on the opening page, where the reader is told that the 
"unfolding tragedy" of HIV/AIDS will only be halted if HIV/AIDS in/affected people 
"educate one another", the self-education process is to be located firmly within the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community (textually represented-cum-constructed through 
discussion of, for instance, the exemplary figures of the "large number of people with 
HIV" whose aim has been to become experts in the field, having found in the 
questions which being HIV/AIDS in/affected poses the motivation to embark on the 
auto-educational road), from whose experience the reader can learn, and whose 
previous personal and collective successes at all this can be the implied reader's 
inspiration (Q 1-6, Q2-2, Q2-4, U 1-2). 
Given such an emphasis, the object whose well-being it is that underlies the policy of 
empowerment through self-education is not so much the individual actual reader who 
may or may not slot him/herself into the implied reader position, but is this textually 
constituted HIV/AIDS in/affected community, personified in part by the textual 
voice and in part by the implied reader, both of which may be viewed as nothing 
other than two of the means by which this community is articulated. 
6.6 Celebrated deviance and uncelebrated nondeviance 
In a manner familiar to other exponents of 'alternative orthodox' discourse, the NAM 
privileges certain discursively constructed classificatory sub-groups of HIV/AIDS 
in/affected persons. Exactly which groups are deemed as deserving of special 
attention are on occasion expressly delimited; for instance, attention must be paid to 
"the needs of special populations such as women, working people, parents, gay men, 
drug users, ethnic minorities, etc. " (S3-21). Elsewhere when it is suggested that "all 
people with HIV" need to have a good relationship with their doctors, the list which 
qualifies how the NAM conceives the idea of "all people with HIV" ("women, gay, 
prostitutes, black, drug users or anyone else") shows again this leaning towards the 
privileging of groups which are normally socially marginalised (Q2-3). 
Out of these various named subgroups, some characteristically merit more of the 
text's attention and sympathy than the others. Intravenous drug users, for example, 
fair well - their habit is couched in terms of being 'use' rather than 
'abuse' of the 
substances involved (which are "recreational" rather than 'proscribed' (R3-18)), and 
as a group they are described as "criminalised" rather than 'criminal' - that is their 
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marginalised status is a function of pernicious social labelling rather than a result of 
their personal behaviour (Q3-3). These sorts of rhetorical moves serve to construct 
as 'normal' behaviour which is more frequently constructed as highly deviant. 
Much attention is also devoted to the special concerns of HIV antibody positive 
women. The questions of the effects of pregnancy on the progression of HIV 
disease, the importance of having regular cervical smears to test for the human 
papilloma virus (which may act as a co-factor, increasing the likelihood of someone 
with asymptomatic HIV infection becoming ill), the low research priority given to 
infections in women which are now considered to be HIV related, and the difficulties 
women have had getting access to clinical trials are all considered in some detail 
(R3-18-R3-19, S3-14). There is, though, one notable difference between the 
discussion in the NAM of the plight of women in relation to HIV/AIDS and those 
found in the other publications considered in this thesis, in that whereas the latter are 
very much concerned with the HIV related needs of lesbians, this group are hardly 
mentioned at all by the Manual. 
6.6.1 Gay men 
Without a doubt, however, it is gay men which are the most privileged of the "special 
populations", and as such comprise the journal's ideal readership. This emphasis is 
to be found both overtly and more implicitly, in the choice of language and advice, 
some of which is such that in the context of most health education texts it would be 
somewhat bizarre, and is only not so because this text's ideal constituency is gay 
men. For instance while discussing early theories about the causes of AIDS, one 
putative factor cited was "a preference for 'receptive anal intercourse' (getting 
fucked)" (RI-7). This is worth unpacking a little; the use here of inverted commas 
around the formal, perhaps putatively official language, coupled with the bracketed 
translation, ironises the former, implying that it is an absurdly staid way of 
expressing what is to be considered a commonplace happening. Notwithstanding 
that the linguistic style of the expression "getting fucked" is not the one usually 
employed within health education documents, it is also significant that that phrase is 
made to equate to receptive anal intercourse rather than vaginal intercourse. 
The NAM contains many similar such textual events which although not explicit 
enough unequivocally to define its ideal constituency as gay men, nevertheless 
display a certain congruence with such a state of affairs, and a related incongruence 
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with the white, middle-class and heterosexual ideal constituency which would be 
more usually found in health education materials. Use of the term "lovers", for 
example, rather than 'partners' is somewhat suggestive of a gay readership (U3-9, U4- 
13). Similarly, the inclusion of "having sex" as an option for coping with 
sleeplessness (along with warm baths, hot milky drinks and listening to relaxing 
music) (U4-12) is something which would be very unlikely to appear in a run-of-the- 
mill heterosexually orientated health education document, but is quite in keeping 
with the laudably proud frankness with which matters of sexuality are often 
discussed by gay men (cf Watney 1994: 136). 
Other more concrete examples of how the NAM's ideal readership is constructed as a 
gay one can also be found; for instance in a discussion of what help is available if 
one should go blind the reader is told that a "range of newspapers" is available on 
cassette, the principal example of which given is Capital Gay (U4-13), and it is 
proposed, within the section on staying healthy, that if one wishes to travel to another 
country, in addition to researching the local medical facilities, one should also 
investigate attitudes and laws towards homosexuality as if this were a more or less 
universal need (U3-4). 
At one level this emphasis is unsurprising to the point of being almost unworthy of 
commentary. Doubtless the majority of the NAM's actual readership is comprised of 
gay men, and those elements of the NAM's text highlighted above are no more than 
reflections of this fact, they are simply examples of the journal responding to the 
perceived needs of that majority. Given that this is the case, then the situation is 
slightly problematic in that such a textual emphasis will necessarily (but 
inadvertently) establish exclusionary dynamics of the sort discussed in previous 
chapters, which come to bear on those groups and HIV/AIDS in/affected persons 
who cannot easily relate to the ideal constituency which the NAM constructs for 
itself. However, this is not the whole of the picture; such a response on the NAM's 
part could not alone explain why while the needs of some subsections of the journal's 
readership are highlighted in the manners discussed above, one particular group - 
hxmophiliacs - are consistently marginalised by the text. This fact is in need of 
some examination and explanation beyond the idea that it is a mere oversight on the 
part of the NAM. 
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6.6.2 Haemophiliacs 
The construction of people with haemophilia, and of hemophilia as an HIV/AIDS 
related issue, is qualitatively quite different from that of privileged HIV/AIDS 
in/affected population sub-groups such as gay men, intravenous drug users and 
women. Despite the fact that it is quite possible to construct hemophiliacs and their 
friends and relations as a very severely HIV/AIDS in/affected group (with 1,220 
haemophiliacs HIV antibody positive, out a total population of about 6,000 (circa 
1991, data from the Haemophilia Society) and haemophiliacs comprising some 44% 
of all reported AIDS cases amongst adolescents (Forsberg et al 1996)), hxmophilia 
gets very few positive mentions in the NAM, beyond a definition in the glossary, and 
occasional specific consideration in the frequently given lists of 'questions to ask 
yourself (Glossary p7, U4-9, U5-9). 
More often than not, then, haemophilia, and those who suffer from it, are mentioned 
only incidentally, for instance when discussing how HIV used to be transmitted 
through blood to blood contact in the form of transfusions of blood products, 
although this is certainly a secondary concern to the sharing of equipment by 
injecting drug users (R1-2). More usually though, haemophilia and hemophiliacs 
only feature in relation to discussion of the plight of some or other of the preferred 
groups. In the following, for example, hemophiliacs attain visibility only by virtue 
of their being a useful control group to set alongside cyto-megalo virus infected gay 
men. Notice in particular the way in which the construction of haemophiliacs slips 
quickly from "people with haemophilia" to "stored blood samples". 
"So far, the only factor that has been shown to be associated with an increased risk of 
someone with HIV becoming ill is indeed infection with a herpes virus - namely CMV. 
Most gay men are infected with CMV, so studies aimed at finding out if CMV was a co- 
factor were carried out in groups where CMV infection is less common. The best group 
for this purpose is people with haemophilia. An added advantage of doing this is that, 
quite often, stored blood samples can give accurate information as to just when someone 
became infected with HIV. Without a defined date of seroconversion it is much harder 
to track the rate of disease progression. " 
(R3-17) 
There are several other similar examples, wherein haemophiliacs do not appear in 
their own right, but only as useful pieces of evidence to support some other 
142 
contention: the appearance of immune deficiency in haemophiliacs in 1982, related as 
it was to their receiving regular injections of blood products, supported the case for 
supposing that AIDS was resultant from an infectious agent (R4-2): the cases of 
haemophiliacs and of drug users are both cited as controls to the conclusions of a 
study of 6000 gay men in San Francisco about the likelihood of progression from 
HIV infection to AIDS (R3-21); the sickness patterns of hemophiliacs and their 
wives together with those of infected children of HIV antibody positive mothers 
compared to their uninfected siblings serve to prove that it is only when one is 
infected with HIV that one may develop AIDS (R4-2); the failure to recruit of a trial 
of AZT versus a placebo in people with haemophilia is given as an instance 
supporting the editorial contention that placebo controlled trials are not the best way 
forward in HIV related research (S3-3). 
While it could be argued that none of these mentions is particularly significant in 
themselves, they become significant when one realises that these are the only sorts of 
mentions which hemophiliacs get - the sort of politico-moral concern for the 
privileged population groups detailed above is entirely missing. 
6.6.3 Explaining this disparity 
To explain the disparity between the commentaries the NAM makes pertaining to 
gay men at one end of the scale and hemophiliacs at the other merely in terms of 
some arbitrary anti-haemophiliac prejudice or oversight on the part of the Manual 
would be somewhat simplistic, and would fail to do justice to unquestionably 
progressive aspirations of the text. Nevertheless, there is an unavoidable tension, 
which remains in need of explanation, between the publication's averred intent to 
serve the interests of all HIV/AIDS in/affected people and this differential coverage. 
The answer to this lies, perhaps, in the different types of communities which the 
various groups here discussed articulate. 
All of the groups which the NAM privileges were to some extent politicised prior to 
the event of AIDS and their being connected with the syndrome. Consequently, the 
kind of subject they articulate is much more amenable to adaptation into an active 
HIV/AIDS in/affected subject than the relatively unpoliticised and passive 
haemophiliac subject is. Of those politicised sub-populations available, gay men 
came to the fore largely because of historical circumstances: it is readily arguable 
that as a group they have been most affected by HIV/AIDS; the syndrome appeared 
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at a time when the vanguard of popular opinion (as opposed to a far-sighted liberal 
minority) was beginning to view homosexuality as an acceptable alternative to the 
heterosexual norm; gay men had a history of activism which was ripe for adaptation 
to the new challenge of HIV/AIDS (cf Watney 1994: 134,244-245) 
In contrast, haemophiliacs lacked any such coherent, active and politically minded 
cohesion - and this is what explains their invisibility in the text. In its role as a 
manual, what the NAM is attempting to do is to construct an ethical subject position 
by which HIV/AIDS in/affected persons can best live with their in/affectedness. 
What haemophiliac identity there was prior to the advent of HIV/AIDS was not such 
that it lent itself readily to the kind of active person with HIV/AIDS becoming which 
the NAM sees as the best hope for those touched by the disease. Consequently, 
according to the NAM's vision of things, it would be better for any actual person 
with haemophilia who engages with its text to abandon any already present self- 
conception as a haemophiliac, and reconfigure himself as an HIV/AIDS in/affected 
person along lines more in keeping with the ideal constituency the NAM articulates. 
Accordingly, those few representations of haemophiliacs which the NAM makes are 
depersonalised such that they are not easily responded to in an ethical fashion, 
thereby marginalising the possibility of an 'HIV/AIDS in/affected hemophiliac'. 
In this context, then, the various privileged sub-groups and the ethical subject 
positions which emanate from them comprise a selection of resources each of which 
can, under the right circumstances, assist any actual reader with the ethical work 
necessary in order to come to terms with being HIV/AIDS in/affected. The principal 
of these resources is the 'gay man' subject position, because that identity has the 
closest fit with the demands made of the 'active, positive, self-determining person' 
with HIV/AIDS subject position which the NAM constructs. This is not to say that 
the two positions are entirely co-extensive, but that the affinity which exists between 
the 'gay man' subject position and the ideal 'HIV/AIDS in/affected person' subject 
position means that the former can be made a highly useful device for promoting and 
articulating the latter, in a way for which the haemophiliac identity is quite unsuitable 
- being as it is quite passive, unconnected with radical politics, and generally 
in tune 
with more traditional patient roles. 
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6.7 Community activism 
The kind of construction of the good HIV/AIDS in/affected person as being one who 
employs one of the preferred models described above as the basis for the ethical 
work they need to do upon themselves in order to become a competent HIV/AIDS 
in/affected individual allows the NAM to articulate the idea that there exists a 
relatively homogenous HIV/AIDS in/affected community. This idea is itself 
premised on the notion that all HIV/AIDS in/affected people are more or less in same 
boat - that is to say, because all of the preferred ethical resource subject positions are 
aligned by certain shared politico-moral and ethical qualities (for example, positivity, 
activity, resilience and resistance to historical, social and political injustice, abuse 
and oppression), so a similar alignment can be afforded to any HIV/AIDS related 
identities which are constructed using them as a model. 
Hence, despite the fact that the experiences of HIV disease which any two HIV 
antibody positive individuals may have may be quite dissimilar, it is possible to 
claim that the interests of all such people, wherever they happen to be on the 
continuum from asymptomatic infection to severe immunosuppression with manifold 
opportunistic infections, are common, in as much as they are all engaged in a historic 
fight against an unprecedented health problem. The "perceived differences" between 
HIV/AIDS in/affected people are therefore to be downplayed, this providing, in the 
form of a rhetorical community which is solid and which displays solidarity, a sound 
basis for activism (RI-5). This kind of approach serves to construct the good 
HIV/AIDS in/affected subject not merely as active, but as an activist. The account 
below of the NAM's conception of what an activist is and does can be seen to be an 
authority discourse of the 'instrumental' type - that is in which the ethical qualities 
displayed by the textually constructed 'community activists' should quite simply be 
imitated by the (implied) reader (Osborne 1998). 
6.7.1 The ethos of activism 
One of the ways the exemplary nature of activists is achieved is through celebration 
of the achievements of AIDS activism, to which the NAM devotes a considerable 
amount of space. A history of such activism is drawn which has it rooted in the 
traditions of American gay community activists, who it was, along with a number of 
gay doctors, first developed the idea of safer sex. Similarly, "community based 
organisations" had a central role in establishing what the needs of those who were ill 
with HIV/AIDS were. What emerged out of this was a tendency for 'unofficial' 
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organisations, which were providing both health education and services for the sick, 
to become discrete from 'official' medical and health care institutions. This history 
allows gay community / HIV/AIDS activists (who are more or less undifferentiated 
in the NAM's account) to be constructed in a heroic light, as those to whom you as an 
HIV/AIDS in/affected reader are beholden (S3-2). 
AIDS activists, then, are made the champions of the people, the heroic vanguard of 
the community to which the implied reader belongs, and whose example s/he is 
incited to follow in his/her own conduct of conduct in relation to HIV/AIDS. For 
example, campaigning or lobbying for hospitals to provide regular sessions giving 
up-dates on treatment options is the correct response to their absence, rather than 
resigned acceptance (Q2-6, U2-2). And although it is acknowledged that the sorts of 
problems which have dogged American research and spawned US style activism are 
not nearly so pronounced in the United Kingdom, because science over here is not so 
competitive as in America, and there exists here a "strong tradition of socialised 
medicine" (S3-15), nevertheless activism is still the order of the day, albeit in an 
almost latent, and certainly far less confrontational, form. Activism over here is 
more a question of being aware of the relevant issues so that if and when the time 
comes for more proactive measures one is well prepared; it is at present more a war 
of position than of manoeuvre (cf S3-18). 
Notwithstanding this, the model is definitely one in which the American form of 
activism is seen as the progenitor of the European version, the former displaying the 
more extreme character it has because of the more difficult circumstances it faced, 
and the possibility that the advent of a similar level of difficulty for the latter may be 
only a matter of time is to be recognised. Simon Watney's idea of a "natural history 
of treatment activism" is cited, in which it is proposed (in language that makes 
Watney's idea sound like a technical theory) that 
"The American experience suggests that a critical mass of discontent with the existing 
system of research and medical care needs to be reached before activism around 
treatment issues becomes militant and widespread. " 
(S3-19) 
a process slowed in Europe by traditions of socialised medicine which hinder 
attempts to challenge medical power. There is one important difference between this 
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account and how the NAM sees things though, and it is in the all important relation 
between HIV/AIDS in/affected persons and doctors; the above is followed by 
comments to the effect that it has also been argued that the relative readiness of 
British doctors to accept criticisms emanating from the community and to learn from 
"the American experience" make such a militant approach unnecessary. Indeed, 
pains are taken to emphasise that in the UK doctors involved in treating people with 
AIDS have been amongst the most energetic of campaigners and that the notion that 
doctors and HIV/AIDS in/affected community members are fundamentally at odds 
"does not represent the world as it really is". Thus in this respect a distinction is 
drawn between American activism and its British counterpart which the NAM is 
here trying to construct, although the former still remains the inspiration for the latter 
(S3-19-S3-20). 
6.7.2 The ethics of activism 
The combination of celebratory accounts of American activism and the cautions 
about how British activism differs from it can be read as ethical directives to the 
NAM's implied reader, who should be moved him/herself to action by the heroic 
deeds of American activists, but the action taken needs to be appropriate to the 
British situation; the point is made, for instance, that to campaign against 
bureaucratic institutional slowness as if this problem were as pertinent here as it was 
in the US would be "foolish" - instead, it is suggested, in a move which if you the 
reader happen to be an asymptomatic person with HIV is your ethical cue to 
activism, that 
"There is likely to be much greater pressure from a-symptomatic people with HIV for 
early testing of drugs, and once again the danger exists that in these different European 
circumstances, research into opportunistic infections will be seen as the lowest 
priority. " 
(S3-20) 
This model - follow the American example 
in as much as that they are active, but do 
not simply ape what they have done - is dominant throughout the NAM's account of 
activism, and some interesting work is done to preserve it, for instance through 
justifying the past illegal acts of American activists - so as not to allow any 
tarnishing of their heroic image - without inciting current British readers to 
follow 
their example too closely (S3-20). Instead, British AIDS activism now needs to 
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reflect a recognition of the degree of influence which "people with HIV disease" 
already have on research and treatment processes. As such, it can afford to take a 
gentler form than the celebrated antics of the ACT UP of the eighties. 
Notwithstanding this, however, the good British activist should be prepared in the 
last instance to take a more strident approach - by targeting institutions directly, and 
by becoming competent both in his/her knowledge of the issues involved, and also in 
exploiting relevant media - if the situation calls for it (S3-20). 
The ethical principle that the good HIV/AIDS in/affected reader-subject should be 
the active(ist) HIV/AIDS in/affected reader-subject is connected, however, to one of 
the dominant ethical principles proposed by the NAM, that being the principle of 
self-education - for much of the commentary given in the name of activism is highly 
detailed and displays a notable technical/medical competence (see for example the 
discussion of the problem of research focusing on reverse transcriptase, and hence on 
the drug AZT (S3-12)). Activism, as the exemplary form of being HIV/AIDS 
in/affected, requires in order to be effective the sort of detailed knowledge about 
HIV/AIDS that only ongoing personal ethical-educational projects of the kind to 
which the NAM aims to inspire its readers can provide (cf S3-19). 
6.8 The 'AIDS in/affected community' and science & medicine 
In many ways the most interesting relationship which is established within the NAM 
is that which exists between the HIV/AIDS in/affected community it articulates and 
science and medicine. This relationship comprises a complex negotiation by which 
is established a crucial space in which the HIV/AIDS in/affected reader-subject is 
able to construct him/herself as one who is inexorably connected to but nevertheless 
autonomous from medical authority. Accordingly the language the NAM uses in its 
discussions of medical practice and institutions is not nearly so antagonistic as in, 
say, the Body Positive Newsletter, articulating instead a rhetoric of co-operation (cf 
Q3-4). 
Neither, though, is it advocating a 'traditional' doctor to patient relationship of the 
sort which Strong suggests is still commonplace, in the British National Health 
Service at least, wherein the patient is mostly passive and the balance of power in the 
relationship falls very much in the doctor's favour (principally by virtue of the latter's 
institutional position) and which he called the 'bureaucratic format' for doctor patient 
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interactions. That this is the dominant form of doctor to patient relationship is 
recognised by the NAM (Q2-3), which seeks to promote an alternative one, which is 
far closer to the less frequent 'private format', in which the balance of power is far 
more evenly distributed (Strong 1988: 228-249). 
It is not exactly this relationship, however. Silverman, building on Strong's work, 
suggests that even in private consultations the doctor's professional knowledge still 
grants him/her dominance over the patient, who remains likely to accept the doctor's 
orders fairly unquestioningly (1987: 104-133). What is encouraged in the NAM, 
though, is a respectful interrogation of the prescriptions and practices of doctors, 
with the assumption being made that usually doctors act in good faith, and that any 
difficulties in communication which arise are in no way malicious, but are merely 
practical problems to be overcome (Q2-2). That their years of training do afford 
doctors a "remarkably complex insight into illness" is not to be denied, but instead 
the demand is made that through the establishment of ongoing and generally non- 
confrontational dialogue between the health professionals and representatives of the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community, "this insight must be shared and its limitations 
known". 
The model is definitely of a sober dialogue rather than of engendering controversy 
and argument, although the right to do so is reserved, in case doctors should refuse to 
co-operate in this process, this 'grass roots community' thus assuming the ultimate 
authority to determine what is and is not acceptable in treatment and research with 
respect to HIV/AIDS. This authority should seldom need to be brandished, however, 
as the NAM suggests that the unusual degree of uncertainty regarding how best to 
treat the syndrome has led those doctors involved in HIV/AIDS related medicine 
characteristically to be quite welcoming of a more than usually candid and reciprocal 
relationship with their patients. 
6.8.1 The historical uniqueness of the event of HIV 
In brief, then, the NAM's vision of this new relationship is that those whose 
relationship to HIV/AIDS is a lay one - by which is meant members of the journal's 
own textually articulated HIV/AIDS in/affected community - do and should have an 
unprecedentedly central and proactive role in dealing with the disease, and in their 
dealings with those whose relationship to it is professional - doctors and researchers 
and the like. This is presented as being the direct result of the nature of the human 
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immunodeficiency virus and of the syndrome it engenders, which are characterised 
as being unique events in medical history, requiring equally unique responses from 
the medical, scientific and HIV/AIDS in/affected populations (Q1-8, Q2-3, Q2-8, U2- 
3). 
Notwithstanding the idea that it was necessitated by the noumenal nature of 
HIV/AIDS, this distinctive new professional-laity relation is founded in the political 
awareness and activity which "those communities first affected by AIDS" displayed, 
something which is also quite new (Q3-2). The NAM is in itself an expression of 
this new relationship, springing from community grass roots and providing 
information accessible to the affected laity in a form found "virtually never before in 
the history of medicine". This unique and progressive approach of the bringing 
together of medical and scientific knowledges with those from other non- 
professional sources is given ongoing expression through the NAM's use of a "two- 
track approach", giving parallel presentations of its various topics in both technical 
and everyday language. This new professional-lay relation is seen as the way 
forward, making professional practice in the HIV field the vanguard of medical 
practice with respect to their patients, any resentment on the part of doctors to such 
an encroachment on what they may perceive as their territory being sadly 
anachronistic. This has the effect of articulating dual subject positions, one of the 
(would be) HIV/AIDS in/affected community member, the other of the 'progressive' 
medic or researcher, both of which exist in an ethical subject relation to the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community controlled authority text (Q 1-2, T 1-2, U 1-3). 
6.8.2 The NAM and the performance of community 
It is not for this thesis to consider whether or not such claims to the uniqueness of 
HIV/AIDS as an event in medical history are true, for to be able to ask such a 
question, one would first have to adopt some or other ontologically realist position, 
which would be contrary to the methodological assumptions made at the start of this 
research, as outlined in chapters 1 and 2. It would be to step back inside Burchell's 
goldfish bowl (1993: 276-277), a move which would defeat the whole object of the 
exercise. Notwithstanding this, those points are, however, certainly arguable. 
According to some forms of reckoning, HIV/AIDS in the West has not become the 
unprecedented health disaster which was foreseen in the mid-eighties, and it could 
certainly be contended that the challenges it presents are in some ways quite akin to 
150 
other more familiar medical issues - the manners in which the problems provided by 
infectious diseases such as herpes, hepatitis, syphilis and tuberculosis have been 
addressed by modern medicine provide plentiful parallels for the approaches taken to 
HIV/AIDS, and the fact that HIV tends to lead to a long period of degenerative 
illness, which medicine can only to some degree alleviate and cannot cure, is entirely 
typical of the majority of the sickness with which late modern Western societies have 
to cope. Whether or not HIV/AIDS is inherently a unique event is underdetermined, 
and it may readily be constructed either as such or as something with a greater or 
lesser degree of commonality with more familiar diseases. 
So it is, then, that while HIV/AIDS certainly provides for a close and reciprocal 
relationship between patients and members of the medical profession, whether this is 
really as unique and unprecedented as the above rhetoric appears to claim is open to 
debate - it is quite imaginable that sufferers of other chronic incurable diseases may 
recognise something of their own situation in what is described by the NAM as being 
specific to the lot of the HIV patient (a speculation which would need more data than 
is available either to the NAM or to this thesis in order to be decided). 
What is important to the questions being asked by this research, though, is the fact 
that the NAM presents this putative uniqueness as true, and that the implied reader is 
expected to accept it as truth. Rhetorically speaking, this can be seen as a 
community performing manoeuvre. The practice of groups establishing and 
maintaining their sense of identity and their solidarity by describing themselves as 
somehow set aside from the norm by virtue of some unprecedented set of 
circumstances is itself certainly not unprecedented, and, indeed, it is very difficult to 
imagine a set of circumstances which cannot be read as unique, through the 
privileging of one or other way of looking at them. However, the successful 
construction of a compelling account of whatever is one's interest, in which the 
radically unusual nature of that thing is stressed, will have a threefold ethical effect 
on those who become subject to that account: firstly, it will motivate them, through 
the sense of purpose, or perhaps even destiny, which such an account affords; 
secondly, it will unify them, by giving them a common sense of identity in relation to 
that purpose/destiny; finally it will ensure faithfulness to the cause in hand, because 
once an individual has invested him/herself in such a project, once s/he has come to 
understand the truth of him/herself in its terms, then to reconfigure his/her self- 
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understanding along other lines would require a leap of thought sufficiently large and 
disturbing to make such a reconfiguration very unlikely. 
6.8.3 Doctors as part of the HIV/AIDS in/affected community 
Community within the NAM is not limited to members of the HIV/AIDS in/affected 
laity, however, in contrast to both of the other main 'alternative orthodox' texts 
considered in this thesis; with certain provisos, doctors can also find a space therein. 
That doctors and HIV/AIDS in/affected people are assumed by the NAM to be on the 
same side is evidenced by the form of activism envisaged within the publication, a 
history being drawn in which these two groups have stood side by side from the start, 
and in which "The idea that there is a division between doctors and activists does not 
represent the world as it is" (S3-20). The use of techniques of this kind, by which 
medics are embraced within the textual community, is not infrequent in the Manual 
(cf U4-15). 
Such community work surely reflects the nature of the NAM - that is it is an 
ostensibly technical therapy related document, to be found in the libraries of 
hospitals and clinics. Its primary concern is the immediate and everyday negotiation 
of treatment. Unlike Simon Watney's work and the Body Positive Newsletter, the 
NAM cannot therefore be so forthright in its criticism and/or rejection of medicine. 
Whereas the two former sets of commentaries achieve their ethical functions to some 
extent by being isolationist, and by turning in on empowering notions of community 
which antedated the appearance of HIV/AIDS, the NAM by its very nature has to be 
a bridge builder; while it is easy and often useful to be dismissive of alternative 
authority discourses such as medical practice when one's principal concern is the 
subject's political self-construction (as with the work of Simon Watney) or the 
subject's spiritual self-construction (as in the Body Positive Newsletter), the NAM's 
central aim - to create a subject who conducts his/her therapeutic conduct in a 
particular manner - is such that the reality of medical authority, manifested in the 
duel facts that doctors control access to most medical information and also to drugs, 
means that a respectful co-operative approach based on a notion of the equal 
complementarity of the patient and the doctor is the only viable one. 
There is, however, another significant aspect to this new professional-lay relation. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on a complementary and non-confrontational 
approach, the doctor is nevertheless to be seen as very much at the service of the 
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HIV/AIDS in/affected patient. This new relationship rests on the acceptance by both 
sides that the final authority on HIV/AIDS related policy - if not on HIV/AIDS 
related technical knowledge - is the HIV/AIDS in/affected community. So it is that 
the community born voice of the NAM can reserve the right to say what constitutes 
good or bad doctoring, the putative right of professionals to police their own 
remaining unrecognised by the Manual (cf S1-10). Ultimately, the textually 
constructed HIV/AIDS in/affected community must be in charge if this new 
professional-laity relation is not to collapse. 
6.9 Summary and conclusion 
The manner in which the NAM effects its role as a manual is such that it operates as 
a complex technology of subjectivity, a machine for becoming an HIV/AIDS 
in/affected person. This technology works principally on an ethical rather than a 
moral plane - that is to say it works through the reader's perceptions of him/herself 
and through his/her will to freedom (in the form of a will to triumph over the blight 
that has (either directly or indirectly) befallen him/her) rather than through any 
overtly moralistic prescriptive discourse of conduct. 
Having said this, this ethical technology is grounded in the 'alternative orthodox' 
way of thinking HIV/AIDS, and as such in all the same politico-moral 
precommitments which that approach employs in order to make HIV/AIDS 
thinkable, and in order to enable practices which are enacted as a response to the 
syndrome. The politico-moral dimension of the NAM-as-ethical-machine, then, is 
neither the object of some open evangelism, nor is it any 'hidden agenda', a 
conspiratorial covert strategy. Rather, it is the bedrock of the form of HIV/AIDS 
related truth upon which the ethical technology sits and operates - the NAM does, in 
its own terms, provide dispassionate and objective accounts of the truth of 
HIV/AIDS, and draws in the light of that truth appropriate conclusions with respect 
to conduct. That such ethical directives have a politico-moral flavour is simply a 
reflection of the fact any truth will in itself necessarily be a political and moral 
construction. 
So it is that the ethical relations which the NAM establishes and through which it 
functions as an ethical machine operate within a particular politico-moral space for 
thinking about HIV/AIDS, negotiation of the boundaries of which is one of the 
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Manual's constant tasks. This negotiation is visible in the kinds of authority relation 
the text sets up with its implied reader. Generally, the ethical relations used by the 
NAM are expressionistic - that is they are intended to cultivate a particular kind of 
person, and allow the reader a considerable amount of self-determination, within the 
parameters of the politico-moral doxa (cf Ul -21, U 1-25, U3-5 with respect to when to 
begin AZT therapy). 
The bounds of that doxa are largely a function of the editorial decisions the NAM 
makes - decisions which are both made in line with the will of the textually 
articulated HIV/AIDS in/affected community, and at the same time comprise that 
will; it is the inclusion in the NAM of any given option which sanctions it as a 
legitimate 'treatment issue', and it is only between such that the implied reader is free 
to decide (cf U 1-26). Nevertheless, the fact that such bounded choice is apparent is 
indicative that the kind of regulation which exists here is ethical in character, rather 
than disciplinary. Regulation is achieved not by obliging the implied reader to come 
to any given conclusion, but by ensuring that s/he uses the technology provided as 
the frame by which s/he makes the matter meaningful to him/herself. In other words, 
the reader's need to cope with HIV/AIDS on an everyday basis is used as an 
opportunity for constructing a mechanism by which s/he can take responsibility for 
him/herself, so long as this responsibility is understood only within the parameters of 
the established field of discourse of the manual. 
In such expressionistic relations the politico-moral underpinnings of the truth 
discourses which are at the foundation of the variety ethical practices from which the 
reader-subject can choose are relatively invisible. However, where a given issue 
brings the debate closer to the boundaries between doxa and non-doxa, and therefore 
the politico-moral nature of the debate becomes more apparent (for instance in the 
parts of the text by which treatment issues are policed, and where political activism 
is given as an appropriate ethical response to being HIV/AIDS in/affected), then the 
style of ethical relation changes; it becomes more instrumental, by presenting a 
particular kind of person or sort of action as being exemplary and to be imitated by 
the reader-subject. Space for self-determination within such a relation is much less 
well developed - one either follows or one does not (Osborne 1998). 
So then, in the NAM, instrumental authority provides a sort of boundary around 
expressionistic authority - the latter provides more secure but less immediately 
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restricting and complete ethical control (this security being granted by the fact that as 
an effect of allowing more space for personal action by those who are under the 
ethical authority, the individuals concerned will invest of themselves into the form of 
personhood proffered), the former allows very closed ethical instructions to be given, 
but is more fragile, more vulnerable to open rebellion - hence where tight control is 
needed - such as when establishing the boundaries of thought - an instrumental 
relation is used, but once these parameters have been demarcated, the relation is 
almost exclusively expressionistic. 
That the NAM operates in this fashion demonstrates that disease is as much a form 
of practice as it is an objective 'condition' - just as Sontag (1989) argued that to every 
illness there was necessarily a metaphorical dimension, so the suggestion here is that 
an essential part of the construction of HIV/AIDS - and indeed of any disease - is its 
ethical aspect, the principles its discourse establishes for the conduct of conduct 
which is required of those who are HIV/AIDS in/affected. To say this is not 
intended as a critique of this boundary-making practice, but just to show that it 
exists, is necessary for something to operate as a manual (advice must be bounded if 
it is to be practicable), and that it implies limits to thought and to being. 
In order to maintain these ethical relations, the NAM must establish its own authority 
in an ongoing way. It achieves this via recourse to a number of authority-granting 
resources: medico-scientific knowledge and activity; an idea of the collective will 
and wisdom of the HIV/AIDS in/affected community; a history of responses to 
HIV/AIDS, within which a number of precedents for conduct have been established; 
the (politico-morally informed, textually constructed) natures of HIV and AIDS 
themselves. Ultimately, however, the required ethical responses govern what is 
allowed to confer authority on the NAM's voice - where medico-scientific views are 
in contradiction with such ethical needs (for example where prognostic statistics are 
in danger of undermining the principle of positivity) their usefulness as authority 
conferring resources is gone, so they are abandoned, and some other source used in 
their stead. 
The NAM gains consent from its reader-subjects for its authority partly by the dual 
ethical stylisations it employs - the detailed management of the text producing 
expressionistic relations wherever possible, by which the reader-subject's own will to 
freedom becomes the motivating factor which places the reader under the NAM's 
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authority; this is due to the fact that that will is both enabled to act by virtue of being 
provided with the clear cut choices of doxa, and yet constrained to act only within a 
given space, and therefore under the authority of the NAM which establishes that 
doxa's parameters - and partly, as with the Body Positive Newsletter, by establishing 
an HIV/AIDS in/affected community, membership of which is assumed for the 
implied reader, but is dependent upon the reader's accession to the voice of the 
NAM's right to delimit what is and is not appropriate for a member of that 
community's conduct and sense of self. 
These various techniques come together to produce an ideal HIV/AIDS in/affected 
subject who displays various qualities: 
S/he is accepting not only of the content of the dominant 'alternative orthodox' 
HIV/AIDS truth discourse, but also of the manner in which that content is to be 
regarded. This has various knock on effects for other related but competing truth 
discourses - some of which (in particular any theory which questions the role of HIV 
in AIDS) are constructed as 'dissident' and as such are to be dismissed, whereas 
others (those of alternative and complementary medicine) are to be given a cautious 
but generally positive hearing. This truth discourse has certain moral as well as 
ontological aspects, which are to be accepted on equal terms with each other - hence 
those celebrations found in the NAM of things which might in other circumstances 
be constructed as deviant become a part of the truth of HIV/AIDS, and thereby an 
enthusiastic acceptance of the rightness and necessity for such celebration becomes a 
requirement on the part of any person infected or affected by the syndrome, in their 
ethical self-construction of a form of personhood appropriate to living with it. Thus 
the NAM's HIV/AIDS truth discourse makes for a situation in which the ethical 
component of the disease demands a particular politico-moral response. 
This politico-moral component then informs the other ethical directives which are 
given to the HIV/AIDS in/affected reader-subject; the need to be positive is very 
often manifested in the shape of its political corollary, the will to activism. 
Similarly, with regard to the reader-subject's need to empower him/herself through 
education, it is the dominant 'alternative orthodox' truth discourse with which the 
reader-subject needs to become familiar, it is with 'alternative orthodox' ways of 
thinking the syndrome that the reader-subject must become competent. Given this, it 
can be seen that in the unprecedented form of doctor-patient relations which the 
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reader-subject is expected to construct as an ethical expression of his/her survival of 
being HIV/AIDS in/affected, and which is dependent upon that self-educational 
programme, the 'alternative orthodox' approach to HIV/AIDS meets with and 
dominates any competing approach which the medical and scientific professions may 
choose to use. 
In truth, the truth of HIV/AIDS which is generally employed in research and 
medicine is ontologically similar to the 'alternative orthodox' account, but perhaps 
lacks the appropriate politico-moral dimension. Thus the new inherently reciprocal 
doctor-patient relation which the NAM creates, where doctors are expected to learn 
as much from their patients as the other way around, contains at its centre a 
mechanism by which to add this missing dimension to the truth discourses of 
HIV/AIDS which are employed in the fields of medicine and research (or indeed to 
displace any other politico-moral aspect which may be found already within those 
discourses) 
. 
In sum, then, the day to day management of being HIV/AIDS in/affected, is to be 
achieved by becoming a particular sort of person, and all one's actions are then to be 
those which are apposite to that sort of person. That person is the 'alternative 
orthodox' truth of HIV/AIDS made flesh. Anyone who wishes to use the NAM as a 
resource by which to cope with being HIV/AIDS in/affected will have to relate to the 
text ethically, and once they do so, will themselves start to become an expression of 
the 'alternative orthodox' truth. Every action they take as an HIV/AIDS in/affected 
person will have an 'alternative orthodox' shape, and will serve to confirm the 
rightness of that particular construction of the syndrome's truth. 
Again, although such observations may create a foundation upon which a critique of 
this state of affairs may be made, no such critique is intended here. No truth 
discourse is without a politico-moral dimension of some shape or another, and one 
could do far worse than the manifest progressiveness which informs so much of the 
'alternative orthodox' vision. The NAM and other similar texts doubtlessly provide 
through this kind of ethical work invaluable assistance to many, many people. The 
question which this thesis is intended to address, then, is how the 'alternative 
orthodox' vector sustains itself as the dominant HIV/AIDS truth discourse, and this 
study of the NAM shows that one of the ways this occurs is through ethical relations 
whereby people who are in some way connected to HIV and AIDS become in 
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themselves aspects of the 'alternative orthodox' account, through ethical work which 
is enabled by publications such as the Manual. The question here is never whether 
or not the 'alternative orthodox' discourse should be dominant. 
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PART 3- MAKING SENSE OF HIV/AIDS 
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Chapter 7 
HIV/AIDS AS AN ETHICO-PANOPTIC REGULATORY MECHANISM 
One of the most remarkable things about HIV/AIDS is its conspicuousness in the 
non-HIV/AIDS in/affected world, especially when it is juxtaposed against the 
arguably lesser visibility of other pressing health problems like heart disease, cancer 
and road traffic accidents in the West (cf Smith & Jacobson 1988: 29,44,68) and 
malnutrition, tuberculosis and civil war in the Third World. This fact is in need of 
explanation. 
7.1 Three visibility-conferring discursive aspects 
There are three aspects of the discourse which contribute to this successful self- 
promotion; i) the combination of 'known facts' and uncertainty contained within it 
serve to produce an eschatological HIV/AIDS, a looming doom, but one which is 
always imminent, never fully here. ii) it opens a new terrain for the division of what 
is normal from what is pathological, changing that process from one which 
establishes an actuality to one which establishes a potentiality, thereby 
problematizing existing techniques for policing and assimilating the 'other'. iii) it is 
constructed such that HIV/AIDS is made something of direct and immediate 
relevance to each and every individual. The discourse centres on sexuality, which 
has over the last two hundred years increasingly been seen as the seat of the truth of 
the self (Foucault 1979), enabling it to be couched in such a way that the truth about 
HIV/AIDS is inseparable from the truth about oneself and HIV/AIDS. 
7.1.1 Apocalypse soon 
Although the heavy-handed AIDS Cassandras of the mid-nineteen-eighties had fallen 
out of fashion by the turn of the decade, and, despite a few hopeful reports of falls in 
the number of AIDS deaths in the USA and UK (in 1995 and 1996), of AIDS wards 
closing for lack of patients, of a dramatic improvement in the state-of-the-art of anti 
HIV and AIDS drugs, and of 'promising' new vaccine research, the picture given 
through the nineties has still been predominantly a gloomy one. HIV/AIDS remains 
a disaster, the worst of which we have not yet seen (Guardian: 20/4/96; 10/6/96; 
1/11/96; 15/2/97; 28/2/97; 1/3/97; Observer: 23/6/96). 
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The eighth world conference on AIDS (1992) carried the message that the spread of 
HIV had not been curbed, and there were suggestions of the emergence of a new and 
undetectable strain of HIV. More recently, other sorts of new strains of the virus 
have been reported to be emerging, which develop resistance alarmingly quickly to 
the drugs which have caused the current downturn in deaths in the West, and which 
are more 'aggressive' and easily transmitted by heterosexual intercourse than the 
older strains, with the implication that a "new wave of infection" will befall the West 
shortly. Despite the improvement in palliative therapies, to hope for a cure would 
still be premature. Indeed, there is much concern that "false hopes" generated by 
hyperbolical talk of wonder drugs might and do lead people to abandon safer sex. 
Despite the decrease in AIDS deaths in the West, world-wide 1.5 million people are 
said (by Peter Piot, the director of UNAIDS) to die from the disease in a year, with 
8,500 being infected anew with HIV every day. The world's poor are particularly 
vulnerable, and it has been posited in some quarters that AIDS might reverse the rise 
of the population in the Third World. Certainly Asia is now acutely affected, with 
more than 3.5 million people infected with HIV, 90% of them through heterosexual 
intercourse. This Asian epidemic is said to be expanding rapidly and largely 
unchecked, with projections suggesting that by the year 2000 the area will have some 
2 million AIDS cases annually. The former Communist Bloc is another area where 
HIV is said to be spreading without any great hindrance. In short, the message is that 
we still must, in the words of a Guardian headline from 1996, "Ignore Hype of Aids 
Success" (Brown 1995: 71,1997: 43; Guardian: 20/7/92; 21/7/92; 22/2/96; 1/3/96; 
25/5/96; 9/7/96; 1/8/96; 29/11/96; 22/12/96; Independent: 12/5/92; Times: 20/7/92; 
also cf Williams 1995). 
This bleak depiction reflects and is premised on a trinity of related 'truths' which 
have emerged out of the complex of discourse discussed in chapter 3; (a) HIV is the 
causal factor, which (b) can be (ever more) easily transmitted through heterosexual 
intercourse, which has led to (c) an epidemic of HIV infection in the third world, first 
in Africa, and ever increasingly in Asia, which is (probably) a model for how things 
are going to be in the West. (That HIV infection is now reportedly of epidemic 
proportions in the former Soviet Union -a territory which stands as a half-way house 
or symbolic gateway between the West and the developing world - is highly 
significant in this regard. ) These three stand as the most durable truths of 
HIV/AIDS, challenged as they are by neither the 'orthodox' nor the 'alternative 
orthodox' vectors of discourse. Such truths are taken as given, and the proper space 
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for debate is then made to be around the question of what should be done about it. 
Take away HIV and the whole edifice collapses. Take away heterosexual 
transmission and the 'end of the world as we know it' scenario is replaced with a 
picture of disease relevant only to a hapless minority. The same applies if the 
African and Asian epidemics are revealed to be artefacts of reclassification of already 
existing sickness, or simply a mistake of inaccurate testing. 
But the most important factor about these core truths of HIV/AIDS is the relationship 
between the present and the future which they establish; the worst of HIV/AIDS is 
always yet to come, particularly when viewed from a Western perspective. The 
affliction which binds Africa now (and which is expected to become much, much 
worse, before too long) is presented as a premonition. HIV/AIDS, as the latest 
means we in the West have found to make sense of all too familiar representations of 
Third World suffering, is more than usually threatening to the Western gaze because 
it is invulnerable to the discourses of comfort normally employed to establish the 
difference between the First and Third worlds. Whereas malnutrition, poor 
sanitation, other infectious diseases and civil war can be explained away as facets of 
'less developed' civilisations, HIV/AIDS cannot. 
In a sense HIV/AIDS is a Western phenomenon, in that the central truths of the 
sickness are fabricated within, are functions of, broader Western discourses of 
disease, of death, of medicine, of morality, of the body. For something to gain 
importance in the discourse of HIV/AIDS, then, it must be highly visible to the 
Western gaze. But it seems unlikely that the conspicuousness of the long established 
African epidemic, and the burgeoning Asian epidemic, derives from concern for the 
suffering which those peoples will have to endure - there are many other causes of 
similar suffering which are too easily ignored, or at least are not seen to merit the 
same degree of attention. Nor is it quite convincing to suggest that African 
HIV/AIDS is given as high a profile as it is simply because it is the biggest problem 
facing Africa today; that would still beg the question as to why the West is so 
uncharacteristically interested in a Third World problem. The answer perhaps is this, 
that the construction of HIV/AIDS is such that these epidemics can serve as a vision 
of hell more pertinent to the twentieth century Western imagination than is Dante's. 
The message to the ideal-typical white middle-class heterosexual non-drug-using 
first world normative individual is clear; HIV/AIDS is going to precipitate the 
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decline of the First (and only true) World to the position of the Third (false, distant, 
'other') World. 
This is, however, only one prong of an eschatological fork; the discourse of 
HIV/AIDS not only presents a possible, impending global disaster, but also a 
multiplicity of individual, potential, personal apocalypses (a claim which will be 
further developed below, after the following discussion of the other two aspects of 
HIV/AIDS discourse). As such, the construction of HIV/AIDS can be seen to be 
consonant with the tendency identified by Beck as present within the new reflexive 
modernity which characterises the West of late, for risks to be of global proportions 
and threatening to all humanity, and yet to be reckoned at the individual rather than 
the national or governmental level (Beck 1992: 12-13; 130-131). 
7.1.2 HIV/AIDS and 'otherness' 
There is a historical precedent for controlling epidemics through the establishment of 
certain individuals or groups as the 'other', followed by their expulsion from 'non- 
other' society (Frankenberg 1992: 74). In addition to this, as Sontag suggests 
(1989: 125-131), the most infamous of diseases have not been necessarily those which 
have caused the highest rates of mortality, but those which change the sufferer into 
something un-human, into something bodily, visibly, physically 'other'. In nineteenth 
century France smallpox was feared far less than cholera, although it killed many 
more. Cholera, however, has a far more dramatic effect on the body, reducing it very 
rapidly to a bluish-black burlesque of the person that once was (Sontag 1989: 125). 
Similarly, leprosy has been universally reviled since time immemorial, but rarely 
causes death. 
HIV/AIDS has certainly come to be a disease of the 'other'; not merely through its 
connexion with various discourses of 'deviance' - of homosexuality, of drug use, of 
not being white - but also through images of the person with AIDS when close to 
death, ravaged by opportunistic infections. In the early days of the syndrome, Mort 
points out, the media were very fond of displaying 'before and after' photographs of 
people with AIDS, emphasising the transforming nature of the disease (Mort 
1987: 213; cf also Alcorn 1988: 73-75 and Gilman 1988: 245-272, in which he 
compares the imaging of people with AIDS with the iconography of syphilis). Later 
came reports that HIV infection can lead to dementia, that most frightful of 
conditions of 'otherness', in which not only the body, but the very self is corrupted 
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(Times: 15/5/92). Crawford has argued that in modern society the idea of healthiness 
is central to the way in which identity is imagined. Hence, HIV/AIDS, in having 
become so much a signifier of all that is unhealthy - both physically and morally - is 
an entity which is profoundly problematic to modern selfhood (1994: 1348). 
Foucault has considered mechanisms by which 'otherness' in the guise of leprosy, of 
madness (1961), of criminality (1977) and of sickness in general (1973) have been 
policed, holding that since the tail end of the eighteenth century this has been 
attempted through technologies of division, the separation of the normal from the 
pathological. The 'other' is assimilated via a controlled expulsion; having been 
named, those tainted with the stain of 'otherness' can be confined, surveyed, 
disciplined, managed. In more recent years, however, some forms of 'otherness' have 
precluded the possibility of making such a straightforward bifurcation, notably those 
of being gay and of being a person of colour. Successful, or rather partially 
successful collective actions of resistance, although failing fully to undermine the 
discourses of deviance imposed upon those states of being, have at least managed to 
establish them as 'normal', in a legal or official sense - the prohibition of racial 
discrimination is enshrined on the statute books, homosexuality has been 
decriminalised and is no longer considered by medicine to be a pathological state. 
Thus, the full force of exclusionary tactics cannot be used (overtly) against gay 
people or people of colour. Despite the best attempts of certain reactionary elements 
of government to make it so once more, it is no longer politically acceptable loudly 
to denounce such people as deviant, whatever may be said behind closed doors. The 
same is true to a degree for people with HIV or AIDS, who officially are not to be 
stigmatised, while unofficially the condition remains laden with pejorative 
connotations. 
There are two factors which have bearing here. First, there is an inverse logic of 
association, the process of denying that people with HIV or AIDS are alien serving to 
re-emphasise the fact that they might be; the idea that 'normal' people do not have to 
protest their normality. Frankenberg has suggested that in relation to epidemics, 
some powerful class or group often successfully gains control of defining who is the 
'other', in terms of that epidemic. Such an 'other' is; 
"... never a totally external other, which could have no social or cultural relevance. Nor 
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has it usually if ever been a new other but an old one put to new uses. " 
(Frankenberg 1992: 74) 
The assumption that this 'old other' is gay men, and that there is some discrete 
'powerful group' against which one can rail (the assumption behind much 'alternative 
orthodox' discourse) has led to a burgeoning of polemics and denials from gay 
quarters, which have served to conjoin HIV/AIDS with gayness (and therefore 
people with AIDS with an ancient 'otherness') possibly more efficiently than any 
external attempt to make that connexion. Guilt is often (rightly or wrongly) inferred 
from voluble protestation of innocence. Secondly there is the matter that in order for 
the 'other' to be assimilated, s/he first must be excluded, and in order to be excluded, 
it is necessary to name him/her as the 'other'. In this context it can be seen that the 
categories 'same' and 'other' are both parts of the same mechanism, and that any given 
individual can be ascribed to either category, without going beyond the pale. The 
question of the application of 'otherness' to people with AIDS, however, is left 
confused and ambiguous, undermining this usual policing process. Thus the person 
with AIDS is made doubly deviant, into something outside the scope even of 
'otherness'. 
This situation is further complicated by the indeterminate latency period of HIV, 
which opens the possibility that anyone might already have travelled into this space 
beyond 'otherness', but not yet be aware of it. Much health education has exploited 
this. In the winter of 1988-89, for example, one press campaign showed a full page 
portrait of an attractive woman, supposedly with HIV. The reader was then invited 
to turn the page to see what she might look like in five years time, and was 
confronted with the same photograph (see Wellings & Field 1996: 22). The power of 
this campaign lies in that it plays upon both the expectation of dehumanising 
disfigurement, and on the impossibility of accurately ascribing 'otherness' (or 'super- 
otherness') to any given individual. There are no outward signs of infection and the 
antibody tests are often inconclusive. (As they test for antibodies and not the virus 
itself, a negative result cannot guarantee freedom from infection. Also there have 
been instances of tests producing falsely positive results. ) 
All this does something significant to the question of the division of the normal from 
the pathological. Armstrong (1983) argued that the tuberculosis dispensary, by 
rendering everyone potentially sick (and thereby effectively abolishing the process of 
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the division of the normal from the pathological), successfully extended the area in 
which a medical regulatory gaze could operate. HIV/AIDS, however, is constructed 
such that it creates the related but different possibility that anyone may be 
unknowingly sick now, affording the possibility of an extended regulatory gaze not 
premised on the abandonment of the division of the normal from the pathological, 
but on its re-location and re-invention as something which is the property of the laity 
more than of medicine. For the nature of HIV/AIDS discourse is such that it allows 
the ascription of normality and deviance to be an ongoing and imprecise process, 
subject to constant review of a sort most apposite for individual, personal, non- 
professional reflection, rather than a once and for all decision to be made by a 
medical professional within an institutional framework. 
The unresolvability of this issue ensures its continued relevance, as those procedures 
for the management of epidemics which centre on the naming of the 'same' and the 
'other' cannot satisfactorily be accomplished. 'Otherness' is thus made unpoliceable, 
and in doing so its salience is magnified, in that there is no comfortable, familiar, 
tried and trusted action to be taken to contain it, so it remains a problem, it remains 
in view. And so a cycle is established; this hyper-visibility of '(super) otherness' 
forcing the question "who is the 'other'? ", the lack of an answer to that question 
focusing attention back onto the unmanageable '(super) otherness'. 
7.1.3 HIV/AIDS and the individual 
"This issue is about AIDS, it is also about you", proclaimed the Sunday Times 
Magazine in 1987 (21/6/1987). In many ways, however, this banner still 
encapsulates quite neatly the central message of the ascendant hegemony, at least in 
those aspects of it designed to educate and attract those who are outside the 
sanctioned HIV/AIDS in/affected community. However, given the failure of the oft 
foretold explosion of HIV/AIDS cases in the 'general population', it may be 
wondered how such a message is made to stick. Strong's model in which the psycho- 
social reaction to any epidemic disease produces three further epidemics may provide 
the answer. These three subsequent epidemics comprise one of fear, one of 
explanation and moralisation, and one of action or proposed action, which together; 
"... have the potential capacity to infect almost everyone in the society. Just as almost 
everyone can potentially catch certain epidemic diseases, so almost everyone has the 
capacity to be frightened of such diseases - and, likewise, has the capacity to decide that 
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something must be done and done urgently. " 
(Strong 1990: 251) 
This he terms 'epidemic psychology'. He argues that these three epidemics are at 
their most marked when they are inspired by a new disease, and that a process of 
normalisation occurs once a disease has become familiar, once responses to it have 
become set, routine, institutionalised. Such, he contends, is what happened with the 
plague after its initial visitations on Europe (Strong 1990: 249-259). HIV/AIDS may 
not follow exactly in these footsteps, however, as normalisation of a disease cannot 
occur until the third of these epidemics is dominant over the first. The most constant 
features of the discourse of HIV/AIDS appear to be changeability and uncertainty, 
particularly with regard to its exact wtiology and prognosis, which together serve to 
problematize the formulation of clear cut practical responses. In terms of Strong's 
model HIV/AIDS is constantly a new disease, being as it is a clinically designated 
syndrome in which a wide array of actual infections and pathologies in individuals 
and groups of individuals may be taken as indicators of the presence of 'AIDS' 
(whose existence is, as a result, always in some sense arbitrary). This allows 
epidemic psychology to flourish after normalisation might have been expected to 
begin. 
If this contention, that the truth of HIV/AIDS is characterised by its changeability, 
seems to contradict the apparent stability of HIV/AIDS knowledge within 'alternative 
orthodox' discourse, then consider the following, taken from the section of the 
National AIDS Manual dealing with how AIDS is defined, which shows the 
syndrome to be a very variable beast indeed, over time, geographically, and in 
relation to specific sub-populations; the definition of AIDS (as formulated by the 
CDCP in the United States) has, "... evolved over time as the shape of the epidemic 
changes" due to pressure from all variety of health care workers (NAM: R 1-9). For 
example, in 1993, three new opportunistic infections - pulmonary tuberculosis, 
invasive cervical cancer and recurrent bacterial pneumonia - were recognised as 
being AIDS defining, because they "... were becoming more common as the epidemic 
grew to affect an increasingly diverse range of people" (ibid). (In addition to this, in 
the United States an HIV infected person with a CD4 cell count of below 200 is now 
defined as having AIDS, regardless of whether s/he is actually experiencing illness. 
It should be noted, however, that although Europe has followed the American lead 
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with respect to the three opportunistic infections, the less-than-200 CD4 cell count 
definition has not been adopted on this side of the Atlantic. ) 
Such changes have had a rather interesting consequence, though, for 
"Although each definition may represent a refinement, they tend to include more 
individuals rather than less, and so people suddenly find that overnight they are being 
categorised as having AIDS, with no real change in their physical status. " 
(ibid). 
And a similar expansion of who may be included as AIDS affected can be seen in the 
development by, amongst others, the World Health Organisation of AIDS definitions 
designed to be "better suited" to developing countries (NAM: R1-8) than Western 
definitions which 
"... are certainly almost useless in Africa and other less developed areas, where the 
marked differences in environment result in a completely different clinical picture and 
the absence of high technology laboratories means that some infections (e. g. CMV, 
MAI) would be very difficult to diagnose. To try to redress these issues, the World 
Health Organisation has developed special definitions for adults and children in Africa. " 
(NAM: R 1-13) 
Interestingly, a positive HIV antibody test is not a prerequisite for an AIDS diagnosis 
according to these criteria (ibid). Once again, on the same tack, the CDC in the 
United States has developed children-specific AIDS definitions (NAM: R1-8), due to 
the "different spectrum of problems" HIV infected children suffer, and the fact that it 
is hard to find HIV in children younger than 15 months (NAM: R1-9). What these 
ever changing definitions do have in common, though, is that they all increase the 
numbers of people who may legitimately be touched by the regulatory mechanisms 
inherent in HIV/AIDS discourse. 
Another factor ensuring the ongoing pertinence of HIV/AIDS is that the discourse of 
the disease centres on sex (cf Alcorn 1988: 70-730). It can be assumed that a 
society's reaction to (and construction of) an epidemic disease will reflect its cultural, 
moral, social and political concerns. In twentieth century Western society, sexuality 
features as a fundamental axis of discourse. Foucault (1979) contests the position 
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that throughout the last century sexuality was repressed, citing as evidence the 
proliferation of discourses on sex within the disciplines of medicine, psychiatry, 
pedagogy, criminal justice, social work and the like. From the end of the seventeenth 
century incitements emerged to discuss sex and to do so endlessly, but as an object of 
analysis, of classification, to create a Scienta Sexualis. Stemming from this 
fascination, the truth of the self has come to be equated with the sexual truth of the 
self. He writes; 
"What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a 
shadowy existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, 
while exploiting it as the secret. " 
(Foucault 1979: 35) 
HIV/AIDS sits right in the middle of this preoccupation, feeding off and furthering 
the conspicuousness of sexual issues, which are meat to the debate of the second of 
Strong's epidemics. In its wake, the most intimate details of manifold and various 
forms of pleasure and precaution have become the standard fare of popular 
magazines and television (Mort 1987: 217). 
How all this relates to the claim made above that HIV/AIDS establishes a multitude 
of personal apocalypses needs to be explained. It has to do with the calculation of 
risk, born of a combination of the fear of the disease (resultant from the fact that one 
of the 'given individuals' for whom one cannot accurately ascribe '(super) otherness', 
or indeed 'normality', is oneself), and the fact that such a calculation is central to 
what action it is possible to take to combat the disease (the third of Strong's psycho- 
social epidemics). HIV/AIDS provides a situation in which the very search for the 
truth of oneself in sex can lead to the radical alteration of that truth, into something 
beyond 'otherness' (cf Miller 1993: chapter 1, on Foucault's 'limit-experiences'). 
This sexual search for self operates not only through actual sexual practices and 
activities, but also, perhaps more importantly, through the individual's ex-post-facto 
or hypothetical analysis of such. In the age of HIV/AIDS, any such analysis will 
pose (unanswerable) questions about the likelihood of infection from both past and 
future contacts. Thus the transformation of the truth of the self can be one of a shift 
from a belief that "it is not likely that I have HIV" to one of "actually, thinking about 
it, it is quite possible that I might have HIV" (and vice versa), each new report of a 
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novel strain of the virus, each new estimate of its latency period, each revelation 
about the putative extent of infection, each remembrance of past sexual contact, each 
hope or expectation of future sexual contact, precipitating a fresh examination of the 
truth of one's heart and history, a reassessment of one's situation in relation to 
infection and all that goes with it. The truths of sex, of the self and of HIV/AIDS, 
then, are conjoined in a Gordian knot, which can be seen to rest on the same three 
truths identified earlier; if HIV does not cause AIDS, or if heterosexual intercourse is 
not the primary conduit of infection, then HIV/AIDS has no grip on the sexual self. 
And the strongest evidence for the first two points is the current plight of Africa and 
the rest of the Third World. 
7.2 HIV/AIDS as a panoptic technology of power 
It has been argued that HIV/AIDS has contributed to an undermining of medical 
credence, which is seen as part of a growing general disaffection with science, 
characteristic of the late-modern West (Altman 1986: 45; Beck 1992: 167; Brandt 
1988: 426). As Beck puts it, 
"Until the sixties, science could count on an uncontroversial public that believed in 
science, but today its efforts and progress are followed with mistrust. People suspect 
the unsaid, add in the side effects and expect the worst. " 
(Beck 1992: 169) 
Perhaps in the light of this, social science has laid claim to HIV/AIDS, its disciplines 
seeing themselves as better placed than medicine to control the spread of infection 
(Coxon A. P. M. 1988: 84; Coxon T. 1988: 127-128; Holland, Ramazonaglu & Scott 
1990: 49; Silverman et al 1992: 69). Silverman, for example, contends that it is 
generally agreed that AIDS is first and foremost a social issue, to which medical 
matters (albeit highly pressing ones) are attached, that due to the lack of an effective 
medical treatment for HIV or AIDS cultural and behavioural change is likely to be 
the most effective mode of combating the syndrome, and that such changes will rely 
upon forms of communication, the complexities of which are as yet not well 
understood (Silverman et al 1992a: 174). In other words, social enquiry is required to 
gain the necessary understanding of HIV/AIDS related social processes to construct a 
social solution to this social problem. 
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In such fashion, then, social science has afforded itself a mandate to probe and to 
investigate the most intimate details of people's lives, legitimated by the threat of the 
extermination of the species. The emphasis on safer sex, (a strategy dependent for its 
coherence on the familiar truths of HIV/AIDS already identified) concentrating as it 
does on particular practices, requires the gathering of knowledge of the minutiae of 
people's sexual habits, to find where the danger lies. Vagueness is unacceptable. 
Social work perspectives on HIV/AIDS have considered the problem of 'the worried 
well', those who fear for their health as a result of past sexual contacts. In trying to 
help such people the social worker is instructed to; 
"... explore the exact meaning of for example a general answer like 'sex' [from the client 
when being interviewed]. Some people may consider masturbation or kissing as sex, 
others may mean penetrative anal sex or vaginal intercourse. " 
(Bamford, Gately & Miller 1988: 68) 
Armstrong (1983: 115) has suggested that medicine and the social sciences together 
comprise an extended panoptic disciplinary mechanism (cf Foucault 1977: part 3), 
and such an interpretation could be made of the medico/social-science discourse of 
HIV/AIDS. However, it is questionable to what degree the concrete forces of either 
arm of such a medico/social-science fork actually touch their targets of regulation. 
Most people have not consulted their doctor, requested counselling or been 
interviewed in depth by sociologists on the subject of HIV/AIDS. Therefore, 
although it is true that medico/social scientific power informs HIV/AIDS, if the 
discourse has any panoptic effect, then some other mechanism must serve to extend 
that regulatory influence throughout the populace. 
As commented earlier, the cultural space inhabited by HIV/AIDS is roughly 
equivalent to that once occupied by leprosy, and later by madness, in that it exists as 
a surface for the articulation of societal concerns about the danger in that which is 
alien, and that historically such matters were regulated via technologies of exclusion, 
of confinement and surveillance, madness taking the place of leprosy when the latter 
vanished from Europe at the end of the Middle Ages (Foucault 1961). Castel has 
suggested, in relation to mental illness, that such strategies are inappropriate to 
'advanced industrial' societies, and that the focus of government has shifted from the 
'dangerousness' of a given deviant subject to factors of 'risk' for a collectivity. This 
new form of surveillance, premised on preventative approaches to social 
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administration such as would be apposite for dealing with the likes of HIV/AIDS, 
effectively dissolves the notion of the subject, and the need for a face to face inter- 
relation between the watcher and the watched that exists in classic panopticism. 
Within Castel's conception all are surveyed, and if enough risk factors are apparent at 
any particular locus, moves are then made to establish the presence or absence of real 
danger. The model is of a broadly scanning social administration, zooming in on 
possible trouble spots (Castel 1991: 281-299). 
Within the discourse of HIV/AIDS, however, there are a great many loci where 
sufficient risk factors are present to warrant investigation (that is, a lot of people 
have slightly suspect sexual histories), and the establishment or otherwise of the 
presence of danger is not straightforward (as discussed above). In practical terms, no 
administration could cope with it, and the limitations of panopticism from which 
Castel wishes to escape reappear. Having said this, policing via HIV/AIDS does 
focus on risk, but at an individual rather than a collective level, precipitating a 
change from a 'top-down' model of regulatory surveillance, dependent on the 
professional ministering of power-inhabited discourses, to a more lateral model, 
suggesting the possibility of auto-surveillance and auto-regulation. Such a model 
could function via the technology of 'the confession', a mechanism with its roots in 
mediaeval Catholicism, but which through the nineteenth century and beyond spread 
into secular relationships, with the doctor, the psychiatrist, the parent, the pedagogue 
replacing the priest as confessor. Foucault used the term 'confession' to apply to; 
"... all those procedures by which the subject is incited to produce a discourse of truth 
about his sexuality which is capable of having effects on the subject himself. " 
(Foucault 1980: 215-216) 
In other words, it is through confession that the individual comes to understand and 
to fabricate his/her own subjectivity in terms of the discourse which entices that 
confession. The Scienta Sexualis of old, then, was an incitement to confession, to 
the fabrication of self as sexual-self, and was administered by those professionals 
who were qualified subjects of vision of the various related defining discourses. 
The discourse of HIV/AIDS, however, is such that it provides a (potentially, 
panoptically) regulating gaze for which anyone can become a competent viewer, but 
which has its own regulatory longevity ensured in that even the competent subject of 
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vision can see only further questions, seldom any definite answers. HIV/AIDS is a 
discourse tailored perfectly for a proto-professionalised public (cf De Swaan 1990), 
conversant with the medical, sociological and psychological truths on which the 
disease is based, and for which it has such marked implications. HIV/AIDS 
discourse has followed the language of psychotherapy out of the realm of the 
confessional consultation and into the much more visible arena of mass 
communications - in the form of magazine or television borne advices - in which the 
imperative to therapy becomes at least as much to do with healing oneself as it is 
with being cured (Rose 1989: 214). Silverman's empirical data, which show a 
tendency for HIV/AIDS counsellors (the most likely candidates to take the 
professional side of any HIV/AIDS related classic professional-lay confessional 
relation) to use 'information delivery' rather than 'advice giving' modes of talk when 
counselling (with the result that the counselling encounter does not encourage the 
person being counselled to expand upon their sexual histories and practices in a 
confessional fashion), support this contention that any disciplinary function 
articulated within HIV/AIDS discourse could not operate through any professional- 
lay confessional relation (Silverman et al 1992a: 185). Thus the new HIV/AIDS 
sponsored great search for the truth of sex and of the self in sex is being carried out 
less by specialists - medics, psychologists, sociologists and so on - than it is within 
the laity, each individual compelled to explore his/her own history to the end of risk 
assessment (as discussed above), and to confess the truth s/he finds, in the pub, in 
front of and on the television, in the conjugal bed, and to do so to his/her peers, the 
others of the laity, and also to his/her own self, in a process that is never ending, as 
neither the truth of HIV/AIDS, nor any individual's personal history is static. 
In shifting the site of the confession from the professional/laity divide, HIV/AIDS 
alters the mode of regulation; it works neither by the constitution of all subjects as 
medical subjects via an extended medical surveillance, nor by substituting factors of 
risk for subjects as the target of the gaze, but by moving the relationship of 
surveillance to the connexions between, and to within the individual members of the 
laity, each of whom becomes at one and the same time both penitent and confessor. 
This surveillance comprises a combination of a lateral gaze-nexus (each individual 
watching and watched by every other) with an inward auto-surveillance (each 
individual monitoring him/herself). Both branches of this surveillance are informed 
by the demands of the triumvirate of truths fabricated within the popular discourse of 
the syndrome. Such a surveillance could potentially have a far greater efficiency 
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than any 'top down' model, in which regulation will break down at the inevitable 
points where the gaze fails to fall; the penetration of a gaze which emanates from a 
problematization of something which is already accepted as fundamental to every 
individual (sex, that is) carries the possibility of being much more thorough, and 
once established of remaining firmly ingrained so long as the problematization on 
which it rests still stands. The discourse of HIV/AIDS severely and chronically 
problematizes sexuality, and opens a space in which power may operate, through the 
promotion of a subject who is all at once prisoner and warder, surveying and 
surveyed by everyone - most importantly, perhaps, including him/herself - 
reciprocally regulating, mutually constituting the truth of each self as a 'sexual and 
threatened by HIV/AIDS' self, and thereby perpetuating the efficaciousness of the 
mechanism. 
7.3 'Alternative orthodoxy' as an ethical technology of power 
Such panoptic regulatory effects as may operate through HIV/AIDS discourse, then, 
rely upon forms of surveillance and interrogation which are ethical in character; that 
is there are certain concrete practices through which regulation may be accomplished 
by the discourse, which obtain at a micro level and which establish particular 
possibilities of and limits to being, by determining who one has to be in order to 
address oneself to HIV/AIDS. And although it is the dynamic which exists between 
all three vectors of the broader discourse which creates the possibility of it acting as a 
lateral-ethic al-panoptic mechanism (the relationship between 'orthodox', 'alternative 
orthodox' and 'dissident' discourse serving to solidify both the truths on which the 
universal relevance of HIV/AIDS is premised, and the uncertainties which continue 
to ensure that relevance) it is in the dominant vector, the 'alternative orthodoxy', that 
the specifics of the ethical aspect of this technology are to be found. 
The parameters of being established by this mechanism, then, can be viewed in detail 
in the ethical relations - in the technologies of self - found in the expressions of 
'alternative orthodoxy' comprised by the texts examined in chapters 4-6. These texts, 
pertaining as they do to those most immediately touched by HIV/AIDS, provide the 
clearest, the most marked and developed examples of 'alternative orthodox' discourse 
in its ethical forms, and one may regard them as templates for the forms of ethical 
instruction which 'alternative orthodoxy' will provide in those situations where the 
underlying conditions of micro-power allow for its prescriptions to be made in a full- 
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bodied and relatively unchallenged manner. Given that it is a central aspect of 
'alternative orthodox' discourse in general that HIV/AIDS is constructed as 
something of direct relevance to every individual, if it were possible to remove all 
forms of resistance to the propagation of 'alternative orthodox' ethical discourse, then 
one would expect the rapid emergence of similarly constructed discourses whose 
ideal reader's connexion to HIV/AIDS was less proximal. Hence, despite the fact 
that the data from chapters 4-6 apply to only a relatively limited part of the entire 
individualised and proto-professionalised public which is the target of the regulatory 
technology described above, it is still safe to consider the ethical prescriptions found 
within the earlier chapters as indicative of the mode of ethical thought which 
operates around HIV/AIDS, and by which a lateral-ethical-panoptic mechanism 
might function at a micro-cosmic level. 
7.3.1 Differing emphases of 'alternative orthodox' discourse 
Each of those texts, however, has its own emphasis: Watney's work centres on the 
political-ethical dimension of being HIV/AIDS in/affected, on the political attitudes, 
approaches and actions which are apposite for an HIV/AIDS in/affected person; the 
focus of the Body Positive Newsletter, with its unerring emphasis on positivity, is 
more on the spiritual-ethical aspects of living with HIV/AIDS than the political; the 
guiding principle behind the commentaries of the National AIDS Manual is to 
provide advice on a technical-ethical plane, about the nuts and bolts of how one goes 
about life as an HIV/AIDS in/affected individual. These distinctions are, however, 
not at all discrete and exclusive, they are simply ideal-typical observations by which 
one can gain an understanding of the differential emphases within the various 
exemplary 'alternative orthodox' texts under consideration. All of the texts contain 
elements of each of these aspects, and each aspect is complementary to the other two; 
the spiritual aspect provides motivation, is that which makes further action 
worthwhile, the political aspect informs such action (including, indeed perhaps 
principally, action upon oneself, action pertaining to the business of shaping who one 
is), and the technical aspect provides the ethical mechanisms by which to actualise 
the ethical visions of the political and spiritual versions of 'alternative orthodoxy'. 
'Alternative orthodox' discourse achieves regulation at the ethical level, of a form 
which would be apposite to the disciplinary potentialities found in HIV/AIDS 
discourse overall, through its constructing, via the sorts of techniques of self 
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described in detail in chapters 4-6, a form of ideal subject with a particular 
characteristic shape: 
(i) The political-ethical level of the discourse situates this subject left of centre in the 
normal political spectrum, opposed to such reactionary neo-liberal nostrums as 
monogamy and abstinence, and to the espousal of any such view in health 
educational, scientific and other official discourses. Personal responsibility, 
however, remains central to the 'alternative orthodox' vision, in the form of the 
ethical necessity to practice safer sex. Underlying this is the subject's implicit 
commitment to the celebration of pluralism, and the forms of politics and activism, 
which, having as their precursors gay politics and activism, spawned the 'alternative 
orthodox' response to HIV/AIDS. With this comes an express commitment to 
oppose any theory of AIDS other than the HIV hypothesis, which may deliberately or 
otherwise threaten the ontological bedrock upon which the 'alternative orthodox' 
political construction sits. 'Alternative orthodoxy' also contains certain potentialities 
for more radical political-ethical prescriptions, not yet fully incorporated into the 
technology, but which may come to the fore should the prevailing conditions of 
micro-power in the world at large allow it. Principal among these are questions 
about the role of the family as the central organising feature of late-modern Western 
society, and ideas about re-configuring hegemonic understandings of sexuality. 
(ii) The spiritual-ethical level of the discourse provides an imperative so 
straightforward and simple that it almost belies is central importance; the subject 
must be unfailingly and indefatigably positive in his/her approach to HIV/AIDS 
in/affectedness. Despair must be reconstructed as the precursor to a subject's 
personal transfiguration to a life of affirmation-in-adversity, anger must be focused, 
and directed against those external forces which hinder the mission of the HIV/AIDS 
in/affected community through which this and the other ethical directives are 
articulated. This positivity is, though, radically informed by political level of the 
discourse. 
(iii) The technical-ethical level of the discourse provides for a subject who can 
realise practically the political and spiritual dimensions of the ethics of 'alternative 
orthodoxy'. This level articulates a subject with a distinct will to knowledge (the 
ontology of which is bounded in the way that all 'alternative orthodox' knowledge is), 
through which the visions of activism found in the first level can be made manifest - 
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this level of the discourse aligns the political and the practical. It also provides the 
means by which a positive outlook can be turned into positive action, with respect to 
the subject's own personal in/affectedness. This is particularly true of the new form 
of relationship which the subject is enjoined to construct between him/herself and the 
medics and other scientists with which s/he has to deal as an HIV/AIDS in/affected 
individual. 
7.3.2 The absence of death in the analysed texts 
The fact that 'alternative orthodoxy' articulates a regulatory technology which 
operates through the ethical production of an ideal subject with a given shape goes 
some way towards explaining one deeply puzzling aspect of the texts analysed 
herein, which is the relative absence within them of death as a motif. A 
straightforward explanation of this absence, that it is simply a reaction against the 
very negative public constructions of the relationship between AIDS and death (cf 
Small 1993), although attractive, is inadequate, as it still begs the question of why 
the issue is not dealt with more proactively; why is the issue of death as raised by 
HIV more or less ignored, rather than re-constructed in some preferred way, as so 
many other issues have been, and as death itself has been in other texts not included 
in this analysis, but which could certainly be considered as expressions of the 
'alternative orthodoxy'? 
Satisfactorily to explore this question, it will be necessary to examine the place death 
inhabits in late-modern society. Mellor (1993) argues that the amount of literature 
on death which has appeared in recent years means that it can no longer be 
considered the taboo subject which it is often assumed to be, although it is, he 
argues, prevented from inhabiting public space. This sequestration is radically 
bound up in the distinctive tendency within what Giddens calls 'late' or 'high' 
modernity to shift problems of meaning out of the public domain and into private 
and subjective space, a trend which creates the previously unknown possibility of 
personal rather than social meaninglessness, for it leaves "the creation of a viable and 
stable sense of self' as the principal course open for people by which to make their 
lives meaningful. Following Giddens further, Mellor argues that death when 
individualised in such fashion comprises a serious threat to people's "ontological 
security" - that is the sense of order, meaning and continuity which they have in 
everyday life - and one which can confront people with either 'Kierkegaardian' 
anxieties about the reality and meaning of that everyday existence, or with 
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Durkheimian 'anomie', which may also have negative implications for their 
maintenance of self (Mellor, 1993: 11-19). Thinking in a similar vein, Dittman 
contends that the existential threat to the person with AIDS in particular is all the 
greater, the constant anxiety the syndrome brings that one will 'die before one's time' 
serving to destabilise radically the possibility of sustaining a unified, coherent 
subjectivity (1996: 1-26). 
The high modern approach to the construction of death, then, renders one 
existentially isolated, and unsure how to make the experience of the death of a loved 
one meaningful, or even how to act in the face of it, with the consequence that 
"... modern persons are increasingly reluctant to come into close contact with those who 
are dying.. . 
Death finds no easy, or generally accepted, place in the conceptions of 
reality generated by high modernity, and which individuals appropriate in their 
reflexive constructions of self-identity. Consequently, when death becomes startlingly 
real in the people around them, their desires for self-preservation encourage them to 
shut themselves off from those people who are dying. " 
(Mellor 1993: 21) 
Following this line of thought would lead to an explanation of the invisibility of 
death in the texts herein analysed in terms of silence simply being the best option 
available, given that HIV/AIDS discourse finds itself sandwiched between the 
unacceptability of ghoulish and spectacular media representations of AIDS death on 
one side and high modernity's lack of any readily adaptable space in which to 
construct a more acceptable form of death on the other. Such an argument, however, 
does not take full account of the way in which the communities which so far have 
been those predominantly affected by HIV in the West actually reacted when death 
did become "startlingly real in the people around them"; far from shunning the 
afflicted of their fellows in an attempt to escape angst through isolation, these 
communities cohered and unified as never before, and through collective activism 
have by now successfully made it an admission of terrible ignorance for a non-HIV 
in/affected person to exhibit any practical expressions of separating him/herself from 
the spectre of death such as to shy away from holding the hand of or using the same 
cutlery as a person with HIV. 
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This contradiction between what Mellor would predict and what actually occurred 
exists because the identity which was most threatened by death-in-AIDS (the ideal- 
typical 'gay' identity), having been forged as the unifying tool through which the 
struggle for collective liberation for people whose sexual object choice is 
homosexual might be won, is, in this regard, not an isolated individual one. To come 
out as gay is not merely to affirm one's sexual preferences, but is to join a politico- 
moral community which affords one one's identity, and which must remain intact if 
one is to keep that identity and not have to surrender to the perniciously isolated 
alternative identity, the 'homosexual'. This is not to imply, however, that such an 
identity creates and belongs to some lumpen mass, and is therefore not articulated 
individually - it is simply that the individuality which is produced is located very 
firmly within a discourse of community, providing for a collectivity of like-minded 
but discrete individuals. So it is, then, that had HIV/AIDS caused the disintegration 
of the gay community by means of those who were uninfected denying those who 
were, this would have had far more damaging effects on the identities of all the 
individuals concerned than the alternative of rallying round and facing death-in- 
AIDS straight on (although this is by no means to suggest that such an 
instrumentalism was the only driving force behind the solidarity displayed by Gay 
communities world-wide in the face of HIV/AIDS - it is certain that a 
straightforward sense of commitment and duty to others who were suffering was a 
central factor). 
This is where the weaknesses in Mellor's account begin to show, for he assumes that 
the only plausible reaction to the sort of existential anxiety which death engenders is 
flight in 'bad faith'. In contrast to this there is, of course, the alternative possibility of 
embracing death as that which gives life meaning; proximity to death can heighten 
one's perception of being alive. If early death does have some sort of 'absent 
presence' within the forms of identity which are afforded by those expressions of 
'alternative orthodoxy' (itself in so many ways the progeny and inheritor of the 
community ethos of the gay movement) considered in this research, then it is in this 
latter spirit, serving as the root of a communal existential project of which unbridled 
positivity is the fruit; the proximity of death can inspire an increase in the intensity of 
being-towards-death, can motivate one to action, and focus one's efforts. (And this is 
by no means confined to those who are actually HIV positive - one does not need to 
be infected with HIV in order to have one's awareness of one's mortality heightened 
by the virus). 
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However, if this argument that 'alternative orthodoxy' has grasped death as an 
existential catalyst is sound, then one is still left with the problem of why death 
should be an 'absent-presence' within the analysed texts, rather than a 'present- 
presence', as it is elsewhere. Armstrong's analysis of the history of thought 
surrounding death may cast some light here. He describes a history of death related 
discourse in which from the middle of the nineteenth century death was supposedly 
hidden, was made secret, was to be regarded as somehow 'indecent'. Patients were 
not to be told of terminal prognoses. This process went along with an increasing 
medicalisation and putative privatisation of death, and with the decline of such 
things as death related rituals and ceremonies, and of public mourning. This regime 
of supposed silence reached its peak in the 1950s (Armstrong 1987: 562-651). 
Armstrong, however, challenges this history on two grounds. Firstly, he contends 
that, similarly to sexuality (Foucault 1979), there was far from a silence regarding 
death, and instead there was a palpable increase in discourse on the subject, 
unprecedented in its degree, but of a form which was medical and governmental 
rather than personal or experiential - indeed, the record taking which accompanied 
this new mode of discourse meant that it was a far more public and less concealed 
form of death than that which had preceded it. Secondly, he rightly suggests that this 
history assumes, in keeping with its liberal account of power as a negative and 
repressive thing, that silence is equivalent to non-discourse - Armstrong, again 
following Foucault, holds rather that silence can be an active part of discourse, what 
is left unsaid functioning alongside and in a complementary relation to what is 
spoken, the limits of the possibilities of both utterance and silence being produced by 
the same regime of micro-power. 
He argues that this was indeed the case with respect to the supposed repression of 
death in the mid-to-late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These changes, 
then, comprised not the displacement of the possibility of speaking about death by a 
new code of silence, but a new configuration of what it was possible and impossible 
to say, and also of who was able to speak. The role of speaking about death shifted 
from those close to the deceased - relatives, friends, neighbours - to the medical and 
administrative authorities, implying a change in the site of death rituals, away from 
the private domestic field and into the public medico-administrative one. In this 
light, the silence on the subject of death (and in particular the silence with regard to 
medical prognoses of imminent death) which obtained between doctors and patients 
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up until about 35 years ago, is properly seen less as a lie enacted by the former 
against the latter, than as a 'conspiracy' between the two parties. The presence of 
death in disease was a secret, acknowledged by both doctor and patient, but allowed 
to remain unspoken (Armstrong 1987: 651-653). This mode of death discourse has 
itself been all but displaced now, by the liberal 'confess all' approach. However, it 
would seem that the HIV/AIDS in/affected communities constructed within those 
expressions of 'alternative orthodox' discourse considered in this work articulate 
exactly this anachronistic mode of apprehending death, rather than the more modem 
version, despite the fact that the latter seems more in keeping with the general liberal, 
individualistic, personal rights and personal fulfilment orientated 'alternative 
orthodox' undertow. There is a possible explanation for this, which has two aspects. 
On the one hand, the sense of this approach lies in the hope which the older model 
provides but which the more recent version abjures. Armstrong holds that silence 
about death was kept by both patient and doctor because it allowed the patient the 
palliative benefits of hope and optimism in the face of approaching personal 
oblivion, benefits which would have been destroyed had the secret been uttered. It 
would seem that the hope which resides in uncertainty is, within the particular 
'alternative orthodox' texts analysed in this thesis, deemed to be more important than 
the relief of having a certain knowledge of one's medical circumstances, if that 
knowledge is of imminent or immanent death. This is an instance where the central 
principle of positivity is in conflict with the individual right to know about one's life 
expectancy, and it is the former principle which (perfectly reasonably) is allowed to 
come out on top. Death in these texts remains therefore unspoken, although it is by 
no means thereby denied; it is the shared secret of the HIV/AIDS in/affected 
community, known by all parties in the discussion, but seldom if ever uttered. 
Armstrong further contends that this form shared silence formed a bond between the 
patient and the physician which relied upon death remaining unmentionable (ibid). 
A similar process can be seen at work here, the unmentionability but undeniability of 
the close presence of death being one of the (spiritual-ethical) glues which hold 
together the community 'alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS subjects as articulated by, 
especially, the NAM and the Body Positive Newsletter. 
On the other hand, the invisibility of death in certain aspects of 'alternative orthodox' 
discourse is to a degree a function of the existentially threatening nature of late- 
modern death, and in particular death-in-AIDS. It was contended above that at one 
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level the identity most threatened by death-in-AIDS was communal. This is so, and 
it is at this level that death-in-AIDS may be confronted head on, in the way that 
history shows it has been. At another level, however, at the level at which this 
identity is made manifest in those who comprise the HIV/AIDS in/affected 
community, at the necessarily individual technical-ethical level (cf 8.2.3), death 
becomes again exactly as problematic as Mellor (1993) and Dittman (1996) suggest. 
Hence, by allowing individual death-in-AIDS to remain an acknowledged but 
unspoken secret - in keeping with which aim very little technical-ethical information 
about how the individual should address him/herself to the issue of his/her own death 
is provided - these examples of 'alternative orthodoxy' effectively remove from 
jeopardy that upon which the mechanisms of 'alternative orthodoxy' overall rest, the 
possibility of the production and maintenance of a coherent HIV/AIDS in/affected 
subject. This also provides a possible explanation for why death is afforded a 
'present-presence' in other forms of 'alternative orthodox' expression - death is 
perhaps mentionable where the form of discourse involved has no immediate 
individually ethical effects on those towards whom it is aimed, where it deals with a 
communal political response, but remains unmentionable where individualised 
technologies of self such as those identified in this work are articulated. This is, 
however, only a speculation, and properly to address this question would require 
extensive further research. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In all its contradictions and complexities, then, the discourse of HIV/AIDS opens a 
space in which a particular form of panoptic regulatory activity may be articulated, 
such activity operating principally through the ethical technologies of the dominant 
'alternative orthodox' aspect of the discourse. Prima facie, the most significant 
distinguishing quality which this technology displays is the definite political agenda 
at work within it; HIV/AIDS has been constructed as a surface upon which a vision 
of political subjectivity which is more usually confined to obscure journals and late 
night minority television can - potentially - be articulated to a wider audience (the 
conditions of possibility for the political-ethical vision given in the specialist texts 
studied herewith being the same as those which enable the 'alternative orthodox' 
hegemony in its more widespread form), and be so presented in a very favourable 
light. However, to conclude the analysis there would be to give an incomplete 
picture; for this regulatory mechanism does not operate in isolation, but needs to be 
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HIV/AIDS, GOVERNMENTALITY AND FREEDOM 
The term 'governmentality' is central to Foucault's later work and can be expanded 
(after Lucien Febvre) as 'the mentality of government', or the 'way of doing things' 
implicit in actions taken by individuals or populations which are designed to inform 
their conduct. Indeed, Foucault defined government as 'the conduct of conduct', an 
enterprise which it is characteristic of modern societies and the modern state to 
attempt to manage through the fusion of two distinct modes of power relation; 
government, then, is manifested through the interaction (although not quite 
integration) of coercive mechanisms of power, with those practices by which an 
individual acts ethically upon him/herself (Burchell 1993: 267-268; Gordon 
1987: 296-297). 
That government functions in such a way has an interesting effect; it means that 
regulation is achieved via the marrying of practices of domination to practices of 
freedom; indeed as Burchell suggests "as techniques of power, the disciplines 
presuppose the activity, agency or the freedom of those on whom they are exercised", 
and such techniques of domination co-exist with technologies of the self in a 
complex relation in which neither can be subsumed to the other. It may be that a 
particular technique of power forms a condition of possibility for a given technique 
of the self, but this is not necessarily so, and the interaction between these two levels 
of regulation may involve as much conflict as continuity. Nevertheless, it is within 
such interaction that the possibilities of how freedom can be practised are established 
(Burchell 1993: 268-269). 
Much commentary has been made to this effect with respect to the exercise of 
freedom under various governments which have lately held office and which have 
been afforded the epithet 'neo-liberal'. The particular relation which exists between 
such 'neo-liberal governmentality' and HIV/AIDS was, of course, one of the central 
planks in Simon Watney's work, and, given that this thesis proposes that the 
discourse of HIV/AIDS as a whole acts as a disciplinary and ethical regulatory 
technology, the relation between that discourse and whatever form of 
governmentality currently obtains ('neo-liberal' or otherwise) is obviously of interest. 
The approach to this issue taken herewith is rather different from Watney's, however; 
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Watney asks in what ways it is that 'neo-liberal governmentality' makes life difficult 
for HIV/AIDS in/affected persons. Although this is certainly a worthy question in 
itself, it is also an incomplete one, for reasons which are best illustrated by taking an 
example from Foucault's own work; when discussing Discipline and Punish, 
Pasquino describes how Foucault frames his question about the emergence of the 
prison, and suggests that he is contending that we need to ask ourselves 
"what are the elements of modernity which might help us to understand the emergence 
and consolidation of the system of punishment by imprisonment? We... should 
attempt... to see in what ways the prison is consistent with modern society... " 
(Pasquino 1993: 36) 
Similarly, rather than viewing HIV/AIDS (or rather the 'alternative orthodox' account 
of it) as an entity which has a given shape prior to and beyond the late modern 
context in which it emerged and which only subsequently affects it, we must seek to 
describe any elective affinity which may exist between current dominant 
governmental forms (whether 'neo-liberal' or whatever) and the appearance (in both 
senses of the word) of HIV/AIDS. 
8.1 Ways in which HIV/AIDS is consistent with late-modern governmentality 
The task at hand, then, is not merely to see whether HIV/AIDS has been exploited to 
political ends (which it doubtlessly has), and if so in what ways, but to gain an 
understanding of the intrinsic position HIV/AIDS holds within the governmental 
mechanism in which we find ourselves in the late twentieth century; to recognise that 
HIV/AIDS is less the victim of late modern occidental governmentality, than it is an 
aspect of it. Such a line is quite in keeping with Foucault's contention that in any 
given period the shapes of diseases which are typical of their age (as HIV/AIDS is of 
ours) will tend to reflect that period's forms of social and political organisation 
(1973: 33). 'Alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse is consonant with the late- 
modern world from which it emerged in five areas: in the relation it establishes 
between the individual and government; in the discourse's role as a 'new vocabulary 
of government'; in the mode of the discourse's construction of subjects; in its 
approach to ideas about science; in its approach to ideas about freedom. These will 
be dealt with each in turn. 
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8.1.1 Individualism & self-realisation 
A number of commentators have of late noted how government in the late modern 
West operates not at the level of class or gender, race or professional relations, but at 
the level of the individual. Rose, for example, holds that the management of 
contemporary life is distinctive in that the government of the large institutional 
bodies - the nation, businesses, hospitals and the like - is predicated on the regulation 
of the subjective and personal capacities of individuals. Government on the large 
scale is inextricably bound up with government at a microcosmic, ethical, level. This 
has in turn led to the emergence of whole new areas of expertise, those which 
articulate knowledges of subjectivity. He considers that such individualising 
knowledges were foundational in the birth of the contemporaneous new forms of 
political authority, and are still central to contemporary governmental forms today. 
These new forms of government seek to regulate persons not by denying their 
individual subjectivity, but instead by encouraging the production of certain forms of 
subjectivity which are in line with the preferred ends of the hegemony of the day - 
things such as economic advancement, being a good parent, being a happy family 
and so on (Rose 1989: 1-3; 1989a: 119-122,130). 
In essence Rose's argument is that all knowledges of subjectivity are in effect aspects 
of programmes of societal regulation; truth discourses about subjectivity are sired 
and fostered by the need to know subjects in order to govern them. And once such 
truths have achieved currency they will have the effect that their objects, in coming 
to recognise themselves and understand their own needs, wants and potentials in 
terms of that truth, will in effect regulate themselves, meeting the political demands 
which governmentality (by which he means the complex of institutions, practices, 
ways of thinking and enactments of such ways of thinking through which power is 
brought to bear on a given population) puts upon them through their efforts to realise 
their own private aspirations and fulfil their personal desires (Rose 1989: 208-209). 
Indeed, Rose sums up the functioning of modern governmental technologies in this 
way 
"The self is a vital element in the networks of power that traverse modern societies. 
The regulatory apparatus of the modern state is not something imposed from the outside 
upon individuals who have remained essentially untouched by it. Incorporating, 
shaping, channelling, and enhancing subjectivity have been intrinsic to the operations of 
government.... government of subjectivity has taken shape through the proliferation of 
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a complex and heterogeneous assemblage of technologies. These have acted as relays, 
bringing the varied ambitions of political, scientific, philanthropic, and professional 
authorities into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of individuals, with the selves 
each of us want to be. " 
(Rose 1989: 213) 
Rose is not, however, trying to draw an image of some sort of conspiracy. He notes 
how the objectives of these new technologies of government through individuality 
were - and, it is the contention of this thesis, still are - often philanthropic in their 
intent, as much as or more than they were motivated by the desire for profit or some 
other self-interest (Rose 1989a: 122). 
While the principal targets of Rose's analysis are the psychological sciences (Rose 
1989: 5), a similar claim can be made regarding governmental effects with respect to 
those discourses of subjectivity articulated around the issue of HIV/AIDS, and in 
particular those born of 'alternative orthodoxy', which can be seen as one of the 
heterogeneous technologies which comprise the latter-day extended governmental 
mechanism which inheres in modern forms of work, parenthood, and family life, and 
which is characterised by the way in which it makes regulation and self-realisation 
into co-extensive projects. Rose holds that in recent years there has been a 
burgeoning of techniques whereby people may resolve their inner turmoils, and 
thereby regulate themselves (things such as: analytic psychotherapy, gestalt therapy, 
behaviour therapy, rational-emotive therapy, person-centred therapy, personal 
conduct therapy), and although he does not name them specifically, self-help 
discourses such as 'alternative orthodoxy' certainly fit within this remit, sharing as 
they do the vocabulary of the therapeutic in their approach to dealing with the 
everyday reality of life as an HIV/AIDS in/affected (sexual) subject (1989: 213-214). 
Consider, for example, the aims expressed in the WHO definition of HIV 
counselling to enable clients to address the issue of HIV infection (both in terms of 
dealing with it if the client is actually infected, and in terms of preventing further 
infection) through seeking "to encourage and enhance self-determination, to boost 
self-confidence [and] improve... quality of life. " (quoted in Silverman et al 1992: 70). 
Such activities of self-fulfilment would all be undertaken within an 'alternative 
orthodox' universe which establishes the truth of the normal and pathological 
HIV/AIDS in/affected subject, and thus through its ethical technological aspects 
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encourages subjects to construct themselves as normal individuals according to this 
vision. 
Beck, too, has noted how one of the things which is distinctive about the late modern 
(post)industrial West is that, due to a fundamental change in the form of relation to 
be had between individuals and society, such societal units as the status group, the 
family, the social class, are no longer the atoms from which society is constructed, it 
is instead the market orientated individual which is the basic unit of the reproduction 
of the social. Social order in this radically individualised society stems from the 
multiple individual assessment of risks, rather than through any form of class 
structure. Beck argues, indeed, that the logical consequence of the way of thinking 
underlying this modernity, in which every individual must be unfettered by 
relationships such that they can respond obediently to the demands of the market if 
they are to survive, is the coming of a society individualised to the point where it 
possesses neither families nor children, so central is the figure of the single person 
(Beck 1992: 3,116,122,127,130). 
One can see elements of this form of thinking in 'alternative orthodox' discourse, for 
instance around the idea of safer sex. The matter of the production of children has 
been removed from sexual activity within the discourse of safer sex - sex in safer sex 
becomes a catalogue of allowable practices, of sexual commodities, from which one 
can choose. Notwithstanding the imperative nature of calls for its uptake, safer sex is 
a health-conferring lifestyle choice which can be bought into, as can exercise through 
the purchase of sports equipment or membership of a gymnasium, or a sensible diet 
through choosing fresh fruit and vegetables instead of crisps and chocolate at the 
supermarket. As such, it is something suitable for the radically individualised, non- 
reproductive, self-actualising consumer-subject which this late modern formation has 
as its ideal. 'Alternative orthodoxy' provides through its propagation of safer sex a 
technology by which individual sexual actors can reconstitute to some degree their 
individual risk in relation to HIV. So pervasive is this individualised mode of 
existence, then, that even something as fundamentally social as sex - after all, it takes 
two - is reducible to the assessment of individual risk. 
Beck certainly does not consider that such individuation is in any way interpretable 
as simply the zenith of personal self-determining freedom, however. Instead he 
holds that personal situations, notwithstanding their individuated character, are 
188 
nonetheless informed by, controlled by, and dependent upon institutions. This has 
the effect of making all private situations also institutional ones, of infusing the 
private sphere with the public one, and thereby making individuation the most 
advanced form of societalization. This situation is made possible because the risks 
which are of greatest significance to this new modernity are qualitatively different 
from those which suited the old; whereas previously risks were localised - the 
occupational hazards of factory work, for example, are located within the factory - 
recent risks show a tendency towards globalization. The consequences of 
modernisation are understood in terms of the threats they pose to all the life of planet 
Earth. The risks our world faces, then, through being in such fashion global, are also 
both "supra-national" and "non-class-specific". In other words, this latest form of 
modernity is organised around the individual apprehension of global risks, rather 
than the national-bureaucratic apprehension of quasi-individual risks, as was 
previously the case; that is, instead of having a situation in which it is the 
government which expresses the most concern, and takes most action, regarding 
national problems such as industrial safety, or the spread of syphilis or tuberculosis, 
in the 'risk society' it is the individual, and collectivities of individuals, who worry 
about, and seek to take action over, world-wide issues, such as the hole in the ozone 
layer, the destruction of the rain-forests, and, of course, the scourge of AIDS. 
Increasingly, then, the private realm is becoming the arena of the political, in terms 
of the fact that it is increasingly within the private sphere that the risks inherent in 
modern living must be calculated (Beck 1992: 12-13,109,130-131). With respect to 
HIV/AIDS, what can be seen in 'alternative orthodoxy' is a discursive ethical 
technology by which such private individual reckoning of relevant risks can be made. 
Again, this displays more of a coherence with dominant forms of governmentality 
than it does a resistance to it. 
8.1.2 New vocabularies and 'making up people' 
Such programmes of government as those described above require the production of 
a vocabulary by which to represent the domain to be governed, and through that 
representation to enable the possibility of management; that is, it is through the 
production of a particular way of representing the social realm that that realm is 
constructed as a thing amenable to a given form of regulation. Rose goes into some 
detail about what is needed with respect to vocabularies of government, arguing that 
government requires a general order of knowledge in order to make its domain 
"thinkable, calculable, and practicable", and also a more specific one by which the 
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"raw material of calculation" can be gathered - demographic knowledges such as 
those of births, deaths, marriages, sicknesses and so on. With respect to this latter 
requirement, for instance, he notes how the mundane operations of bureaucracy as 
found in medicine and psychiatry, education and the penal system, serve to construct 
people as individuals through the routine gathering and inscription of personal 
histories (1989: 6; 1989a: 120,125-126). This model of how government works fits to 
some extent with the analysis of 'alternative orthodoxy' which has been central to this 
thesis - for 'alternative orthodoxy' is just such a representational system; it is the new 
vocabulary of the sexual self, and one which increasingly applies not merely to those 
who have been directly affected by HIV/AIDS, but to an expanding number of less 
directly connected (sexual) subject positions in the post-HIV/AIDS world. As such, 
it can be regarded as the more general type of governmental knowledge - that which 
enables one to think the field in question. 
Beyond this point, though, the comparison must stop, for the mechanisms by which 
the new vocabularies which Rose describes are said to operate differ from those at 
work within 'alternative orthodoxy'. 'Alternative orthodoxy' lacks a mechanism to 
produce the second order of governmental discourse, by which information about the 
arena of government can be gathered, in order to assess its current state in an ongoing 
manner. This information needs to be of a type where it represents in a form readily 
amenable to calculation those elements of the domain in question which are deemed 
to be significant. The location in which such information is to be presented, digested 
and acted upon is some or other official place of decisions - the manager's office, the 
committee room, the ministry, and the like (Rose 1989a: 121). Governmentality as it 
is present in 'alternative orthodoxy', however, does not employ the forms of 
inscription characteristic of this order of discourse as Rose describes it. Its 
knowledges are not so readily amenable to calculation. Neither is there any central 
bureaucratic decision making office wherein the intelligence which has been 
gathered is translated into the actions of government. All this implies that if 
'alternative orthodoxy' is a governmental discourse, then some other form of 
governmentality is at work within it. 
This is indeed the case, for the two orders of discourse and their associated 
mechanisms which Rose describes are only necessary if the regulationary technique 
being employed involves a traditional professional-lay disciplinary relation. 
'Alternative orthodoxy' works instead primarily at an ethical level - the calculations 
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which under a disciplinary regime would be made bureaucratically are instead made 
by each and every individual who has become subject to the discourse, and who 
therefore comes to regulate him/herself in its terms. In such a system the equivalent 
to second order information is gathered, assessed and acted upon by multiple 
individual processes of self-reflection. 
'Alternative orthodoxy', then, provides a different form of governmentality from that 
described by Rose. In order to understand this difference, and the relationship 
between his model and this alternative form, it will be helpful to consider Rose's 
account of the governmental effects of the psychological discourses. He suggests 
that the government of human subjects is dependent on those scientific discourses 
which made the normal and the pathological functioning of people thinkable and 
knowable, principal amongst which are the psychologies, the construction of which 
has served to connect at a fundamental level technologies for the production of 
subjectivities with networks of power by which they may be regulated. The psyche, 
according to Rose, makes a peculiarly good domain for such government because its 
discourses stress the necessity for the subject not to be dominated, but to be free to 
make his/her own decisions within a nexus of relations with others. The 
psychologies produce subjects who are readily amenable to developing and 
controlling their own subjectivities through processes of self-inspection and self- 
correction (1989: ix-x, 7). 
The importance of such psychological discourses is manifested in the fact that our 
age is now characterised by what Rose terms 'the therapeutic culture of the self; that 
is, the particular form of selfhood which is found in the late twentieth century West 
is that of "the desiring, relating, actualising self', the self whose main objective is the 
continuous (re)production and development of itself (1989: xii). However, whereas 
Rose explores how such a self was constructed by the psychological discourses, the 
contention here is not that 'alternative orthodoxy' produces a similar form of 
selfhood, but instead that it relies upon such a construction, although not one of its 
own making. If the bureaucratic dossier-taking technologies of medicine, 
psychology, education and the like have constructed these self-actualising selves, 
then 'alternative orthodoxy' takes them as its raw material upon which it can bring its 
ethical technologies to bear. In other words, whereas the concern of the 
psychological sciences is to produce individuals through processes of inscription of 
certain aspects of them, 'alternative orthodoxy' is an ethical regulatory cuckoo, 
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concerned to inform subjectivities which have already been created, to give shape to 
the actual existential being of individuals whose basic capacity to existentiality was 
given by the variety of bureaucratic disciplinary technologies of inscription which 
were brought to bear upon such individuals prior to their coming into contact with 
'alternative orthodox' discourse. The regulatory potential of 'alternative orthodoxy'. 
then, relies on the fact that technologies of individuation are by now so ingrained in 
Western societal forms that by the time someone encounters its ethical technologies, 
that person will already have become individuated through the operations of the 
variety of bio-political technologies which are characteristic of our age. 
Given the above, the new vocabulary which 'alternative orthodoxy' establishes is 
perhaps better considered less as a governmental technology which works by 
producing subjectivities, than as a technology of subjectivity which happens to 
produce governmental effects. Arguably the more important aspect of 'alternative 
orthodox' discourse is, then, its function as a technology for what Hacking refers to 
as 'making up people' (1986). Hacking's position is highly similar to Rose's, in that 
he too holds that with the emergence of new ways of counting people, that is, with 
the creation of new categories of people, so there appears a corresponding set of new 
possibilities of being for people, but the emphasis of his analysis is more to do with 
the nature of the subjectivities produced than the bigger, societal picture which Rose 
paints. (Having said this, Hacking certainly does not ignore the connexions between 
the business of making up people and that of social control, suggesting that the 
expansion of labels devised in the nineteenth century by which to describe people as 
objects of a variety of professional gazes may have created the possibility of hugely 
more sorts of people than had ever been before, and have done so as part of a 
"medico-forensic-political language of individual and social control" (Hacking 
1986: 226). ) 
Hacking argues that when new categories by which to define people are created, 
people will come, quite spontaneously, to fit themselves into the "new ways for 
people to be" which are attendant with those new categorisations, making themselves 
into new kinds of people. Moreover, he holds that prior to the description of a 
category of person it is impossible to be that person. This is due to the peculiar 
nature of human action and being (as opposed to, say, the action and being of a non- 
self-conscious bacterium) in that it is intentional and must be comprehensible, and is 
therefore bounded and determined according to how it can be described. 
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Consequently, if no mode of description for an action or state of being exists, it is not 
possible deliberately to do that action, nor to understand oneself in terms of that state 
of being. Conversely, of course, if new ways of describing actions or ways to be 
emerge, then there is a corresponding and consequential increase in the possibilities 
which are open to people (1986: 230-23 1). Hence, prior to the invention of multiple 
personality disorder, and the homosexual as a type of person, it was possible to be 
neither a multiple nor a homosexual. This is not to say that there were not features of 
behaviour apparent in people which are now interpretable as signs of someone being 
either of those sorts of person, but that to adopt that sort of self concept as a response 
to behaving in such fashion was not an option (1986: 223-225). Hacking's argument, 
then, is that homosexuals and multiples were not discovered - there were not, he 
holds, discrete kinds of persons already in existence who languished in invisibility 
prior to their suddenly becoming visible to human scientists and bureaucrats towards 
the end of the nineteenth century - but that with the invention of that kind of person 
by such bureaucratic and human scientific enquiry came the simultaneous creation of 
that kind of person. "In some cases, that is, our classifications and our classes 
conspire to emerge hand in hand, each egging the other on" (1986: 228). 
A similar movement can be seen in the workings of 'alternative orthodoxy', in that it 
creates the possibility of an HIV/AIDS in/affected subjectivity. This may seem at 
first sight to be nonsense. It would, surely, be far more compelling to suggest that 
'alternative orthodoxy' merely shapes a state of being - in/affectedness - which is 
given by forces beyond that discourse's scope. This is not so, however, as can be 
seen by following one of the arguments which Hacking himself puts forward, 
pertaining to the differential ontological statuses of different classes of discursive 
object. 
Hacking describes four separate categories of objects: horses, planets, gloves, and 
multiple personalities. He argues that horses have similarities in nature beyond our 
decision to classify them together. Similarly, he suggests that when the conceptual 
shift was made which removed the Earth from the centre of the universe, and made 
the Moon and the Sun into different classes of celestial body from the other planets a 
real difference had been observed. Gloves, on the other hand, he considers to be true 
constructions, because they are the results of human manufacture - the concept 
"gloves" fits gloves like a glove because we make it so to do. Hacking's claim is that 
multiple personalities are more like gloves than like horses, in that the category and 
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the thing emerged simultaneously, each as a function of the other. He would hold 
that the same applies to homosexuals and to gay men, and the argument here is that 
HIV/AIDS in/affected persons fit this model as well (1986: 228-229). 
Assuming for the moment that it is safe to accept Hacking's realist ideas about his 
first two categories of objects (a moot point), there is a variety of reasons why 
HIV/AIDS in/affected persons are themselves more like gloves than horses; that is, 
even if one accepts that being infected with HIV is a state which exists beyond the 
discursive construction of it (another moot point) there are reasons to think that the 
HIV/AIDS in/affected personhood which 'alternative orthodoxy' provides is not a 
necessary function of the ontology of being infected. The first and most obvious 
reason is because affectedness is more significant than infectedness within the 
discourse - although it is certainly problematic, infectedness is (putatively) relatively 
easily determined by means of a blood test, whereas affectedness can mean whatever 
it has to in order for the discourse to be in contact with the given individual who is to 
be regulated by it. One can be said to be affected if one: is infected; knows or loves 
someone who is infected; is part of a population subgroup with a high level or risk or 
infection; has friends or relatives who are members of such a population subgroup 
although one is not a member oneself; is sexually active; knows or loves someone 
who is sexually active; is a living human on planet earth in the late twentieth century. 
The vagueness of the category of affectedness is central to the efficiency of the 
discourse as an ethical technology - whereas top-down disciplinary regulatory 
technologies rely upon the professional identification of a minority of citizens as 
something, HIV/AIDS provides the opportunity for the majority of citizens to 
identify themselves or those around them as something, almost no matter what their 
individual circumstances are. It is almost harder not to be HIV/AIDS in/affected 
than to be so. This strategy not only vastly enlarges the contact patch of the 
discourse, but also serves to give it a stronger grip on those it subjectifies, because 
each of them will have decided for themselves that they should be constructed as 
HIV/AIDS in/affected, rather than finding themselves constrained to be defined by 
some or other professional gaze. People are quite likely to revolt against their 
doctor's judgement, but will defend their own assessments most vociferously. 
Secondly, having said that infectedness is more easily defined than affectedness, it is 
not without its problems - to recapitulate, HIV antibody tests are still 
held in some 
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quarters to be unreliable, the virus has an extraordinarily long and unpredictable 
latency period, and even if one is not presently infected, there is always the 
possibility of future infection lurking in the shadows. Thirdly, even if infectedness 
were sufficiently stable to be deemed a more suitable basis for an HIV/AIDS related 
discourse than affectedness is, the idea is none the less loaded with political-ethical- 
moral notions pertaining to how to be as an HIV infected individual, which could be 
other than they are - that is with things which are not necessarily derivable from the 
ontology of the object of HIV infection. 
The HIV/AIDS in/affected subject which is established by 'alternative orthodoxy' 
differs from both the multiple personality and the homosexual, however, in one 
central way; it is not a function of the bureaucratic professional creation of classes - 
its condition of possibility does not reside in the trained 'recognition' of certain types 
of people - but instead depends upon a non-professional or more accurately proto- 
professional, but always lay, gaze which operates more or less laterally. Admittedly, 
one could argue that the authority voices described in chapters 4-6 gaze down upon 
their readers, but they are nevertheless of a far more equal standing with their 
subjects than the faceless machinery of calculating bureaucracy is with those who it 
counts. The authority voices of 'alternative orthodoxy' are always themselves 
members of the classificatory group (HIV/AIDS in/affected persons) the possibility 
of which their discourse serves to create, and as such 'alternative orthodoxy's' 
construction of the HIV/AIDS in/affected individual shares a great deal with the way 
the possibility of being a gay man was created by people who previously were only 
able to make themselves up as homosexuals. However, its grass roots credentials 
should not be taken to imply that it is therefore immune to the charge of being an 
aspect of a regulatory technology; to recapitulate, Hacking argues that the 
establishment of the possibility of being a particular kind of person involves the 
creation of a new vocabulary for discussing that kind of personhood, while Rose 
holds that the establishment of the possibility of a new realm of government requires 
precisely the same. Ergo, if a new mode of representing a given domain emerges, 
with it necessarily comes both the possibility of making up people in a new way, and 
that of governing them in a new way, with the new mode of personhood and the new 
mode of government being connected to each other at root, sharing as they do the 
same conditions of possibility. Every new way of making up people implies a new 
way of governing them, and vice versa. 
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There are considerable advantages for the purposes of regulation, though, if the 
particular form of personhood technology established by a discourse relies on a lay- 
to-lay mode of construction (as is the case with gay men and with HIV/AIDS 
in/affected persons) rather than a professional-to-lay one (as was the case with 
homosexuals and still is with multiples). The palpable historical resistance to the 
classification 'homosexual', and the contradictory enthusiasm amongst people who 
practice same-sex activity for the alternative 'gay' identity, is evidence enough that a 
form of being created by an external professional classification is not going to be as 
stable as one that is created by those who wish themselves to take the label. 
This is not to say, though, that professional-to-lay classifications of personhood 
possibility are wholly anachronistic, and now supplanted by the more efficient lay-to- 
lay variety; for arguably, one needed first to have the homosexual in order to invent 
the gay man, because without the homosexual, there would have been no possibility 
of being a person whose essential self was defined by sexual object choice, a central 
aspect of the gay identity. Similarly, it should perhaps be contended that there could 
be no HIV/AIDS in/affected person - at least not in a form recognisably similar to the 
one which 'alternative orthodoxy' articulates - without the prior existence of the gay 
identity. We can, perhaps, see a natural history of power infused regulatory identities 
emerging here: first one has subjectivities created by the professionally regulated 
inscription of certain qualities of persons (of the sort the importance of which is 
emphasised by both Rose and Hacking) into a form of identity which is amenable to 
a disciplinary style of regulation; then that identity will come to be reclaimed and re- 
invented by those who have adopted it, thereby removing the professional aspect 
(and the need for detailed note-taking), stabilising the whole creation, and altering 
the mode of regulation from the disciplinary to the ethical; next comes the stage 
whereby that identity is used as a former to construct new related 'spin-off identities, 
with more diverse possibilities, and therefore the potential to appeal to a wider 
audience - again regulation here will operate at an ethical 
level, but the possibility of 
'lateral panopticism' (cf 7.2) also opens up with the creation of such new forms. 
One can certainly see such a movement in the history of HIV/AIDS related identities, 
but whether or not the model would bear out in other areas is beyond the bounds of 
this thesis. Hacking, certainly, holds that it is not possible to give a generalised 
account of the making up of people, arguing that each category is unique and 
has a 
unique history. He does, however, offer a partial framework, in which 
he describes 
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two 'vectors' which are quite similar to the first two stages outlined above, describing 
the first vector being to do with the realities which are created by expert labelling 
"from above", which some non-expert people then choose to adopt, and the second as 
being to do with "the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled, which presses 
from below" and creates an alternative, competing reality (1986: 234). The properties 
of 'alternative orthodoxy' are such that in some ways it appears to be located on the 
boundary between these two vectors - it is both expert and autonomous from 
expertise, its roots are in resistance from below, yet its pronouncements comprise an 
authority from above - but in other, perhaps more compelling ways (in particular 
because of its peculiar abilities to be both inviting to everyone and yet exclusive, and 
to have both a clear central authoritative voice, while still seeming to offer the 
possibility of the radically de-regulated sort of authority which comes with self- 
assessment) it seems to be an example of a third kind of vector, one stage further on. 
8.1.3 'Biographical construction kits' 
Government of the late twentieth century West, then, is characterised by its creating 
and shaping possibilities of being for those who are to be governed, by the way it 
revolves around the production and regulation of individual subjectivity. If one 
traces this mode of government back to its inception, one can observe, as Rose does, 
the importance of professionally organised discursive technologies such as the 
psychological assessment, through which people are made calculable, and thereby 
become amenable, "in the name of their subjective capacities", both to having certain 
things done to them, and to doing certain things to themselves (1989: 7-8). As a more 
recent expression of governmentality, however, the way in which 'alternative 
orthodoxy' renders subjectivity is such it makes people amenable to doing things to 
themselves far more than to having things done to them, and does so in ways that are 
more existential than psychological - the discourse is less about uncovering the truth 
of the inner self, of 'finding oneself through therapy, than of fulfilling the self, 
through effecting personal change, via appropriate ethical action. 
Such a situation is not at odds with Rose's model, however. He suggests that the 
limits which liberal democratic governmental forms place upon direct coercion of 
individuals to the purposes of the state necessitates a state of affairs in which it is the 
choices, aspirations and value of free individuals which need to governed. Hence the 
foundational position of expertise regarding subjectivity in late twentieth century 
Western governmentality, because if it cannot directly repress, then to be effective 
197 
government must be indirect. Expertise provides the bridge by which the pertinent 
targets of government (the conduct of individuals) can be reached by the apparatuses 
of the state, its efficaciousness guaranteed by the compelling nature of the truths, 
norms and images which it offers. Within such a mechanism the citizens control 
themselves, each one being an active agent, effectively colluding with the state (Rose 
1989: 10) 
"Such a citizen subject is not to be dominated in the interests of power, but to be 
educated and solicited into a kind of alliance between personal objectives and ambitions 
and institutionally or socially prized goals or activities. Citizens shape their lives 
through the choices they make about family life, work, leisure, lifestyle, and personality 
and its expression. Government works by 'acting at a distance' upon these choices, 
forging a symmetry between attempts of individuals to make life worthwhile for 
themselves, and the political values of consumption, profitability, efficiency, and social 
order. Contemporary government, that is to say, operates through the delicate and 
minute infiltration of the ambitions of regulation into the very interior of our existence 
and experience as subjects. " 
(ibid) 
Although the dominant values of 'alternative orthodoxy' may not be "consumption, 
profitability, efficiency, and social order", the mechanism which the discourse 
articulates is identical with that which Rose suggests is characteristic of our age. 
Through providing a catalogue of possibilities for HIV/AIDS in/affected subject - 
possibilities regarding therapy, personal attitudes, politics and so on - 'alternative 
orthodoxy' achieves government at the level of the soul (Rose 1989: 11). It provides 
a territory in which the individual who encounters it can reckon his/her own qualities 
against those of a normative image of what s/he could be, according to expert 
authorities in possibilities of being for an HIV/AIDS in/affected person, such as 
those considered by this thesis. 
The regulatory processes found in 'alternative orthodoxy' are in line with the times in 
a further aspect, however. Rose suggests that the principal form of self- 
understanding which people now have is at an economic level, and is that of the 
(individual) consumer rather than the (class conscious) producer. The principal way 
in which people are able to give meaning to their lives is by constructing an 
individual lifestyle, made up of a selection of elements proffered in the 
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representations of the possibilities of life given in a variety of media. The ongoing 
business of purchasing products and services is co-extensive with the project of one's 
own self. Individuality is generally a function of buying (either literally or 
metaphorically in the sense of 'buying into') an off the peg, mix and match lifestyle. 
This has the effect that political citizenship is no longer a matter of being afforded 
certain privileges and responsibilities as a result of being a member of the body 
politic, but it is a function of the individual free exercise of choice within the market 
place (1989: 102,226). 
Beck, too, holds that peoples' self-understandings, their identities, their 'biographies', 
are increasingly becoming a function of such mandatory lifestyle choice, and given 
this, that the individualisation which characterises late modern societies implies 
necessary market dependency; to him, the modem day collectivity of individuals 
comprise an "isolated mass market" - that is, the level at which institutional control 
can be made of the social is no longer the class, nor the family, but is the individual, 
through the institutionally shaped individual (but standardised) biography. What he 
is arguing is that in individualisation is the mechanism for a kind of standardisation 
and institutional control of unprecedented penetration; he holds that this form of 
individualisation has led to a marked decrease in the number of areas of life wherein 
persons have no opportunity to make identity-informing personal decisions, and to a 
corresponding increase in the amount of biography-shaping decision-making which 
each individual must make. The limits to the possible choices which one can make, 
however, are given according to the requirements of dominant social institutions in 
the form of what Beck terms "construction kits of biographical combination 
possibilities". This isolated mass market, then, consumes en masse not only the 
generic physical goods on the market, but also generic "opinions, habits, attitudes 
and lifestyles" (Beck 1992: 131-132,135). 
'Alternative orthodoxy' constructs in miniature this marketplace of subjectivity, 
providing as it does exactly such biographical construction kits, in a form directed 
towards the 'sexual and threatened by HIV/AIDS subject'. The straightforward 
information-giving aspects of it advertise what is available to buy into, the 
confessional accounts provide the dramaturgical human element, by which one may 
compare the projected subjectivity of the protagonists with one's own, to see if the 
products they employ would fit well into one's own life-play. Just as the modern 
worker must seek fulfilment within rather than emancipation from work (Rose 
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1989: 103), so the HIV/AIDS in/affected individual cannot hope to be freed from 
infection and/or affectedness, but must instead realise his/her potentialities through 
the ethical possibilities inscribed in 'alternative orthodox' discourse. Just as things 
such as the Quality of Working Life movement served to bolster managerial 
authority by aligning the individual's personal objectives with those of the company 
(Rose 1989: 108-110), so 'alternative orthodoxy' aligns the most basic desires of those 
whom it touches - to stay alive and healthy - with a particular, preferred politico- 
moral vision. And the ideal subject which this 'alternative orthodox' ethical 
mechanism seeks to construct is strikingly similar to that which Beck argues is the 
usual product of the current form of modernity, in that s/he must be motivated by 
self-interest (in the sense of seeking self-fulfilment) and vigorously active (that is 
self-constructing) (Beck 1992: 136). 
Rose holds that the current form of governmental rationality is as effective as it is 
precisely because it forms a space within which the exact desires, aims and values of 
individuals and families can vary. Conduct is only tightly controlled by legislation at 
the boundaries of this space. The government of conduct is then achieved through 
the manifold personal efforts of individuals, in their attempts to construct for 
themselves a lifestyle from the alternatives on offer within this governmental space 
(Rose 1989: 224). 'Alternative orthodoxy' stands both as a microcosmic version of 
this system, pertaining to a specific (but expandable) section of the population, and 
as an expression of that mode of government overall. Such a mode of government is, 
of course, far more efficient than a more direct form of control, partly because it is 
less likely readily to provide opportunities for resistance, and partly because late 
modern Western subjectivity is at such a profound level about making individual 
choices of consumption. Therefore a system of regulation within which one is given 
a field of ethical choices from which one can get an 'off the peg' lifestyle fits very 
well with the forms of self-concept which are characteristic of our era. Although it is 
not often overtly consumerist, the notion of choosing and working towards a lifestyle 
in this fashion is present in 'alternative orthodoxy', making for a good fit with such a 
form of government. 
8.1.4 Science and expertise 
It is not only at the level of the political-economic hegemony of the consumption 
orientated subject that 'alternative orthodoxy' is consonant with the times, however, it 
also follows precisely late modem approaches to scientific knowledge and authority 
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familiar from other arenas. Science's failure to provide a ready solution to the 
problem of HIV/AIDS, and its consequential apparent loss of authority, is something 
often noted within 'alternative orthodox' discourse (cf Weeks 1988: 10,13-14). This 
is, of course, very much in keeping with the general distrust and antipathy towards 
science and technology which is oft noted by social commentators as a significant 
aspect of late twentieth century Western culture, and as being indicative of the 
decline of the classical modernist social formation. Beck, however, considers that 
this "counter-modernistic scenario [which is] currently upsetting the world" 
represents not the collapse of modernity, but rather a new reflexive form of 
modernisation, one which is not confined within the limits of industrial society (Beck 
1992: 11). Such a thesis provides a more illuminating insight into the position of 
science within 'alternative orthodoxy' than any specious account of some noble 
populace rising up in the face of the failure of 'big science'. 
Beck argues that increasingly the acquisition of wealth is reckoned in terms 
secondary to the management of risks, in a reversal of the position which 
characterised classical modernism. This process goes hand in hand with the loss on 
the part of the populous of their previously held naive and unreflexive faith in 
technologism. Such a reflexive loss of faith is, to Beck, not at all indicative of the 
failure of the modernist project, but is part of it. For as a result of this general 
decreasing faith in science, scientific knowledge has become massively 
demonopolized. While scientific knowledge overall is becoming increasingly vital 
to society's continued successful running, it is simultaneously becoming decreasingly 
able to define truth satisfactorily and solidly, as its past mistakes come home to roost, 
and as it becomes more and more differentiated -a process bringing with it an ever 
increasing amount of conditional and uncertain results which become impossible to 
comprehend in totality (1992: 12-13,156,167). 
Nevertheless, society remains subject to a general process of scientization. This 
process can be seen in the observation Beck makes about the nature of the threats 
which our society nowadays considers itself to be facing. He notes how such threats 
are more and more couched as things which are as yet somewhat abstract and 
intangible, and which will likely affect our children, and our children's children more 
than they will our own generation. He also notes the seeming contradiction that 
although such threats are often seen as the results of the failure of scientific 
modernism - global warming, pollution and the problem of nuclear waste, 
for 
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example, are all couched as being the results of irresponsible employment of 
scientific techniques in industry - they nevertheless require a scientific gaze in order 
to be perceptible as threats in the first place. It is scientific prediction which alerts 
the world to the probable damage past and present science has done to the future 
world (1992: 156-157,162). The construction of HIV/AIDS fits this model precisely - 
with rumours that HIV was the result of an experiment gone wrong and with the 
failure of medicine to combat the disease as effectively as we have been led to 
believe it should be able, science is (at least partially) to blame for the problem of 
HIV/AIDS. Yet the full significance of that problem - the ever increasing predictions 
of how much worse a scourge the disease will be, soon - rely entirely on virological 
and epidemiological science. 
The tension between this societal reliance on scientific knowledge and the increasing 
difficulty in making clear, definite, trustworthy sense out of scientific data, serves to 
afford those non-scientists who seek to apply scientific understandings (or indeed 
those who are the targets of scientific thought) an active role in the co-production of 
such knowledges, and indeed of knowledge itself, because of the need to "actively 
manipulate the heterogeneous supply of scientific interpretations". Lay people are 
increasingly becoming the "assessors of science", freed from slavish adherence to the 
dictates of experts, and instead coming to work in a co-operative relation with 
professional scientists, the latter providing their expertise as a service to be bought or 
rejected, rather than dispensing truth to be unquestioningly consumed by ordinary 
folk. In other words, because lay people and experts are generally becoming 
decreasingly discrete from each other, the straightforward process of internalisation 
of ideological norms on the part of the public, which characterised science to lay 
relations up until the 1960s, has been displaced by the reflection upon and decision 
between competing knowledges and expertises (Beck 1992: 156-157,168-169). 
This is precisely the situation which the idealised member of the 'alternative 
orthodox' HIV/AIDS in/affected community finds him/herself, compelled to use 
medico-scientific accounts of HIV/AIDS (or else end up excluded, and part of the 
'dissident' camp), yet at the same time not to submit his/her HIV in/affected 
personhood to the direct control of medics and scientists. The good HIV/AIDS 
in/affected person must take control of his/her own therapy, and must acquire 
sufficient expertise to do so. And in doing so s/he is once more aligning him/herself 
with the dominant governmental mode of societal regulation through mandatory 
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choice-making within a bounded space of freedom; for within such a model medical 
options and scientific accounts become so many competing products within the 
ethical lifestyle catalogue. You must choose the truth and therapeutic strategy which 
is right for you, but you must do so within the bounds of ontology and practicability 
which 'alternative orthodoxy' sets up. Hence the form of the authority voice in 
'alternative orthodoxy', with its tendency to make its pronouncements as those of an 
'old hand' who nonetheless remains a member of the laity. In an age which has 
become sceptical of professional experts, the pronouncements of an amateur expert 
will be more commanding than those of a psychologist, a doctor, a teacher or similar. 
The textual community voice of 'alternative orthodoxy' provides an image of an 
informed, intelligent member of the lay public, who has already engaged with 
medicine and science, has found them wanting, and has assessed their strengths and 
weaknesses by virtue of his/her existential experience of being HIV/AIDS 
in/affected. 
8.1.5 Freedom 
It can be seen, then, that it is not only elected governments which can exhibit 
governmentality. This fact was observed by Foucault in his later works, with his 
contention that in contemporary society there is a movement away from a 
disciplinary mode of regulation of people's lives, and towards regulation along 
ethical lines, in which each individual constructs his/her own 'aesthetic of existence', 
in a manner exactly similar to that found within the textual dynamics of 'alternative 
orthodoxy' (Gordon 1993(1986): 31). As has already been suggested, the form of 
ethical relation necessary for individuals to auto-construct and auto-regulate in this 
way requires ethical authority discourses, and it is in this light that the emergent 
'alternative orthodoxy' can been seen as a governmental discourse, as a mechanism of 
individualisation and totalization, concerned as it is to regulate both individuals and 
an entire population, and to do so through informing their 'free' lifestyle choices, 
rather than through disciplinary coercion (although a certain amount of disciplinary 
quasi-coercion, in the form of the lateral surveillance nexus described earlier, will be 
involved too). It can be seen as a device for the exercise of 'bio-politics' (a term 
coined by Foucault which Gordon describes as "the phenomenon whereby the 
individual and collective life of human populations, or even of the human species, 
becomes an explicit object of practices of government"(1987: 299)), but one which 
emanates less from the ascendant neo-liberal phoenix, than from the old 'free Left', 
and does so as a function of the latter movement's resistance to the former. 
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This may appear to contradict the idea that HIV/AIDS exists as it does as an element 
of late modern governmentality (a thing not often said to have any great sympathy 
with the 'spirit of '68') but this is not so; notwithstanding their explicitly differing 
political flavours, the parallels between the role of the rationality of the recent liberal 
hegemony which has informed such governmentality, and that of the rationality of 
the 'alternative orthodoxy' are marked; Burchell describes a "distinctive liberal art of 
government" which involves "governed individuals adopting particular practical 
relations to themselves in the exercise of their freedom in appropriate ways". This is 
to be achieved via the propagation of appropriate techniques of self around a variety 
of discourses made problematic by their relation to liberal thinking - some examples 
are the questions of saving; of how being a parent should be enacted; of self- 
improvement; of personal responsibility (1993: 273). This process leads eventually to 
a situation in which acceptance of the rationality of liberalism - being that which 
informs the available practices of the self through which freedom is manifested - 
becomes a condition of the active exercise of freedom (ibid: 276) 
The 'alternative orthodoxy', through its seeking to establish what it is to be 
in/affected by HIV/AIDS, what are the burning issues for someone so in/affected, 
how someone should respond practically, politically and above all personally to 
HIV/AIDS, realises an almost identical strategy. The fact that it articulates quasi- 
existential notions of self-realisation, coupled with pseudo-Kantian rhetorics of 
pluralistic respect for persons (cf Benn 1988; Cooper 1990), may seem to imply that 
radically deregulated, multiform and individually authentic freedoms are central 
designs of the 'alternative orthodoxy', but this is not the case. Such rhetorics belie 
the fact that, within the 'alternative orthodox' mode of thought, in order to be deemed 
worthy of respect, and thereby to be afforded the possibility of freedom, one must 
already have done ethical work upon oneself such that one inhabits, functions within, 
and would make any expressions of freedom in terms of, 'alternative orthodoxy's' 
tightly policed and politico-morally regulated space. The desert and attainment of 
freedom, then, are inextricably tied up with an ethical regulatory project; the numbers 
may be different from the neo-liberal example, but the formula is the same, reflecting 
a near identical underlying way of thinking government -a way of thinking which 
runs deeper than expressed political opinion. 
In an attempt to address this problem - that the practice of freedom can be in itself a 
part of a technology of regulation - Nikolas Rose proposes that it is possible to 
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differentiate between freedom as a means of resistance and freedom as device of 
power (1992: 3). He describes some ways in which freedom may be understood in 
this second sense; 
"freedom as it has been articulated into norms and principles for organising our 
experience of our world and of ourselves; freedom as it is realised in certain ways of 
exercising power over others; freedom as it has been articulated into certain rationales 
for practising in relation to ourselves. " 
(ibid) 
In short, freedom becomes a device of power when it is made technological, when 
freedom is found as a function of particular forms of practices. He further postulates 
the possibility of a critical sociology of freedom which would explore 
"rationalities and techniques of government that have sought to justify themselves in 
terms of freedom and certain practices of the self in which selves have been encouraged 
to understand and act towards themselves and others in terms of a norm of freedom. " 
(ibid) 
Indeed, the centrality of freedom (or rather of a certain way of thinking freedom) as 
an organising principle for everyday life is, he suggests, characteristic of our age. 
However, with respect to HIV/AIDS, the interesting thing is that the concern for 
freedom is less articulated in those forms of discourse which one might expect prima 
facie to be conduits of 'freedom as a formula of power' than it is in discourses which 
are openly advocates of resistance - that by dint of resistance being organised and 
collective, a normative authority discourse of resistance emerges, and Rose's 
distinction is, in this case, threatened with collapse; 'freedom as a formula of 
resistance' becomes 'freedom as a formula of power', with a different political 
emphasis from those of dominant neo-liberal discourses, but with a highly similar 
technique. Rose describes advanced liberal strategies of government as operating not 
via the controlled articulation of expertises concerned with 'society', but rather 
through the regulation of the personal choices, obligations and investments one feels 
towards those in one's immediate world, those "in relation to whom one's destiny [is] 
linked"; that is, these strategies create a new relation between the mechanisms of the 
government of others and technologies of the government of the self, with the effect 
that individuals thereby take an active role in their own government. The territory 
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within which this new alliance operates is that of the set of mutual obligations which 
comprise the community (1993: 285; 1996: 330-331). Such, however, is an equally 
good description of the strategy for resistance exhibited within 'alternative 
orthodoxy'; in its making of ethical prescriptions about how to respond morally, 
politically and personally to HIV/AIDS, in its describing the form that freedom 
seeking resistance should take, rather than simply making an underdetermined call to 
resistance, the 'alternative orthodoxy' fulfils all of Rose's criteria for being a 
discourse of freedom as a device of power, and therefore a legitimate object of 
inquiry for his proposed critical sociology of freedom. 
This problem is not unprecedented, though - HIV/AIDS is not the only seeming 
territory of resistance which operates towards the ends of modem governmental 
thinking; Kitzinger, for example, has argued that dominant lesbian identities, in 
following the liberal humanistic norms of 'romantic love' and 'personal fulfilment', 
merely reproduce the repressive patriarchal ideology which first inscribed the 
possibility of that kind of self-conception. Lesbians who adopt that manner of self- 
understanding in doing so serve to reproduce, strengthen and legitimate boundaries 
of thought which are functions of the very social order which oppresses them, and 
against which lesbian identities are commonly imagined to be a radical alternative 
(Kitzinger 1989: 82-83,88-89). A very similar dynamic appears to operate through 
'alternative orthodoxy' in that the possibilities of being which it establishes rely on 
the same technologies of thought, and therefore must be seen as supporting, and as 
aspects of, late modern governmentality. 
There is one highly significant difference, however, between what Kitzinger observes 
to be true for lesbian identities and what can be said of the subjectivities created by 
'alternative orthodoxy'; for the latter, although they reproduce exactly the 
mechanisms of late modern governmentality, have successfully changed the manifest 
content of the political message which the subject must hear, into something which, 
although it has certain parallels with the bourgeois ideals which are commonly 
understood to sit at the heart of modern Western governmentality (individualism, 
self-realisation through purchasing power, and so on - cf 8.1.1), nevertheless has its 
roots in and still reflects a far more radical approach to the world. In doing so they 
sow the seed for possibly more fundamental change at some point in the future -a 
change which would perhaps mirror the more extreme elements within 'alternative 
orthodoxy', those which are aware of the workings of governmentality and seek a 
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response to HIV/AIDS which is more profoundly communal than the collectivity-of- 
like-minded-individuals style of response which obtains currently. This is a highly 
efficient strategy; given that all people in the West are inevitably made-up as typical 
late modern individuals by the plethora of discursive technologies which bear upon 
them from birth, it must be at the level of such an individual - accessible through the 
technologies of self which characterise late modern govemmentality - which one 
gives the message that this form of individuality is ripe for challenging. Otherwise 
one will remain unheard. 
Hence, there is within 'alternative orthodoxy' (and indeed - just to pre-empt the 
charge that the following argument relies on a methodological artefact - within 
individual 'alternative orthodox' texts) a tension between those elements of it which 
bolster the dominant mode of thinking and those which could upset it. 'Alternative 
orthodoxy', of course, like all discourses, is a fluid, changeable thing, and although 
the radical aspect of the discourse is very much an undertow beneath the more 
powerful quasi-conformist-individual-governmental aspect, which of these will 
eventually dominate is hard to say. However, given the fact that the more radical the 
message, the less immediate and powerful the ethical effect that it has, the odds have 
to be on the latter, unless there is some major shift in the form of micro-power in 
society generally. For someone who has always understood themselves as an 
individual, it is a relatively small step to convert one's ethical project of self from the 
sort which is most obvious within late modern liberal governmentality - to forge an 
aspirant, acquisitive self - to one which involves the development of the sort of 
humanistic tolerant pluralism often found in 'alternative orthodoxy'; it is merely a 
matter of putting a different raw material into the same machine, like switching to 
unleaded petrol, or making packages out of re-cycled paper waste instead of virgin 
wood pulp. It would require a quantum leap of thought, however - like giving up the 
car completely for some new and unimaginable form of transport - for many of the 
subjects of 'alternative orthodoxy' to respond ethically to the more radical side of the 
discourse. 
What all this has to do with the issue of freedom may not be immediately clear. The 
connexion is to be found in the fact that what it is to be free depends upon what 
technologies are available by which to realise that freedom. Liberal forms of 
government, in forming a society which depends upon 
individuals regulating 
themselves, and in turn upon the existence of technologies of self by which forms of 
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self-regulatory subjectivity are constituted and shaped, serve to construct what Rose 
terms "space(s) of regulated freedom", which operate through widespread ethical 
self-regulatory practices. In such a situation, citizens, in choosing how to conduct 
themselves freely, regulate themselves according to the dominant account of how 
things should be, through their own strivings to live a good life (Rose 1989: 223- 
224). 'Alternative orthodoxy' opens one such space of freedom in the technologies it 
provides for existential self-realisation and fulfilment through the moulded 
experience of being HIV/AIDS in/affected. As such, it is very similar to other 
contemporary but not HIV/AIDS related notions of freedom, in that it depends upon 
people having been made-up such that they are amenable to transformation through 
slow, individual, painstaking ethical work, undertaken within a bounded knowledge 
of the possibilities of autonomous action, as established by the expert knowledges 
provided within authority discourses. Rose holds that the psychological is the most 
important such authority in society at large (1989: 253), but in 'alternative orthodoxy' 
what one can see is a related set of commanding expertises, currently more localised, 
but with great potential for expansion of their domain of influence and authority. 
While it is possible that a future discursive configuration may enable a presently 
almost inconceivably different, communal form of freedom (the progenitors of such a 
mode of thought and being are certainly present in 'alternative orthodoxy') for the 
moment this dominant form of HIV/AIDS discourse reproduces a notion of freedom 
as being enacted through individual lifestyle choices which have as their overt aim 
personal happiness and fulfilment, but which are aligned with the forms of rationality 
which underpin our society's political, social and institutional aspirations. Thus, 
expressions of personal freedom as an HIV/AIDS in/affected person can and should 
be viewed as elements in the achievement of government; for whether expressions of 
personal freedom are affirmations of our culture's overall hegemonic messages, or 
are acts of resistance to them of the form most often found within 'alternative 
orthodoxy', both forms of expression are predicated on the same technical conditions 
of possibility. 
8.2 A bad thing? 
Weber (1948,1949) is quite right to suggest that one cannot expect (social) science to 
decide the sorts of questions of moral and political values raised by this work. 
However, sociologists live in a moral and political world and cannot by fiat absolve 
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themselves from their responsibilities in this regard, whether or not they would like 
to. Consequently, is becomes necessary to consider the implications of the fact that 
'alternative orthodoxy' articulates a mechanism of governance, around the issue of 
whether such governmental technologies are in and of themselves bad, or whether it 
is the (largely neo-liberal) uses to which they have been put in recent years that has 
afforded them the sociological bad press they have generally received. 
Before setting out to address this question, there is a point of order which needs to be 
made, given the Weberian methodological pre-commitments of this work (cf 2.5.2): 
if 'neo-liberal' rationality is to be criticised simply by virtue of its governmental 
nature (that is because it has disciplinary and ethical ramifications, whatever they 
may be), then, along with a wide variety of other 'progressive' discourses, the 
'alternative orthodoxy' must be tarred with the same brush. If, on the other hand, the 
problem is not the very fact of the existence of any governmental mechanism, but 
instead lies with certain of the specific values articulated by whichever system 
happens to be dominant, then the dangers inherent in governmentality per se must 
become incidental to the debate. Otherwise, what should be a rigorous and (as far as 
possible) objective study will be in danger of being reduced to nothing but specious 
sophistry. It would, for example, be methodologically highly dubious to decide that 
the mechanisms articulated in the 'alternative orthodoxy' were indeed Rose's 'freedom 
as resistance' (1992: 3), and therefore to be excused from critical gaze, or to gaze 
upon them but with too sympathetic an eye (whilst still attacking their detractors for 
faults which both sides exhibit) simply because such a course were in keeping with 
one's own moral instinct and political leanings. 
8.2.1 Governmentality as a problem in itself 
Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to consider Kinsman's discussion of the 
'problem' of the operation of technologies of governance through community based 
HIV/AIDS organisations. In his work, which is based on data from Ontario, he 
constructs a history in which such organisations have been to the greater extent 
transformed from their original purpose - advocacy of those affected by the syndrome 
- into service provision organisations, which exist and work 
in partnership with State 
agencies. He considers that such a transformation has more or less subverted the 
mission of these community HIV/AIDS organisations, in that this strategy of 
partnership is in effect a means to subsume community action within the overall 
governmental response, which in turn has the effect of creating community based 
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HIV/AIDS organisations as new sites of governmental regulation of people with 
AIDS. This regulation is manifested through the idea of personal responsibility, in 
particular with respect to the issue of the further transmission of HIV (1996: 394- 
398). 
He argues that the mandate which community based AIDS service organisations 
have to empower their charges through educating them in the "skills and languages" 
necessary for responsible self-management of their condition, serves in fact to 
individualise the problem and the responsibility for its management, and to make 
those who adapt well to this form of personal responsibility amenable to governance 
through self-regulation in terms of the professional expertises of public health, 
forensic and medical discourse. Although he acknowledges that this shift has 
afforded some people more control over their health care, he is more concerned with 
the problematic possibility that community based AIDS organisations are ever 
increasingly being "pulled into" the regulatory practices which such discourses 
articulate (Kinsman 1996: 394-395,399-400). 
Kinsman argues that the "self-managing, self-regulating individuals with AIDS/HIV" 
which such practices produce will be less troublesome to social and medical agencies 
than people with AIDS who have not been reconstructed as responsible individuals. 
Worse than this, though, is the fact that these newly produced individuals are given 
responsibility for the management of their condition, but are not given the resources 
necessary to be responsible - things like social support, access to therapies, access to 
knowledge, access to good food, access to condoms. In this view, then, the notion of 
individual responsibility for one's condition as a person with AIDS is largely a sham; 
it makes the principal duty of those people with AIDS with greater resources to cause 
as few problems as possible for those professional agencies of regulation with which 
they should come into contact, and it enables the more repressive regulation of those 
who, for lack of resources, fail to be responsible. Such people can be reconstituted 
as "'bad', 'mad', 'sick', or not properly educated", each potential reconstruction 
affording the possibility of heavy-handed regulation of those concerned along 
criminal, psychiatric or public health lines. In short, the major effect of this trend 
towards 'responsibilizing' people with AIDS in this fashion is to divert attention away 
from the need to make changes at the level of governmental, medical and 
pharmaceutical responses to HIV/AIDS (1996: 398-401). 
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Certainly Kinsman's analysis of the situation in Canada is insightful. However, a 
number of important difficulties arise if one attempts to understand by means of his 
model the data employed in this thesis, which were derived largely from sources 
within the UK. Kinsman's model has governance being articulated through the 
rueful propagation, at the level of grass roots community organisations (a level which 
might prima facie be equated with the major exponents of 'alternative orthodoxy' 
discussed in this thesis), of the notion that people with AIDS must be individually 
responsible for the management of their condition. This self-regulation through 
responsible behaviour operates, he argues, over a variety of areas, but principally 
with respect to the transmission of HIV, having the effect that it makes people with 
AIDS into the problem; he holds that this responsibility is something which is 
constructed as peculiar to people who have already been infected, and that the 
"mythical 'general population"' is not be given the same responsibility - despite the 
fact that HIV is most often transmitted by people who are unaware of their infected 
status (1996: 394-395). 
The picture derived from the data in this analysis is somewhat different from what 
might be predicted from Kinsman's experience, however. For one thing, there is the 
very straightforward problem that the 'alternative orthodox' mode of thinking 
HIV/AIDS very clearly articulates the message that safer sex (as the principal form 
of HIV related behaviour for which individuals must be responsible) is something 
which is to be taken on board by every sexually active person. It does not construct 
HIV antibody positive people as somehow especially responsible in this way. Less 
straightforwardly, though, there is the problem that the axis upon which 'alternative 
orthodoxy' divides those who are central to its concern (members of the HIV/AIDS 
in/affected community) from its own mythical general population is 'affectedness' 
more than it is 'infectedness'. This fact serves to construct individuals as objects of 
government which are far more heterogeneous in their possibilities than those which 
are to be found in the (putatively self-evident and given-in-nature) category 'people 
with AIDS' which inhabits a similar space in Kinsman's account; for the subjects of 
'alternative orthodox' regulation are not defined by some supposedly extra-textual, 
embodied state, such as having been diagnosed HIV antibody positive, in the way 
that Kinsman assumes the subjects of regulation of Canadian community based 
HIV/AIDS related activity are. As has been discussed previously, not all people who 
are members of the 'alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS in/affected community are HIV 
antibody positive, and not all HIV antibody positive people are to be admitted to this 
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community, this policing process having the effect of ensuring that those who seek to 
enter this space, far from having their political and activist ambitions undermined by 
the process of regulation through individual responsibility (as Kinsman suggests is 
true in Canada), must, in order to enter, make exactly such political and activist 
ambitions central to their ethical projects of self - 'alternative orthodoxy' certainly 
constructs the ideal HIV/AIDS in/affected individual as responsible for him/herself, 
but makes it the height of irresponsibility for any such individual to fail to be 
appropriately politically aware and active. 
8.2.2 Levels of analysis 
It is possible that this contradiction is explicable simply in terms of differences of 
local conditions between Ontario and the UK. There is, however, another possibly 
more compelling explanation to consider, which revolves around the difference in 
the levels at which analysis was engaged by Kinsman and within this thesis. For 
although Kinsman talks about practices - governmental, medical, AIDS service 
organisation related - he does not go into them in any great detail, he does not 
describe the process by which is constituted the self-with-AIDS which is amenable to 
the forms of auto-regulation he outlines. He does not engage with the problem at a 
technical level of the sort which is apposite for this kind of enquiry (cf Rose 
1989: 218). 
Kinsman draws a picture of an idealised radically communal grass-roots response 
which has been corrupted and debased by the inclusion of ideas of individual 
responsibility. So it was, he argues, that ideas of social and mutual responsibility for, 
for example, safer sex, came to be converted by the influence of non-community 
professionals into the languages of the individual calculation of risk, displacing the 
need for the development of social sexualities, responsibilities which are held at a 
communal level, and regulatory technologies which reflect such conceptions - all 
exactly the sorts of things which comprise the 'radical undertow' in 'alternative 
orthodoxy' (Kinsman 1996: 396-397). This picture, though, begs an order of question 
which Kinsman leaves largely unanswered: how could such communal ethics be 
articulated technically? How would they be enabled and manifested? 
And should one attempt to address such issues oneself, what one finds is that, as was 
noted before, in a world where people are ineluctably made up as individuals of a 
sort which are amenable to forms of individualistic government, it must be at the 
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individual ethical level that notions of responsibility and consequent action are 
manifested. A community itself can behave responsibly, can have its own sexual 
practices and its own responsibilities, only at a rhetorical level. In order for that 
rhetoric to be turned into action, it must be articulated through ethical technologies 
which are applied to individuals, through which those individuals who comprise the 
community can be ethically regulated such that they conduct themselves 
appropriately to the (rhetorically) communal ethos. These are exactly the sorts of 
technologies which have been observed in this analysis - technologies which allow 
individuals to submit themselves, individually, to just such an ethos of community, 
within the terms of which they then proceed to regulate themselves, ethically and, 
still, as individuals. 
The picture given when the data are looked at at this level, then, is less of a 
transformation from a social/communal understanding of how to apprehend 
HIV/AIDS to an individual one, than of a struggle between two different visions of 
how to respond to HIV/AIDS individually, one born of discourses of community 
(and the individual's relationship to it) which have their roots in the politics of gay 
liberation, the other the inheritor of classical economic liberalism. Individual ethical 
regulation of members of the HIV/AIDS in/affected community, then, was not 
imposed upon community responses to HIV/AIDS in the way that Kinsman's model 
would suggest, but was always implicit in the forms of technologies of self which 
were available to both sides of the debate, the parameters and possibilities of which 
are a function of the epistemological and conceptual limits which characterise our 
age, of the episteme in which we live. Communal responsibility and action is 
imaginable only at the rhetorical level - to make it technical would require the 
constitution of a new form of subjectivity which is arguably beyond the bounds of 
what it is possible to think in the late twentieth century West, and certainly beyond 
the limits of thought established by 'alternative orthodoxy', notwithstanding its 
radical inclinations. 
Put simply, Kinsman's argument is that people with AIDS are regulated as 
individuals at a grass-roots level and this is a bad thing. Better terrain for HIV/AIDS 
related regulation, he argues, would be the discourses of social policy, of 
pharmaceutical research, and, in particular, of the latter's relationship to medical 
practice and treatment. He is not hopeful, though, of the possibility of effecting such 
a change in the site of regulation, because it would involve such a fundamental 
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challenge to those sedimented institutions (1996: 401). However, the making of 
exactly such challenges is precisely what the individually regulated HIV/AIDS 
in/affected subject of 'alternative orthodoxy' is created to be able to do. Kinsman is 
quite correct to warn of the dangers enabled by and often associated with individual 
governmentality, arguing that it directs attention away from structural questions such 
as access to social supports, access to treatment, access to nutrition, and so on, but he 
is wrong to assume that these dangers are the necessary results of the operation of 
such a technology. The problem is not in the fact of an individualised, governmental 
technology, but in its content and usage. 
8.3 Conclusions 
This study has endeavoured to look at HIV/AIDS in a way which is not common 
within the field of commentary on the syndrome, in that it has disavowed the idea 
that the object of study has an inherent given nature which can be revealed by 
sociological enquiry. HIV/AIDS is herein regarded as an uncertain phenomenon, one 
which is not exotic in and of itself, but one which must be made exotic in order to 
analyse it; the intention was not to observe and understand the 'real' strangeness of 
HIV/AIDS, but deliberately to construct the syndrome as strange, as part of a thought 
experiment whose aim was to address the difficulties with thought and being which 
viewing the disease in such fashion brings (cf Rajchman 1991; Woolgar 1988: 28). 
As such, the research created and has worked within an ethical heuristic of its own 
making. 
This approach has produced a number of findings, the status of which must be 
understood in terms of the methodology employed. If one looks at the syndrome in 
this way, then one can see: that there is a particular hegemonic way of thinking 
HIV/AIDS - the 'alternative orthodoxy' - which is not the reactionary, repressive 
discourse which is most often noted and criticised within HIV/AIDS commentary; 
that this discourse relies for its authority at least as much on the articulation of 
'authentic' experiential voices as it does on intellectual coherence; that this discourse 
articulates a number of political, moral and ontological truth obligations to which 
anyone who wishes to assume authority on the subject must submit; that this 
discourse, especially as manifested in HIV/AIDS related user texts, operates a variety 
of technologies of self which provide for an ideal HIV/AIDS in/affected subject who 
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also submits to these truth obligations; that such technologies of self comprise part of 
a wider ranging governmental mechanism, operating at the level of the individual. 
These findings can in turn be translated into a number of problems. For example: 
that the politico-morally laden nature of 'alternative orthodox' HIV/AIDS discourse 
has led to the rejection of some very likely effective approaches to reducing the 
spread of infection; that this same politico-moral nature operates a number of 
technologies of exclusion which disenfranchise certain of those who are infected 
with HIV or in some other way touched by AIDS; that 'alternative orthodox' 
discourse's dogmatisation of a particular scientific account of the problem of 
HIV/AIDS precludes certain forms of investigation into solutions to it. If thought on 
these issues were to be reconstructed around the insights which this research's 
peculiar viewpoint affords, then new benefits could surely be reaped. Precisely how 
this might be done is beyond the terms of reference of this work, however; to make 
such decisions would be to step back inside Burchell's goldfish bowl (1993: 276-277) 
(a right and proper thing to do, certainly, but not in pages such as these (cf Weber 
1948,1949)), a move which might, anyway, make these problems disappear - without 
the ethical frame of reference within which this research was undertaken, and which 
necessitates a certain detachment, these issues may simply cease to be difficulties. 
Notwithstanding this, however, one issue in particular does demand further 
consideration, and that is the fact that 'alternative orthodoxy' can be read through this 
form of analysis as operating an individualised governmental technology. This 
special attention is warranted due to the fact that such an observation is so much at 
odds with the averred nature and approaches of the 'alternative orthodox' way of 
thinking the syndrome, the notion that the 'best' modes of response to HIV/AIDS are 
communal ones being fundamental to it. Concern that such responses have become 
themselves infected with the virus of individualism is widespread. However, from 
the analytical vantage point taken herein, this worry would appear to be misplaced: 
for it seems that the great strength of 'alternative orthodoxy' is precisely in its 
successful reconfiguration of a territory which pre-existed it - the territory of 
individuality - into something which serves its own politico-moral aspirations. 
To 
repeat an important point, in a world where everyone is necessarily constituted as an 
individual anyway, what better way to get things done than by the reconstitution of 
that subjectivity such that the personal aims and ambitions of each reconstructed 
individual are in line with the political ends of the source of authority? 'Alternative 
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orthodoxy' has achieved precisely that - in using HIV/AIDS as a surface upon which 
to elaborate a new ethics of life-style for individuals (cf Foucault 1991: 343) it has 
ensured that a central part of the self-constitution and self-regulation of every good 
HIV/AIDS in/affected community member that s/he must work towards a resolution, 
favourable to the HIV/AIDS in/affected community, of exactly those sorts of 
structural questions which Kinsman argues such forms of governmentality 
marginalise. 
This brings us back the to the possibility which Rose posits for spaces of freedom to 
operate either as technologies of power or as technologies of resistance (Rose 
1992: 3). It was suggested above that with respect to HIV/AIDS this distinction was 
problematic, yet the claim that 'alternative orthodox' ethical mechanisms are an 
efficient way to achieve the political ends articulated by that mode of thought seems 
to raise the division again. Again, the resolution to this apparent contradiction is to 
be found in the matter of the levels at which the discourse operates. At the level of 
the epistemological configuration of our age, 'alternative orthodoxy' provides no 
resistance at all, and is in fact a function of, a reflection of, exactly the same 
mechanisms which enable our society, and which also comprise the conditions of 
possibility for neo-liberal governmental forms. At the concrete political level, 
however, such technologies of self provide an excellent means by which to articulate 
resistance, their efficiency guaranteed precisely because they are not problematic at 
the epistemological level. The politics of 'alternative orthodoxy' and of neo- 
liberalism are like two competing pieces of software, each creating and closing off 
certain possibilities, but both of which, nonetheless, rely on, and through using 
reinforce the necessity of, the same operating system. 
The ethical technologies of self found within 'alternative orthodoxy', then, can be 
seen as acts of magnificent pragmatism. They take the diverse multiplicity of 
responses to HIV/AIDS which are articulated by an already individualised 
population, and through providing a new focus for that individuality, by aligning 
people into an identity which is community-based and bounded, but is nonetheless 
still individual, by giving them a certain field of freedom, regulated by the 
discourses 
of expert authority 'alternative orthodoxy' provides, they unify those responses, and 
thereby create the solidarity necessary to engage in the struggle for resources, 
for 
support and so on. So when Kinsman asks "what alternatives can 
be developed to 
these strategies of regulation that can challenge and shift them in the direction of 
216 
meeting the needs of people living with AIDS/HIV...? " (1996: 405) he is asking the 
wrong question. The question which needs to be asked is how it is that the potentials 
for advancing the interests of HIV/AIDS in/affected people which already exist 
within these technologies can best be realised. 
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